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Abstract 
 
 
        It is well known that tax administration can be subject to an influence of political 
power, and bad tax administration may lead to an efficiency loss. However, both the 
extent and the mechanisms of the political intervention and the efficiency loss are still 
not fully understood in empirical works.  
        Using the Chinese Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms, digitized data on the 
turnover of prefectural secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party, and the County 
Public Finance Statistics Yearbook in China from the year 2000 to 2007, the three 
chapters in this Ph.D. thesis aim to contribute to our understanding of following three 
questions: 1. How do local government incentives affect tax enforcement and effective 
tax rate of VAT? 2. What is the role of local politicians in selective tax enforcement 
across industries? 3. To what extent does the dispersion in the effective VAT rate across 
firms lead to production efficiency loss via the channel of resource misallocation?  
        The results suggest that: 1. Weak local government incentives, rather than lack of 
information on tax base, lead to a low effective VAT rate in China. 2. There is an 
increasing favouritism in tax enforcement towards capital-intensive industries as the 
prefectural secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party stay longer in office. On the 
contrary, labour-intensive industries face tougher tax enforcement. 3.  A tax-neutral 
reform which eliminates the dispersion in VAT rates across firms in the same 4-digit 
industry produces a gain in aggregate TFP in the order of 7.9% of GDP on average in 
the period from 2000 to 2007.  
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Chapter 1
The Eﬀect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China∗
Abstract
How signiﬁcantly, and through what mechanisms, can taxation be constrained by
political incentives? Which factors can shape the local political incentives in institu-
tions with multi-level governments? This paper uses the abolition of the agricultural
tax in 2005 across China as a natural `ﬁscal squeeze' experiment to address these
questions. I show that the revenue loss of county governments were largely and
quickly oﬀset by tougher tax enforcement. In particular, counties increased eﬀective
VAT rates without substantial changes in statutory VAT rates and changes in the
reported tax base. This suggests that taxation capacity is not necessarily binding
and constrained by access to information on tax base, as has been highlighted in
many studies. There is a potentially large role for governments to endogeneously
determine on how aggressively to enforce the statutory taxes. The incentive for VAT
enforcement can be weakened, however, if the county: (1) receives a lower proportion
of total VAT revenues after sharing with prefectural and provincial governments; (2)
has a broader VAT tax base; or, (3) has more abundant sources of revenue from land
sales. These ﬁndings are consistent with a model of endogeneous tax enforcement
in presence of politicians' personal interests and tax competition in an institution of
multi-level governments.
∗The author is grateful to Francesco Caselli and Camille Landais for their supervision of this project
and other related topics, and especially thankful to Tim Besley, Kleven Kleven, and John Sutton for their
generous help and comments. Acknowledgements go to Johannes Spinnewijn, Torsten Persson, Ethan
Ilzetzki, Steve Pischke, Robin Burgess, Frank Cowell, Ronny Razin, Guy Michaels, Ximin Yue for their
suggestions. The author also appreciates the feedback from participants in Work-in-Progress Seminars
on Public Economics, Macroeconomics and Labour at LSE, and beneﬁts from discussion with Qing Zhu,
Shumin Yue, Qingwang Guo, Xiaoyong Cui, Bingyang Lv, Junxue Jia, and Jing Zhang. Special thanks
to Heng Yin and Liutang Gong for data supports. The author, of course, bears the responsibility for any
errors in the paper.
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1 Introduction
Poor countries are ﬁscally characterized by lower tax-to-GDP ratios, collecting less
than 20 per cent of GDP, while rich countries take up to half of their GDP in tax revenue
(Gordon and Li, 2009; Kleven, 2014; Besley and Torsten, 2014).
The reason why the tax-to-GDP ratio is low in poor countries continues to be in debate.
Recent theoretical studies argue that it can simply be a result of a lack of information.
Underlying causes may include informality, cash transactions, and the underground econ-
omy (Gordon and Li, 2009), or a lack of third-party reporting by large modern ﬁrms
(Kleven, et al., 2009). The role of information is also emphasized by a growing empirical
literature based on ﬁeld experiments or quasi-experiments, which highlight the importance
of tax administration and the role of third parties, suppliers, and consumers in revealing
information (Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Pomeranz, 2013; Naritomi, 2013).
Another strand of literature argues that real world tax administration is not only
constrained by a society's economic structure, but also determined by incentives shaped
by political institutions and power structures (Besley and Persson, 2013). Although the
importance of government taxation incentives has long been widely recognized, we still
lack a rigorous empirical understanding of which incentives are eﬀective, and through
what mechanisms they operate.1
This paper exploits the nation-wide abolition of the agricultural tax in China in 2005
as a natural `ﬁscal squeeze' experiment in which county governments suﬀered a severe
revenue loss. To meet their ongoing normal commitments to ﬁnance local services, county
governments were forced to raise public revenue. Using the cross county variations in
revenue loss has allows me to apply the standard diﬀ-in-diﬀ approach to identify the
eﬀect of local governments' incentives to enforce tax.
The results show that the agricultural tax revenue loss can be largely oﬀset by tougher
tax enforcement on other existing taxes in the same year of abolition. On average, the
total tax revenue net of agricultural tax rose by 10%. And total tax revenue was virtu-
ally unchanged. This suggests that Chinese counties do not face binding ﬁscal capacity
constraints. 2
To understand the role of incentives, this research particularly focuses on formal man-
ufacturing ﬁrms and their eﬀective VAT rate, which is deﬁned as the ratio of a ﬁrm's
payable VAT to their reported valued-added. This is distinct from the statutory VAT
1Khwaja et al. (2014) provide a recent inﬂuential study in this regard. They conduct a ﬁeld experiment
on property tax collectors in Pakistan and ﬁnd that performance-pay schemes can be a powerful device
to improve tax administration and increase tax revenue. Diﬀerent from the motivation of my study, their
research focuses more on the trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts from tax revenue and potential costs in social
dissatisfaction and corruption.
2This paper reveals how the governments taxation respond to an adverse ﬁscal shock in the short-term.
It complements Besley and Torsten (2009), who study the long-run response of states' taxation capacity
to more drastic adverse shock such as external wars.
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rate, which is the rate of tax that ﬁrms should legally pay. I ﬁnd that the eﬀective VAT
rate increased on average by 8% due to the abolition of the agricultural tax. This implies
that tax collection by county governments and tax authorities is not strictly constrained
by access to information. I also show that this change is not driven by a change in reported
value added: authorities are able to increase tax revenue by imposing higher eﬀective tax
rates on the reported tax base.3
Finally, this research examines several factors in an institution of multi-level govern-
ments that may aﬀect the incentives to enforce VAT. The results show that the incentives
could be attenuated if the county: (1) receives a lower proportion of total VAT revenues
after sharing with prefectural and provincial governments; (2) has a broader VAT tax
base; or, (3) has more abundant sources of revenue from land sales. The ﬁrst ﬁnding
conﬁrms that, in an institution of multi-level government, tax-sharing system does shape
the tax incentives of lower level of governments. The other two ﬁndings suggest that, due
to tax competition and local politicians' personal interests originated from corruption
(Chen, 2015b) or GDP-based promotion scheme in China, local governments are more
liable to loose tax enforcement once they are more capable to mobilize ﬁscal revenue.
The striking contradiction between easy access to information and prevalent weak
VAT enforcement in China oﬀers a unique opportunity to study the role of political
incentives in tax administration. On the one hand, VAT has long since been lauded
for its advantage in terms of information revelation, as it leaves a paper trail along the
supply chain (Pomeranz, 2013). In China, VAT is under the administration of the State
Administration of Taxation (SAT) which aims to operate uniformly across the whole
country and independently of subnational governments. With the help of the Nationwide
VAT Special Invoices Online Cross-checking System, accessing relevant information is
a simple procedure.4 In addition, ﬁrms in the current study are large and formal and
closely monitored by governments.5 While on the other, VAT in China had not been well
3To understand this, deﬁne the taxation ratio as tax payment/true tax base. The taxation ratio can
be divided into two components: (1) report rate = reported tax base/true tax base; and, (2) eﬀective
tax rate = tax payment/reported tax base. Given the true tax base, tax revenue can be increased,
either by cracking down on the under-reporting of tax base, or by raising the eﬀective tax rate. Most
recent empirical studies mainly focus on the ﬁrst margin and highlight the role of information (Slemrod
et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Pomeranz, 2012). Their typical approach is to identify the variation of
reported tax base in ﬁeld experiments, under the assumption that the true tax base does not change with
the treatment. This paper focuses on the eﬀective tax rate.
4The Nation-wide VAT Special Invoices Online Cross-checking System was set up in 2001. With
this system, tax authorities can easily identify a huge variety of relevant information, including name of
products or services in a transaction, quantity, value, and applicable VAT rate, and names of buyers and
sellers, and so on.
5Normally, these big manufacturing ﬁrms are known as above-scale industrial ﬁrms. Before 2006, a
manufacturing ﬁrm in China is deﬁned by the Bureau of Statistics as above scale if it is a state-owned
enterprise or its sales volume is greater than ﬁve million Yuan (approximately $810,000 USD). From 2007,
a state-owned enterprise with a sales volume lower than ﬁve million Yuan is not known as an above-scale
ﬁrm. From January 2011, the threshold increased from ﬁve million Yuan to twenty million Yuan. The
value-added of all above-scale ﬁrms accounts for about 90% of the total GDP of the manufacturing sector.
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enforced. The empirical facts suggest that the eﬀective VAT rate is not only commonly
low across China, but also diﬀers across regions.6 Weak VAT enforcement, probably due
to corruption at local level (Chen, 2015b), arising from local politicians' career concern, or
driven by local tax competition, leaves great opportunities for subnational governments
to raise VAT revenue by increasing the eﬀective VAT rate.
This paper provides a direct contribution to the literature on the role of political
incentives in tax enforcement. Most of the existing literature study the incentives of
tax enforcement from perspectives of tax inspectors and tax administration. Besley and
McLaren (1993) study the incentive role of wages for tax inspectors. Khwaja et al. (2014)
study how performance-based payments could stimulate tax inspectors' eﬀorts. Slemrod
et al. (2001) ﬁnd that audit threats deter tax misreporting behaviour. The role of infor-
mation has been highlighed in literature, which ﬁnd relevant parties, including product
consumers in VAT (Pomeranz, 2013), third parties in income tax (Kleven et al., 2009,
2011; Kleven, 2014), ﬁnal consumers (Naritomi, 2013), or workers (Kumler et al., 2013),
can play an important role in information disclosure.7 In addition, information can also
explain the unique taxation structure in developing countries, and the formal ﬁnancial
sector is key to information access (Gordon and Li, 2009). This paper also aims to pro-
vide useful micro empirical evidence to recent studies that stress the interaction between
economic development, tax systems and political institutions (Besley and Persson, 2009,
2011, 2013, 2014).
Additionally, the ﬁndings of this paper are consistent with a number of cross-country
studies which claim that VAT administration is not eﬀectively enforced in developing
countries (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Aizenman and Yothin, 2008). The VAT enforce-
ment problem in China and its political determinants were initially documented by Chen
(2015a, 2015b). Finally, this paper links to a huge literature on tax evasion, including
the comprehensive review papers (Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002;
Slemrod, 2007) and empirical evidence in China (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Cai and Liu,
2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional
background. Section 3 interprets the conceptual framework. Section 4 describes the
datasets and measurements of the main variables. Section 5 introduces the empirical
strategy and reports the main results. Section 6 studies the heterogeneity in incentives
of VAT enforcement and the eﬀects on total tax revenue and other government revenues.
Section 7 discusses alternative explanations and conducts a variety of robustness checks.
Section 8 concludes.
6For details, refer to Figure D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D.
7Of course, the role of the relevant party in information revelation cannot be exaggerated. For example,
the eﬀectiveness of third party information can be weakened if taxpayers can substitute misreporting to
less veriﬁable margins (Carrillo, et al, 2014).
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2 Institutional Background
2.1 VAT Administration
Two Separations in Government and Incentives for VAT Enforcement
The task of collecting tax cannot usually be eﬃciently delegated due to two separa-
tions in the public sector. First, there is a separation between governments and taxation
administrators. The delegation of tax collecting by the former to the latter generally
leads to a moral hazard problem. Second, there is a separation between national and sub-
national governments. Conﬂicts in tax sharing or vertical tax competition are common
between diﬀerent levels of governments.
Figure 2.1: Four Players in VAT Administration in China
 National Government 
State Admin. of Taxation 
(SAT) 
Sub-national Governments 
(prov, prefecture, county) 
Task delegation: 
Tax administration 
Task delegation: 
GDP growth, Employment 
Firms 
VAT:  GDP, employment 
VAT
VAT: (1 - ) 
Intervention 
Reduce VAT 
Figure 2.1 sketches the institutional background of VAT administration in China, with
both types of separation in place. The ﬁgure shows that VAT administration in China is
delegated to the State Administration of Taxation, which is under the direct leadership
of the national government. The national government also generally delegates many
executive tasks, such as GDP growth and employment, to sub-national governments.
This leads to intense horizontal competition between sub-national governments across
regions (Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li, and Zhou, 2005). As a result, a race to the
bottom in tax is inevitable. In addition, VAT is a sharing tax in China, with the national
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government obtaining 75% (α in Figure 2.1) and sub-national governments, including
provincial, prefectural, and county, taking 25%. This further intensiﬁes horizontal tax
competition. In an institutional setting like China, where local governments have no
legislative right to set tax rates, the tax base, or to create a new tax, they have incentives
to lean on the tax administration to lower the local eﬀective VAT rate.8
Nevertheless, a weak incentive does not mean that local governments have no incentive
at all to enforce VAT. Despite the low sharing ratio, VAT is still the second biggest source
of tax revenue after business tax for subnational governments.9 Also, VAT is the biggest
source of tax revenue in about 1/5 of all counties (in 1/10 of all provinces).10
Subnational Government and VAT Administration
The central government controls the personnel appointments for the State Adminis-
tration of Taxation (SAT) and its fund is allotted via a vertical administrative system.
In spite of this, local governments can still exert enormous inﬂuence, either directly or
indirectly, on VAT inspectors.
In the ﬁrst place, the chief of a local oﬃce of the SAT is under the direct supervision
of the party secretary in the same jurisdiction.11
In addition, there are several other indirect ways for subnational governments to in-
tervene in VAT enforcement. First, the capability of the SAT in tax law enforcement
is limited by local departments of Public Security, which are under tight control of lo-
cal governments.12 Second, the local government can help the SAT with issues such as
obtaining land for oﬃce buildings, schooling for children, local hospitals for health care,
8Studies have shown that local governments in China oﬀer preferential corporate income tax treatment
in order to attract ﬁrms to invest and stay in their jurisdictions (for example, see Wu, 2009). Anecdotal
evidences shows that VAT could also be used as a tool in tax competition.
9During the period of 2000 - 2007, VAT accounts for about 15% of the county government tax revenue
(about 12% at province level), and business tax is about 25% at the county level (18% at province level).
10Roughly speaking, VAT in China is a tax on value-added in the manufacturing sector. Also, business
tax is the one on turnover in the service sector. The third largest source of local tax revenue is corporate
income tax on proﬁts in both the manufacturing and service sectors, which accounts for about 7% of the
county governments' tax revenue.
11China is under the governance of a hierarchical bureaucratic system, from central government at the
top, followed by province, prefecture, county and village/town. At each level of government, there is an
appointed secretary of the Communist Party who is the most powerful local oﬃcial. At the same time,
for each level of government, except village/town, there is a corresponding Nation Bureau of Taxation
oﬃce (or the headquarters at the central government level). The chief of the local oﬃce of the State
Administration of Taxation is appointed by the headquarters at the central level or by the oﬃce at the
upper level of the State Administration of Taxation. However, in almost all cases the chief of the local
oﬃce of State Administration of Taxation is also a party secretary of the local oﬃce. Within the system
of the Communist Party of China, he/she is under the direct leadership of the party secretary in the
same locality. For example, the chief/party secretary of a county oﬃce of the SAT is led by the county
secretary of Communist Party. The latter can considerably aﬀect the promotion and political career of
the former.
12For example, in China, the SAT is entitled to crack down on fake invoices only with the help of
the police. Therefore, the SAT can do nothing with a fake invoice if the local police are not willing to
collaborate.
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and so on. Third, it is openly known that the SAT receives a subsidy from the local
government in order to improve its working conditions, or for any other reason. Fourth,
tax administrators have their own dirty laundry. As a last resort, selective anti-corruption
is a credible threat by local governments against a tax administrator once he/she refuses
to cooperate.
To sum up, although the de jure VAT rates are legislated at a national level, local
party secretaries and other local oﬃcials can inﬂuence the de facto tax rate of a ﬁrm.13
Ways to Lower the Eﬀective VAT Rate
There are many ways to reduce the eﬀective VAT rate. Here I introduce four possible
cases. First, local governments can demand that the SAT turns a blind eye to ﬁrms using
fake invoices, which are rampant across China.14 In some extreme cases, local governments
even subsidize and encourage local ﬁrms to use fake invoices.15 Second, local governments
can directly order the local oﬃce of the SAT to enforce a lower VAT rate on a ﬁrm, if the
local oﬃcials are powerful enough.16 Third, slack tax enforcement by local governments
could be conducted through nominal delayed tax payment, so that the actual payment
of a ﬁrm is smaller than its real tax liability. This delayed tax payment could be carried
forward and not paid out unless demanded by governments. Fourth, although not quite
as popular, some tax farmings are used in VAT collection. This makes room for ﬂexible
tax enforcement.17
13Chen (2015b) studies the role of the prefectural secretary of the Communist Party in selective en-
forcement on VAT across industries.
14Most of the VAT special invoices are not in fact fake. Actually, they are authentic invoices simply with
a fake transaction or a fake recorded amount. There are many informal companies in China specialising
in the sale of fake invoices. Figure D.4 in Appendix D shows records of my conversations with fake invoice
dealers through text messages on the eligibility, price and sources of the VAT special invoices.
15Anecdotal evidence shows that this type of case is common in many regions. A case is currently being
brought to the court in Jiang Xi province in which a company is being charged with issuing and selling
fake VAT special invoices to other ﬁrms. The company under charge is said to be subsidized by the local
government. For another example, the SAT announced the eight biggest cases of tax law violation in
2013. All of these cases were related to fake VAT special invoices. In every case, the tax evaded is above
one hundred million RMB yuan (about $15 million USD). The highest eﬀective tax rate a ﬁrm paid in
one of these cases was only 0.11% (Xinhua Net, October 21, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-
10/21/c_117804571.htm)
16This case is rare but not impossible. For example, anecdotal evidence reveals that in 2012, Samsung
Electronics invested in a project worth ¿7b USD in Xi'an, the capital city of Shannxi Province. To attract
the gigantic FDI, Mr. Zhao, the provincial secretary of the CPC at the time, agreed that a VAT rate of
11% could be applied to this project. Of course, disputes over the unlawful tax rate followed between the
Shannxi government and the SAT. The central government had to step in, and ﬁnally Shannxi government
won the case. It turned out to be a gentleman's agreement through private bargaining between the local
government, the SAT and the central government.
17Tax farming is called Bao shui in Chinese. It means tax collection is contracted with tax payers
who are requried to make tax payment on a basis of a pre-determined tax base, rather than the statutory
tax base.
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2.2 Agricultural Tax Reform
Agricultural taxation in China before the 2005-reform includes three types of taxes:
Agricultural Tax, Agricultural Specialty Tax and Livestock Tax. These taxes are levied
on various agricultural products. The tax-payer is an organisation or an individual who
obtains revenue from the taxable agricultural products.18 The agricultural taxation is a
local tax and the revenue is mainly shared by county and prefectural governments.
The purpose of the central government in abolishing agricultural taxation was to relieve
the burden of rural farmers and mitigate rural social unrest, which has been violent and
rampant since the 1990s. To pave the way for the agricultural tax reform, and guarantee
local government expenditure on education and government regular operation, the central
government decided to subsidize local governments through an inter-governmental trans-
fer/subsidy. The amount of subsidy is based on a formula and subsidy payments began
in 2001.19
All agricultural taxes were abolished by the Standing Committee of the 10th National
People's Congress from January 1st, 2006. Nevertheless, under the pressure and order
of the central government, local governments nearly stopped collecting all these taxes in
2005, even before the law was formally passed by the national congress.20 Therefore, the
18The Agricultural Tax is a type of tax levied on agricultural products, including grain, cotton, plant
oil and sugar, among others. In legal terms, the Agricultural Tax is calculated based on the formula:
Agriculture Tax= Area of Land × Output per Unit of Land × Tax Rate. . In practice, the output of
crops per unit of land stems from a historical level in the early 1960s and did not change after that time,
rather than using the actual output of current year. Therefore, the agriculture tax is literally more like a
tax on land, rather than on agriculture products. After the 1990s, the agriculture tax was generally paid
in cash based on the current price of crops rather than being paid in kind. The tax rate is determined
by local governments, varying between 13% and 17%. The country average is 15.5%.
The Agricultural Specialty Tax is similar to the agriculture tax but levied on only some selected agricul-
ture products, such as tobacco, tea, fruits, aquatic products, animal hides and furs, mushrooms, among
others. The agriculture specialty tax is calculated based on the market value of the product, and the tax
rate varies for diﬀerent types of agriculture products. Similarly, the Livestock Tax is levied on livestock
including horses, cows, sheep and goats and camels. The livestock tax is calculated either based on the
market value of livestock or based on the number of herds.
19The factors used in the subsidy formula is information mainly relevant prior to the subsidy being
made, including local expenditure on education, health, road construction, militia training, as well as the
number of villages and households under the poverty line, and the number of students in primary and
high school. In the whole country, the transfer from 2001 to 2005 respectively is (in Billion RMB Yuan):
8, 24.5, 30.5, 52.3, 65.4. 6. The formula for subsidy/transfer is as follows: subsidy = township transfer
+ village transfer + education fund transfer, where: township transfer = (village education expenditure
+ birth control expenditure + poverty alleviation expenditure + village road construction and repair
expenditure + militia training expenditure + other funds expenditures + reduction in slaughter tax +
reduction in agricultural specialty tax  increase in agricultural tax) × transfer coeﬃcient. And the
transfer coeﬃcient = (ratio of agricultural tax revenue to total tax revenue / national-wide average ratio
of agricultural tax revenue to total tax revenue × weight + ratio of basic public expenditure to total tax
revenue / national-wide average ratio of basic public expenditure to total tax revenue × weight) × ﬁscal
burden ratio of central government. And the village transfer = wage and compensation of village public
servants + village poor household subsidy + administrative and oﬃce expenses. Readers can refer to Li
and Xu (2006) for details.
20Although some local governments still collected agricultural taxes in 2005, it is very small and amounts
only to 8.9% of collection in 2004. In empirical work, the author alternatively chose year 2006 as the
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exact timing of the revenue loss was somewhat of a surprise for local governments, even
though they had known since the early 2000s that the tax would be abolished sooner or
later.
It should be noted that the agricultural tax is collected by the Local Administration
of Taxation, and that VAT is administered by the State Administration of Taxation; two
independent taxation bureaus. The former is under the direction of local governments,
while the latter is led by the central government. The staﬀ of the Local Administration
of Taxation would not be re-assigned to the State Administration of Taxation following
the abolition of the agricultural tax.
3 Conceptual Framework
Why does the abolition of agricultural tax serve as a good natural experiment to
identify the impact on tax enforcement? What is the underlying economic mechanism?
These questions may be answered by a model of optimal taxation with many types of tax
available and taxation costs to be incurred.
The main mechanism of the model is the tension between beneﬁts of public funds
and taxation cost. The latter includes the administrative cost, deadweight loss, and local
politicians' personal loss. The ﬁrst two costs are common in the taxation theory. The
third cost is emphasized in this paper. It is rooted from local politicians' personal interests
due to corruption or career promotion, or because of jurisdictional tax competition under
China's political institution. And it mainly comes from the fact that the likelihood of
the promotion of local politicians is positively related to local GDP performance in China
(Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li, and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011), and higher tax may hurt
investment and GDP growth.
In this section, I only sketch the model and its predictions relevant to my empirical
work. Model details and rigorous technical proofs of predictions can be found in Appendix
A.
Suppose the public funds T can bring beneﬁts B(T ) to local governments, with
B′(T ) > 0, and B
′′
(T ) < 0. Without loss of generality, I assume there are only three
types of taxes to ﬁnance the funds, with each type of tax bearing a certain taxation cost
denoted by Ci(Ti), i = 0, 1, 2, with C
′
i(Ti) > 0, and C
′′
i (Ti) > 0. Empirically, we can think
of these three types of taxes respectively as agricultural tax, VAT, and land sales revenue.
Of course, they can be generalized to other taxes or public revenues depending on the
scenarios under study.
In this model, the marginal taxation costs C
′
i(Ti) are predominantly aﬀected by three
reform year in addtion to the baseline regression with 2005 as reform year. The results in both cases are
consistent.
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types of costs: (1) the administrative costs, (2) the eﬃciency loss due to tax distortions,
and, (3) the cost of tax base loss to local politicians, for instance, due to political pro-
motion, horizontal tax competition between jurisdictions, or for other reasons. Appendix
A presents details of how the political promotion and tax competition aﬀect the taxation
cost Ci(Ti).
Figure 3.1: Eﬀect of Abolition of Agriculture Tax
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The optimal condition requires that the marginal costs of any tax should be equal to
the marginal beneﬁts of total public funds. That is,
B
′
(T ) = C
′
i(Ti) ,∀i = 0, 1, 2 (3.1)
The optimal condition (3.1) can be depicted by the left graph of Figure 3.1, where
MB(T ) indicates the marginal beneﬁt, and MCi(T ) (i = 0, 1, 2) are marginal cost of
taxation respectively for three types of taxes. MCs(T ) curve is the aggregate marginal
cost of total public funds T . It is the horizontal aggregation of all the MCi(T ) curves.
The optimal total public funds Ts is determined by the intersection point E between
MB(T ) and MCs(T ) curve. Given MCs(Ts), the optimal amount of each tax Ti is equal
to MC−1i (MCs(Ts)), where MC
−1
i (·) is the inverse function of MCi(·). That is, tax
revenue T1, T2, and T3 are set so that all marginal costs are equalized.
Suppose tax-0 (the agricultural tax) now has to abolished. What is its impact on the
enforcement of other taxes and the mobilisation of other sources of public revenue? How
can this impact be aﬀected by other relevant factors. These questions can be answered
by the following predictions based on the model.
The ﬁrst question can be answered by Prediction 1 as below.
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Prediction 1 (Abolition of Tax) Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and no new type of
tax can be introduced, then the government would strengthen enforcement on existing taxes
and raise more revenue from other available sources.
Crude graphical proof of prediction 1 can be demonstrated by the right panel of Figure
3.1. After the abolition of tax-0, the aggregate marginal cost curve MCs(Ts) should
shift leftward, pushing the equilibrium from point E to point E ′. This is because the
marginal beneﬁt of public funds rises due to revenue loss. Given rising marginal beneﬁt,
the government now has a stronger incentive to raise more revenue from existing taxes,
even though it would be more costly to do so. In the end, both T2 and T3 increase.
Generally, the total tax revenue Ts would decrease (or not change) if the marginal beneﬁt
curve MB(T ) is downward sloping (or vertical).
For the second question, I only consider three factors relevant to the empirical study:
(1) tax sharing ratio of subnational governments;21 (2) size of tax base; and, (3) marginal
cost of other public funds. These three factors associate Prediction 2, 3, and 4, respec-
tively.
Prediction 2 (Tax Sharing Ratio) Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and tax-1's eﬀective
tax rate τ1 increases, then τ1 would rises by less if the local government had a lower sharing
ratio in tax-1.
The intuition of Prediction 2 is simple. A lower tax sharing ratio implies that local
governments have to collect more total tax revenue from local ﬁrms in order to obtain a
given amount of tax revenue. Therefore, a lower tax sharing ratio dis-incentivizes the local
governments to enforce tax because the taxation cost for each Yuan of local governments'
tax revenue would be greater.
Prediction 3 (Size of Tax Base) Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and tax-1's eﬀective
tax rate τ1 increases, then τ1 would rises by less if the tax base y1 is greater in tax-1.
Prediction 3 is quite intuitive. What governments care about is total public funds. To
raise a certain amount of revenue, they only need to increase the tax rate by a smaller
amount if the tax base is larger.
Prediction 4 (Marginal Cost of Other Public Funds) Suppose that tax-0 is abolished
and tax-1's eﬀective tax rate τ1 increases, then τ1 would rise by less if the marginal change
of marginal cost (that is,C
′′
2 (T2)) of other funding sources is smaller.
The rationale behind Prediction 4 is similar to that of Prediction 3. What governments
care about is total public funds. They do not have to squeeze too much revenue from one
21Tax sharing is common in multi-level governments. For example, the VAT tax in China is a sharing
tax. For 100 Yuan of VAT paid by a ﬁrm located in a county, 75 Yuan goes to the central government, the
remaining 25 Yuan is divided between the provincial, prefectural and the county governments. Generally,
the tax sharing ratio of a county government is determined at the subnational level. It therefore varies
across provinces. Its geographic variation provides an opportunity to study the eﬀect of the tax sharing
ratio of a county government and its incentive to enforce tax. After all, county governments are at the
grassroots level; their incentives can critically aﬀect the tax enforcement. Readers can refer to Section
6.1 and Appendix B for details.
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tax if they are actually able to mobilize revenue from other less costly sources.
4 Data and Main Variables of Interest
4.1 Data Description
This paper employs two datasets: (1) the Annual Survey of Industrial Production
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2000-2007); and, (2) the County
Public Finance Statistics Yearbook of China (2000-2007).
The Annual Survey of Industrial Production includes all state-owned ﬁrms and non-
state owned ﬁrms with annual sales of more than 5 million RMB yuan (approximately
$800,000USD). I use data from 2000 to 2007. The number of ﬁrms increases from about
66,000 to 168,000 during the sample period after dropping bad observations.22 Information
on each ﬁrm includes a 4-digit industry code, ownership, county-level region code, value-
added, sales revenue and tax payments including VAT, corporate income tax, business
tax and other minor local taxes.
The County Public Finance Statistics Yearbook of China (2000 - 2007) includes gov-
ernment revenue and government expenditure at county and prefecture levels. In this
paper, we are interested in the following variables: (1) tax revenue; (2) total revenue
(including oﬀ-budget revenue); (3) total expenditure (including oﬀ-budget expenditure);
(4) agricultural taxation revenue; (5) subsidies for agricultural taxation reform; (6) total
population; and, (7) total GDP.
All the summary statistics of the main variables are reported in Table 1. It should be
noted that Panel A reports the county-(2-digit) industry-year level data used for regres-
sions. The data is collapsed from the ﬁrm level data of the Annual Survey of Industrial
Production.
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Insert Here)
4.2 Measurement of Main Variables
4.2.1 Eﬀective VAT Rate
I construct the eﬀective VAT rate of a ﬁrm f in year t as:
Effective V AT ratef,t =
Payble V AT f,t
V alue addedf,t
(4.1)
22I drop three types of observations: (1) the observation with empty cell, and (2) the observation
with non-positive value for capital stock, labor input, value-added and wage compensation, and (3) the
observation with value-added less than the wage (even without adjustment in wage, value-added in many
ﬁrms are also less than the wage compensation).
12
For notational convenience, I will ignore subscripts f and t hereafter for all relevant
variables without causing confusion. The eﬀective VAT rate deﬁned in (4.1) can be
further written as τ˜
s·S˜−τ˜m·M˜
S−M , where S˜ and M˜ are the sales and intermediate inputs used
to calculate the payable VAT. Due to tax evasion or other reasons, S˜ and M˜ may diﬀer
from S andM , which are used to calculate ﬁrms value-added. τ˜ s and τ˜m are the tax rates
actually applied for sales and intermediate inputs, respectively. They could diﬀer from
the statutory tax rates τ s and τm. In the data, only τ˜ s · S˜ and τ˜m · M˜ are observable.
It can be shown that the variation of the eﬀective VAT rate may come from four
sources: (1) τ˜
s·S˜−τ˜m·M˜
τs·S−τm·M due to tax enforcement or tax evasion; (2) statutory input VAT
rate τm and output VAT rate τ s ;23 (3) input-output ratio M/S; (4) export-sales ratio
E/S.24
Several caveats should be noted with the measurement of eﬀective VAT rate in Ex-
pression (4.1). First, because only τ s · S˜ and τm ·M˜ are observable, we cannot distinguish
the exact manner of tax evasion by manipulating tax rate (τm or τ s) or by tax base (M˜
or S˜). Second, the variation of the eﬀective VAT rate may come from the manipulation
of reported value-added, that is, the denominator in Expression (4.1), rather than from
tax evasion through the numerator. I will test the possibility of manipulation of reported
value-added in Section 7.
4.2.2 Revenue Loss from Agriculture Tax Abolition
Although the agricultural taxation has already been a very small source of tax revenue
in early 2000s, it was still, especially at the county level, an important part of local
government tax revenue.25 During 2000 - 2004, the agricultural taxation revenue on
average accounted for around 12% of the county government tax revenue. Despite the
subsidy for agricultural tax reform from the central government, the revenue loss incurred
by the reform is still considerable to county governments.
23The statutory rate varies because certain sectors or activities are taxed at diﬀerent rates, and ﬁrms
diﬀer in their input-output structure or to the extent to which they engage in activities subject to special
tax treatment.
24To understand sources of variation in the eﬀective VAT rate, I decompose it into two components:
Effective V AT rate = τ˜
s·S˜−τ˜m·M˜
τs·S−τm·M · τ
s·S−τm·M
S−M (4.2)
where τs · S − τm ·M is the payable VAT calculated based strictly on the tax code.
The ﬁrst component on the right-hand side of Expression (4.2), τ˜
s·S˜−τ˜m·M˜
τs·S−τm·M , reﬂects the ratio of actual
VAT and statutory VAT payments. The second component , τ
s·S−τm·M
S−M , can be re-written as τ
s +
(τs − τm) (S/M − 1)−1, which implies that the variation in the statutory rates τs and τm, as well as the
input-output ratio M/S, could potentially be sources of variation in the eﬀective VAT rate. If the ﬁrm
exports goods worth E, then τs in Expression (4.2) should be replaced with τs − τe · (E/S), where τe is
the post-rebate statutory VAT rate for exports. In this case, the ratio of export to sales is an additional
source of variation.
25For example, in 2001, the agriculture taxation was 28.6 billion RMB Yuan (approximately $4.67m
USD) for the whole country, accounting for only 1.87% of total tax revenue of China (revenue of central
government and local governments in total).
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In this paper, I propose the following measurement of a revenue loss to each county c
due to the abolition of agricultural taxation:26
Agrc =
(Agr Tax Revenuec,2000−2004+Subsidyc,2000−2004)
Total Tax Revenuec,2000−2004
− Subsidyc,2005−2007
Total Tax Revenuec,2005−2007
(4.3)
On the right-hand side, Xc,2000−2004 (Xc,2005−2007) is the average of variable X in county
c in a year between 2000 and 2004 (2005 and 2007). Agr Tax Revenue is the agricultural
tax revenue. Subsidy is the formula-based central government transfer associated with
the agricultural taxation reform and received at county level.27 Total Tax Revenue is
the total budgetary tax revenue, including VAT, corporate income tax, business tax and
others, while oﬀ-budget revenue is not included.28
5 Empirical Strategy and Results
5.1 Motivating Facts
The nationwide abolition of agricultural tax in 2005 generated a variation of tax rev-
enue loss from two dimensions. Over time, most counties suﬀered a net revenue loss.
Across counties, the intensity of the revenue loss varied. The variation over time and
across counties allows for the standard Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ method to identify the impact of agri-
cultural tax abolition on tax enforcement.29
Given China's immense size and its geographical heterogeneity, it is obviously more
plausible to use the variation within comparable locality rather than the variation across
the whole country. In this paper, I choose to compare counties within the same prefecture.
30
26Apparently, measurements of such a revenue loss are not unique. In Section 7, I will use alternative
measurements for robustness checks.
27Refer to Section 2.2 for details of the subsidy. Figure D.5 in Appendix D shows that the subsidy began
in 2002. No matter whether or not we include the subsidy into agriculture taxation as local government
revenue, it is clear that local governments suﬀered a revenue loss in year 2005. We can also use a broader
measurement of subsidy by also including subsidies due to abolition of agricultural specialty tax and
reduction of agricultural tax rate, which started from year 2004. Due to lack of data in year 2007, the
author does not use this measurement in calculating Agrc in this paper. However, using the data from
2000 - 2006, a robustness check shows that Agrc adopted in the paper is highly correlated with the Agrc
using the broader measurement of subsidy, and the main regression results do not signiﬁcantly change
with alternative measurement of Agrc.
28In China, the local government can also raise revenue through other non-tax sources such as fees and
local funds, or selling land and public assets such as state-owned enterprises.
29Of course, the local government in China can also raise revenue through other non-tax sources such
as fees and local funds, or selling the land as well as public assets such as state-owned enterprises.
30In China, there are about 3,000 counties and 300 prefectures in 31 provinces (including Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqin as municipalities under direct administration of national government).
On average, there are about 3 million people in each prefecture. Its area is approximately equal to a
square of 180 kilometres. Nation-wide cross-county distribution of revenue loss is displayed in Figure
D.5 (in histogram) and in Figure D.6 (in map). Within-prefecture cross-county distribution is shown in
Figure D.7 (in histogram) and in Figure D.8 (in map with Aba Prefecture in Sichuan Province as an
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The key assumption of the Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ method is that the control and treatment group
should follow parallel trends before the treatment takes place. Also, the change of treat-
ment group trend relative to that of the control group after treatment was thus identiﬁed
as the treatment eﬀect.
Firstly, I divide all counties into two groups based on a speciﬁed threshold in the
intensity of revenue loss deﬁned by Expression (3.3) after controlling for the prefecture-
year ﬁxed eﬀects. I tentatively propose the median of as the threshold. Counties above
(below) the median are treatment (control) group. To make a comparison, the eﬀective
VAT rates of both groups are normalized to zero in the year 2000. Then I plot the time
proﬁle for both groups. The ﬁgure suggests that a parallel trends assumption holds well
before the abolition of agricultural tax. After 2005, something seems to have happened so
that the parallel pattern broke down and there is a relative increase in eﬀective VAT for
the treatment group.31 As a robustness check, I also set the 1st quartile of the intensity
of the revenue loss as the threshold. The time proﬁle of the eﬀective VAT rate is plotted
in Figure D.10 and D.11 in Appendix D.
Figure 5.1: Eﬀective VAT Rate over Time (Grouping by Median)
example).
31The time proﬁle of the original data is plotted in Figure D.9 in Appendix D.
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Figure 5.2: Change of Eﬀective VAT Rate across Counties
If the change of the eﬀective VAT rate after 2005 shown in Figure 5.1 is caused by
the abolition of agricultural tax, then the magnitude of this change should be positively
related to the intensity of revenue loss in each county. Therefore, we should expect a
relative rise in the pre-post change in the eﬀective VAT rate for counties suﬀering greater
revenue loss.
This positive relationship is depicted in Figure 5.2, where the horizontal axis is the
revenue loss deﬁned by Expression (4.3), and the vertical axis is the pre-post change of
the eﬀective VAT rate for each county measured by the diﬀerence between the average
eﬀective VAT rate of period 2005 - 2007 and the average of 2000 - 2004.
5.2 Empirical Strategy
For suggestive purpose, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show that the variations of the eﬀec-
tive VAT rate are correlated with revenue loss due to the agricultural tax abolition, both
over time and across regions. In this section, I employ a standard Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ regression
to identify the impact of tax revenue loss on the eﬀective VAT rate.
The regression of Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ can be speciﬁed as below:
τc,p,t = α+ βc + ηp,t + γ · Postt + θ · Postt ·Agrc + ρ ·Xc,t + c,p,t (5.1)
where the outcome variable τc,p,t is the eﬀective VAT rate. The subscript c, p, t are county,
prefecture, and year, respectively.
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Postt is the dummy variable indicating the year pre and post the reform, taking value
one for year 2005 and after. Agrc, measured by Expression (4.3), is the revenue loss to
county c.
Parameter of interest is θ, capturing the response of the eﬀective VAT rate to the
intensity of the tax revenue loss. County ﬁxed eﬀects βc are included to absorb the county-
speciﬁc characteristics. To guarantee that counties are comparable, the identiﬁcation only
exploits the very local within-prefecture variation, by controlling for prefecture-year ﬁxed
eﬀects ηp,t, so that θ would only capture the county-year speciﬁc revenue loss within a
prefecture.
Xc,t is a vector of time-variant county characteristics, including median of ﬁrm size,
capital-intensity, proﬁtability, ownership dummy, and mobility dummy in county c and
in year t.32 They are included to avoid missing variables potentially correlated with
Postt · Agrc and aﬀecting τc,p,t.
Identiﬁcation assumes that there is no other county-year-speciﬁc shock correlated with
the revenue loss due to agricultural tax abolition, or alternatively, counties should follow
the parallel trend if tax abolition had not ever happened. To the author's knowledge,
there is no other big reform in the same period correlated with the revenue loss and
potentially has an impact on VAT rate. Of course, placebo and other various tests will
be conducted in Section 7 to verify this assumption.
It should be noted that, even under parallel-trend assumption, diﬀerent countries may
respond diﬀerently to the shock of the same magnitude. Therefore, what θ captures is
the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET), instead of the Average Treatment
Eﬀect on the Untreated (ATEU).
5.3 Empirical Results
Panel A of Table 2 reports the regression results of Equation (5.1). The positive coef-
ﬁcient 2.35 of Agr × Post shows that counties facing bigger revenue loss from agricultural
tax abolition experienced a signiﬁcant rise in the eﬀective VAT rate, suggesting that the
VAT enforcement there was strengthened after the reform.
What does the magnitude of the coeﬃcient 2.35 mean? Suppose a `treatment' county
suﬀered 100 percentage points more revenue loss than a `control' county. Then the co-
eﬃcient 2.35 implies that the eﬀective VAT rate rose by 2.35 percentage points more in
the `treatment' county compared to the `control' county. On average, the gap in revenue
loss between an average treatment county and control county is 30 percentage points in
the sample. This means the eﬀective VAT rate rose on average by 0.8 (=2.35 Ö 100 /
32Firm size is measured by LOG(sales), and LOG(Valued-added); capital-intensity by LOG(1+total
assets/sales); proﬁtability by total proﬁt/sales; ownership dummy takes 1 for non-state-owned enterprises;
mobility dummy takes 1 if the ﬁrm is in the mining industry. To avoid poor control, all these variables
take the median within a county.
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30) percentage points. Since the average eﬀective VAT rate is 10 percentage points, this
means it should have increased by 8 percent on average. Additionally, suppose there was
no response in tax base, then the 8% increase in the eﬀective VAT rate would translate
into an 8% rise in VAT revenue.
Table 2: Agriculture Tax Reform and Eﬀective VAT Rate (Insert Here)
6 Additional Results
6.1 Heterogeneous Eﬀect on the Eﬀective VAT Rate
In an institution where a local government's incentive to enforce tax codes is weak,
even though they must strengthen VAT enforcement due to loss of tax revenue as shown
in Section 5, their incentive could still be weakened by several factors.
In the conceptual framework in Section 4, I provided two predictions on the incentives
of tax enforcement.
First, counties with a lower VAT sharing ratio may be more weakly incentivized to
enforce VAT (Prediction 2).
Second, county governments may have a weaker incentive to raise the eﬀective VAT
rate if they have a stronger capacity to mobilize the revenue (Prediction 3 and Prediction
4. That is, they have either a greater VAT base or more capacity to obtain revenue from
other sources such as land sales).
In this section, I will exploit the exogenous variation from the abolition of agricultural
tax to test these two predictions.
6.1.1 VAT Sharing Ratio and Incentive of VAT Enforcement
VAT is a sharing tax between diﬀerent levels of governments in China. The central
government sharing ratio is 75%. This is the case across the whole country. However, the
sharing ratio of provincial governments, prefectural governments and county governments
diﬀer across provinces. 33 The sharing ratio between subnational governments was set
by subnational governments as early as 1994 when the historic tax reform was launched;
it had not changed signiﬁcantly since.34 Some evidence suggests that a lower sharing
ratio for county governments may attenuate their incentives to enforce VAT.35 This is
because the county government is at the grassroots level where tax enforcement is actually
33For example, county governments in Zhe Jiang province and Jiang Su province gain a high 70% of
the province total VAT revenue (net of 75% taken by the central government), while those in Hei Long
Jiang province only achieve 20%.
34Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays the cross-province variation of the VAT sharing ratio and its
persistence over time.
35Table B.1 in Appendix reports the regression coeﬃcients of eﬀective VAT rate on VAT sharing ratio.
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implemented, their low sharing ratios generate a weak incentive to enforce VAT, and the
variation of the sharing ratio across regions could lead to dispersions in the eﬀective VAT
rate.
The abolition of agricultural tax provides us with an opportunity to study how the
incentive of tax enforcement of local governments could be aﬀected by VAT sharing ratio.
Table 3 reports the heterogeneous eﬀect of the abolition of agricultural tax on the eﬀective
VAT rate. Consistent with the results in Table 2, Table 3 shows that the abolition of
agricultural tax leads to a rise in the eﬀective VAT rate. In addition to this, it also
suggests that the incentive of VAT enforcement could be weakened if county governments
get a lower share of total VAT revenue. This can be seen from the negative coeﬃcients
on Agr × Post × (1 - County Share) in column (1), on Agr × Post × Prefecture Share
in column (2), and on Agr × Post × Province Share in column (3).
I also run the horse-racing in column (4) by including both Agr × Post × Prefecture
Share and Agr × Post × Province Share in regressions. The coeﬃcients of both terms
are still negative, but only Agr × Post × Province Share shows signiﬁcance.36
It should be noted that, although the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, their magnitude is
rather small. For example, in column (1), the coeﬃcient is -0.23, implying that the rise
of the eﬀective VAT rate would be smaller by 0.00023 percentage points if the county
sharing ratio decreased by 10 percentage points.
Table 3: VAT Sharing Ratio and Incentive of VAT Enforcement (Insert Here)
6.1.2 Revenue Mobilization Capacity and Incentive of VAT Enforcement
Some studies suggest that governments' incentive to build up taxation capacity could
be weaker if they have stronger capacity to mobilize revenue from other sources (Jensen,
2011; Besley and Torsten, 2013). In this paper, I exploit the exogenous variation of the
abolition of agricultural tax to study the similar mechanism for VAT enforcement.
Before doing this, I have two prior hypotheses in mind; that the incentives to enforce
VAT can be aﬀected by the following two factors. First, incentives are weaker in regions
where county governments have a relatively broader VAT tax base. Second, incentives
are weaker in regions where county governments have more abundant sources of revenue
from land sales (a type of revenue from natural resources).
Empirically, these two factors can be measured in the following ways. First, the relative
size of the VAT tax base is measured by the average of `manufacturing GDP/(manufacturing
and service GDP)' between 2000 and 2004 for each county because VAT is mainly im-
posed on manufacturing ﬁrms in China. The agriculture sector is not included in the
36This may suggest the ineﬃciency loss along the delegation chain. The longer the distance between
principal and agent, the weaker the incentive for the agent to take into account the principal's interests.
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denominator because it can lead to a correlation with the revenue loss due to the agri-
cultural tax abolition. Second, local governments' capacity to mobilize land sales revenue
is measured respectively by two indices: `Land sales revenue/local government revenue',
and `land sales revenue/local GDP '. These two indices also take the average between 2000
and 2004 for each county.
The results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) shows the heterogeneous eﬀects
associated with the relative size of VAT tax base. The signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient
of Agr × Post × VAT Base suggests that a greater VAT tax base weakens the incentive
to enforce VAT. However, the magnitude is quite small, coeﬃcient -0.21 implies that
the eﬀective VAT rate falls only by 0.021 percentage point if the ratio manufacturing
GDP/(manufacturing and service GDP) increases by 10 percentage points.
Column (2) and (3) report the heterogeneous eﬀects related to land sales revenue.
The signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients of Agr × Post × Land Sales/Rev and Agr × Post
× Land Sales/GDP suggest that the incentive to enforce VAT could be weakened by
greater capacity to mobilize revenue from other sources. However, the magnitude is also
very small: coeﬃcients -0.26 (-1.77) suggest that the eﬀective VAT rate falls by only 0.026
(0.00177) percentage points if the ratio Land Sales/Rev (Land Sales/GDP) increases by
10 percentage points.
Table 4: Resource Mobilization Capacity and Incentive of Tax Enforcement (Insert Here)
6.2 Eﬀect on Total Tax Revenue and Other Revenues
In the end, we want to know the extent to which tax enforcement can oﬀset revenue
loss from the abolition of agricultural taxation. After all, the model in Section 3 predicts
that the tax revenue net of agricultural tax should increase, while total tax revenue should
drop, and local governments should also attempt to mobilize revenue from other sources;
selling land could be an option in China.
Table 5 reports the eﬀect on total tax revenue, other sources of revenue, and other
measurements of county government revenue. All these revenue take logarithm. Panel
A reports the eﬀect on tax revenue. Column (1), (2), and (3) are the total tax revenue,
total tax revenue net of agriculture and business tax revenue, respectively.37 The results
show that, while the total tax revenue insigniﬁcantly drops, the total tax revenue net of
agricultural tax signiﬁcantly increases. The coeﬃcient of 0.39 implies that the total tax
revenue net of agricultural tax increased on average by about 0.13% (= 0.39 Ö 10 / 3).
The business tax revenue increased as well, by 8% (= 0.25 Ö 10 / 3).
37Business tax is a turnover tax imposed mainly on ﬁrms in the service sector. It is collected by the
Local Administration of Taxation and is the largest source of local tax revenue. Due to lack of ﬁrm level
data, this paper does not study the eﬀect on ﬁrms' eﬀective business tax rate.
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Panel B extends the deﬁnition of government revenue by including revenue other than
taxes. Column (4) is all-county government revenue including tax, transfer revenue and
fund revenue. Column (5) is the budgetary revenue including taxes and transfer revenue.
Column (6) is the land sales revenue, which has been a very important source of revenue
for local governments since 2000. The results of all revenue and total budgetary revenue
are insigniﬁcant. This is consistent with the eﬀect on the total tax revenue in column (1).
However, the land sales revenue signiﬁcantly increased by 26% (= 0.78 Ö 10 / 3). 38
The results in Table 5 show that county governments can raise the revenue, both by
strengthening existing taxes and from other sources, such as land sales. The tax revenue
loss due to the abolition of agricultural tax can be almost oﬀset by the increase in other
taxes. This suggests that the taxation capacity of county governments is not strictly
constrained, even in the short run.
Table 5: Eﬀect on Total Tax Revenue and Other Revenues (Insert Here)
7 Testing for Alternative Explanations and Robustness
Checks
7.1 Placebo Test
The unbiased identiﬁcation with Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ requires parallel trends. That is, THE
outcome variable in diﬀerent counties should follow the same time proﬁle before the reform
and show diﬀerent trends after the reform. By specifying each year t before the reform
with a dummy variable Y r_Dt, the following regression can be used to test the parallel-
trend assumption needed for regression (5.1).
τc,p,t = α+ βc + ηp,t +
∑2003
t=2000 γt · Y r_Dt +
∑2003
t=2000 θt · Y r_Dt ·Agrc
+γ · Postt + θ · Postt ·Agrc + ρ ·Xc,t + c,p,t
(7.1)
Year 2004 is speciﬁed as the base-line year so its dummy are not included in the
regression. The parallel-trend assumption requires that θt = 0, for t = 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the placebo test based on Equation (7.1), with year 2004 as
the baseline year. The coeﬃcients of year 2003, 2002, 2001 and 2000 are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, conﬁrming the parallel-trend assumption.
In addition, by running regression (7.2) as below, we can see the dynamics of diﬀerence
in τc,p,t between counties suﬀering diﬀerent levels of intensity of revenue loss due to the
38On average, land sales revenue account for 4% of all government revenue, or amount to 6% of total
budgetary revenue.
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agricultural tax abolition.
τc,p,t = α+ βc + ηp,t +
2007∑
t=2000
γt · Y r_Dt +
2007∑
t=2000
θt · Y r_Dt ·Agrc + ρ ·Xc,t + c,p,t (7.2)
In this setting, θt after year 2005 is expected to be positive when τc,p,t is the eﬀective
VAT rate. Similar to Equation (7.1), year 2004 is speciﬁed as the base-line year. The
parallel-trend assumption now requires that θt = 0 for any year prior 2005.
Figure 7.1: Dynamic Eﬀect of AGR. Tax Reform on Eﬀective VAT Rate
Figure 7.1 displays the dynamic eﬀect of revenue loss of county governments on the
eﬀective VAT rate based on regression (7.2). In the graph, τc,p,t is normalized to zero for
the county where the Agrc = 0. The dots mark the τc,p,t for the county where Agrc = 1,
which means a 100 percentage points tax loss measured by Expression (4.3).39 Year 2004 is
the baseline year. We can see that before 2005, the eﬀective VAT rate is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the baseline year 2004, conﬁrming the parallel-trend. In 2005, the year
abolishing the agricultural tax, the eﬀective VAT rate immediately increased in counties
where Agrc = 1. Although the increase is not signiﬁcant at a 95% conﬁdence level, it is at
a 90% level. In 2006 and 2007, the eﬀects continued to rise and they were all signiﬁcant
at a 95% conﬁdence level.
39On average, the intensity of the revenue loss should be 30 percentage points, given the standard
deviation of 15 percentage points within prefecture variation in the intensity of revenue loss shown in
Figure D.8 in Appendix D.
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7.2 Export-sales Ratio and Input-output Ratio
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, in addition to tax enforcement or tax evasion, a ﬁrm's
eﬀective VAT rate could also be aﬀected by three other factors: (1) statutory input VAT
and output VAT rate; (2) export-sales ratio (because of VAT refunds); and, (3) input-
output ratio (due to intermediate input deduction).
By law, we know that there was no change in the statutory VAT rate during the
sample periods in China. However, it is still possible that the abolition of agricultural
tax aﬀected the eﬀective VAT rate through an export-sales ratio or input-output ratio.
I explored these possibilities and report the results in Table 6, which show that there
is no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect either on export/sales or on intermediate input/output.
Therefore, these two channels can be ruled out.
Table 6: Eﬀect on Export-sales Ratio and Input-output Ratio (Insert Here)
7.3 Manipulation of the Value-added
From deﬁnition (4.1) of the eﬀective VAT rate, we may suspect that the variation of
eﬀective VAT may come from the manipulation of value-added (the denominator) rather
than from any change of VAT payment (the numerator). This suspicion is plausible given
the fact that local governments in China have an incentive to over-report local GDP
(aggregates of ﬁrms' value-added) for their political promotion.
I tried to test the validity of tax enforcement against the hypothesis of value-added
manipulation in two ways. One way is to directly look at the eﬀect of the abolition
of agricultural tax on the value-added of ﬁrms. Another is to cross-validate the tax
enforcement by studying the eﬀect on the proﬁt gap rate, which is thought to be related
to corporate income tax evasion in China (Cai and Liu, 2009). The results suggest that
the manipulation of value-added should be not a channel through which the eﬀective VAT
rate is changed.
7.3.1 Eﬀect on the Value-added of ﬁrms
If the relative rise in the eﬀective VAT rate in counties suﬀering more revenue loss is
the result of manipulation of value-added, it must imply that the value-added of ﬁrms
in these counties should be downwardly and relatively adjusted. However, this does not
only contradict common knowledge that local oﬃcials have an incentive to rig up the
value-added rather than the opposite. Additionally, it is inconsistent with the following
facts that the value-added of ﬁrms in these counties did not actually signiﬁcantly change.
Table 7 reports the eﬀect of the abolition of agricultural tax on the value-added of
ﬁrms. Panel A is based on Equation (5.1), and Panel B is on Equation (7.1). The
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coeﬃcient of `Agr × Post ' shows the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcients of
`Agr × Year 200x ' (x = 3, 2, 1, 0) imply that there was a relative rise in value-added
after 2004 compared to year 2000 - 2003. Therefore, the evidence is not consistent with
the downward manipulation of value-added following the abolition of agricultural tax.
Table 7: Eﬀect on Firms' Value-added (Insert Here)
7.3.2 Eﬀect on the Proﬁt Gap Rate
The proﬁt gap rate is the proﬁt gap normalized the valued-added of a ﬁrm. Also,
the proﬁt gap of a ﬁrm measures the diﬀerence between its imputed proﬁt and reported
proﬁt. Cai and Liu (2009) suggest that the proﬁt gap is potentially related to tax evasion
of corporate income tax in Chinese manufacturing ﬁrms (a larger proﬁt gap implies more
possible tax evasion).
Given the nature of the proﬁt gap rate, I can cross-validate the eﬀect on the eﬀective
VAT rate by studying the eﬀect on the proﬁt gap rate for two following reasons.40 First,
the conceptual framework in Section 3 predicts that the abolition of one type of tax would
lead to the rise of tax enforcement on all available taxes. Therefore, the proﬁt gap rate
should decrease if the tax enforcement is strengthened. Second, since the eﬀective VAT
rate and the proﬁt gap rate both have the value-added as the denominator, they should
change in the same direction if it is the manipulation of value-added that leads to the
variation of the eﬀective VAT rate. Otherwise, they should move in opposing directions
if it is the tax enforcement that results in these changes.41
Table 8 reports the baseline regression results based on Equation (5.1) and the placebo
test based on Equation (7.1). The negative coeﬃcients of `Agr × Post ' suggest that ﬁrms
in counties suﬀering more tax revenue loss are less likely to under-report proﬁts following
the abolition of agricultural tax. All the placebo tests conﬁrm the parallel trends except
the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient of `Agr × Year 2002 ' in column (6).42
The dynamic eﬀect based on Equation (7.2) is displayed in Figure C.3 in Appendix C.
Table 8: Eﬀect on the Proﬁt Gap Rate (Insert Here)
40Appendix C provides details on these reasons.
41Of course, I still cannot rule out the possibility that the value-added was manipulated and tax
enforcement was strengthened simultaneously.
42To my knowledge, it is quite likely to be related to the corporate income tax reform in 2002 or another
year-speciﬁc shock.
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7.4 Robustness Checks
7.4.1 Change in Government Expenditure
So far I have only focused on the revenue side of the government budget. However,
revenue and expenditure are related. The best outcome for the current study is that the
expenditure of county governments remained rigid and did not change in response to the
revenue loss: but was this the case?
To this end, I studied the variation of county government expenditure associated with
the abolition of agricultural tax. The results are reported in Table 9. They show that
the eﬀects on ratios of government expenditure to revenue are positive (column (1) - (3)),
while the eﬀects on ratios of government expenditure to local GDP are not signiﬁcant
(column (4) - (5)). This implies that the county government expenditure was quite rigid
while revenue fell. The expenditure did not make adjustments in response to revenue loss.
Table 9: Change in Government Expenditure (Insert Here)
7.4.2 Other Reforms
There are two major reforms during the sample period: (1) the corporate income tax
reform in 2002;43 and, (2) the transformation of VAT from production type to consumption
type for eight industries in three north-east provinces in 2004.
To check whether these reforms could aﬀect the conclusion of this paper, in column (1)
of Table 10, I dropped all ﬁrms in the north-east provinces to ensure that the results would
not be aﬀected by the reform in 2004 of switching from production VAT to consumption.
Also, in column (2), I dropped the ﬁrms that were set up after 2001 so that the ﬁrms that
remained in the sample would not be aﬀected by the corporate income tax reform of that
year. The results in Table 10 show that the eﬀect on eﬀective VAT is still signiﬁcant.
Table 10: Robustness Checks  Other Alternative Explanations (Insert Here)
7.4.3 Agriculture Goods Invoices
After the abolition of agriculture goods, ﬁrms which purchased agriculture products
as intermediate inputs could no longer get the invoices for VAT deduction. This may
increase the eﬀective VAT rate of agriculture-related industries such as food processing,
beverage, tobacco, textiles, leather and fur processing, among others. I drop all these
industries from the sample, and the regression results are reported in column (3) of Table
10. The results show that the eﬀect on eﬀective VAT remains robust.
43This reform requires the State Administration of Taxation to be in charge of the corporate income
tax for all ﬁrms established after 2002. Before the reform, the Local Administration of Taxation also
collected corporate income tax of some ﬁrms according to ﬁrms' ownership and aﬃliation.
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7.4.4 Entry of New Firms
China has experienced rapid economic growth with massive ﬁrm entry every year over
the last two decades. To stimulate the investment, local governments generally promise
preferential tax treatment to new ﬁrms. This could also aﬀect the results of the regressions.
To eliminate the channels through new ﬁrms, I drop the ﬁrms set up after 1999 so that
no newly born ﬁrms are included in the sample period 2000 - 2007. The regression results
are reported in column (4) of Table 10. They show that the eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT
rate is still signiﬁcant.
7.4.5 Change of Industrial Structure
The eﬀective VAT rate varies across industries, even if tax enforcement strictly follows
the tax code. If the industrial structure changes across regions, it may bias the regression
results. To control for this, I run the regression at the county-year-(2-digit) industry
level, and control for the county-(2-digit) industry ﬁxed eﬀect. The results are reported
in column (5) of Table 10. Still, the eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT rate is robust.
7.4.6 Pilot Reform Regions
Before formally and legally abolishing the nation-wide agriculture tax, several pilot
reforms were launched in a small number of regions. In 2000, Anhui province was chosen
to start the pilot reform. In 2001, Jiangsu Province and a further 102 counties in other
provinces joined the programme. In 2003, eleven provinces followed up, however; all
pilot reforms were not compulsory in the sense that local governments were at their own
discretion in determining the ways to reform and the magnitude to which they were to
lower the agriculture taxation. Even within a province, diﬀerent prefectures had their
own views. Because the pilot programmes were not pervasive across the whole country
and agriculture tax was not entirely abolished until 2005, the nationwide abolition in 2005
was still a considerable disturbance to these piloting regions.
Among all pilot reforms, two of the largest and earliest took place in Anhui province
in 2000 and Jiangsu province in 2001.44 To check whether the revenue loss measured with
Expression (4.3) is still valid in pilot reform regions, I run regressions based on Equation
(5.1), with counties in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces taking additional interaction between
Agrc and the Post dummy variable.
45
44Figure D.12, D.13 and D.14 in Appendix D display the distribution of revenue loss in these two
provinces. The revenue loss is still measured with Expression (4.3). The two graphs suggest that these
still exist big within-prefecture variation in revenue loss despite these two provinces had launched the
reform as least four years before the nationwide abolition in 2005. It suggests that the pilot regions still
experienced diﬀerent revenue loss across counties in 2005.
45Other sporadic pilot reforms are either small in scale, or very close to the year 2005. Their potential
to invalidate the identiﬁcation in this paper should be much weaker than those in Anhui and Jiangsu.
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Table 11 reports the regression results. Column (1), (2), and (3) reports the regressions
with Anhui province, Jiangsu province and the two provinces combined taking additional
dummies respectively. The coeﬃcients on Agr × Post × Anhui Dummy and Agr × Post
× Jiangsu Dummy are close to zero and insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the pilot regions
were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from other regions. In column (4), I drop observations from
these two provinces and run the baseline regression based on Equation (5.1). Consistent
with previous results, the coeﬃcient on Agr × Post is still positive and signiﬁcant at a
5% conﬁdence level.
Table 11: Robustness Checks  Pilot Reforms (Insert Here)
8 Conclusion
Information and incentives are two pillars that support a well-functioning tax collec-
tion system for a country. Abundant theoretical analysis and empirical works have been
conducted on the role of information. In contrast, the number of empirical studies on
the incentives remains relatively small. Using ﬁrm-level data from the Annual Survey of
Industrial Production (2000 - 2007), this paper exploits the nation-wide abolition of agri-
cultural tax in China as a natural `ﬁscal squeeze' experiment in which county governments
were forced to raise taxation from ﬁrms to cover their rigid public expenditure.
The paper makes several contributions to our understanding of the extent and mech-
anisms of the role of incentives for low tax revenue in developing countries through the
lens of China. First, the paper shows that a revenue loss on county governments in China
can be largely and quickly oﬀset by tougher tax enforcement. On average, the total tax
revenue net of agricultural tax increased by 10% immediately in the year of agricultural
tax abolition. This implies that the taxation capacity of developing countries may not be
formidably binding, even in the short run.
Second, to understand whether incentives for tax enforcement could be a ﬂexible mar-
gin to raise tax revenue, I particularly focus on the VAT. The paper has a novel ﬁnding
in that tax enforcement can be made through raising the eﬀective VAT rate. This implies
that, given the information on the tax base (ﬁrms' value-added), there is still a room
for tougher tax enforcement by imposing a greater eﬀective tax rate. On average, the
eﬀective VAT rate increased by 8% immediately in the year of agricultural tax abolition
and the increase lasted for at least three years. This ﬁnding is complementary to recently
growing literature which focuses on the channel of raising tax, mainly through cracking
down on the under-reporting of tax base.
Third, the incentives for VAT enforcement depend on several factors. The results
Therefore I do not intend to discuss them in the robustness check.
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show that it can be weakened if the county: (1) receives a lower proportion of total VAT
revenues after sharing with prefectural and provincial governments; (2) has a broader
VAT tax base; or, (3) has more abundant sources of revenue from land sales.
Due to the limited data, the paper failed to answer several important questions. For
example, through which channel was the eﬀective VAT rate raised after the abolition of
agricultural tax? Is it mainly through input VAT or output VAT? Or, through clamping
down on fake invoice usage? Moreover, in addition to several factors studied in this paper,
there should be many other factors that can constrain the incentives for tax enforcement.
These questions are open for future research.
As Bird (2004) points out, the best tax policy in the world is worth little if it cannot
be implemented eﬀectively. Despite the good nature of VAT in terms of information,
its technological frontier cannot be fully achieved if tax administration is not well incen-
tivized. Although the empirical study of this paper is based on the experience in China, it
is not unique to the rest of the world, especially for countries where the task of collecting
tax is not eﬃciently delegated. The ineﬃciency in delegation could be caused by the moral
hazard of tax inspecting (Besley and McLaren, 1993), or the result of tax competition
and tax sharing which is prevalent in ﬁscal federalism regimes. All results suggest that
a weak incentive for tax enforcement can also be an important cause of low tax-to-GDP
ratio in developing countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Annual Survey of Industrial Production in China (2000 - 2007)
Sample Size Mean St. Dev. Min Max p10 p50 p90
Eﬀective VAT Rate1 139,287 10.34 9.66 -153.22 697.38 0.98 8.74 20.87
Proﬁt Gap Rate2 139,287 34.67 42.85 -2783.55 2813.98 -12.3 40.19 75.92
Debt Ratio3 139,287 55.77 28.94 -120.02 1585.95 22.19 55.28 86.37
CapInt4 139,287 0.18 0.21 0 1.24 0.01 0.13 0.32
Ownership5 139,287 0.89 0.18 0 1 0.7 0.95 1
Proﬁtability6 139,287 0.09 0.65 -16.8 176.27 0.03 0.06 0.14
Firm Age7 139,287 6.36 4.71 0 95 3 6 9
LOG(V-added)8 139,287 9.05 0.69 3.76 16.31 8.33 8.96 9.85
LOG(Sales)9 139,287 10.1 0.7 3.65 16.4 9.36 10.04 10.9
Input - output Ratio10 139,287 0.76 0.17 0 21.3 0.69 0.76 0.84
Export - Sales Ratio11 139,287 0.02 0.13 0 10 0 0 0
Panel B: County Public Finance Statistics (2000 - 2007)
Sample Size Mean St. Dev. Min Max p10 p50 p90
Agr12 19,950 0.25 0.23 -0.81 1.21 0.01 0.22 0.56
LOG(GDP)13 8,898 3.47 0.94 0 5.78 2.2 3.61 4.52
Notes:
1. Eﬀective VAT Rate is deﬁned as Payable VAT / value-added × 100.
2. Proﬁt Gap Rate is measured by proﬁt gap / value-added × 100, where proﬁt gap is the
imputed proﬁt minus the reported proﬁt. See Section 5.1 for more details.
3. Debt Ratio is measured by total liability/ total assets × 100.
4. CapInt is capital-intensity measured by capital / sales. Capital is measured by total asset in
Panel A, and measured by net ﬁxed asset / sales in Panel B. The measurements are diﬀerent due
to lack of consistent data.
5. Ownership is dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is not a state-owned enterprise.
6. Proﬁtability is measured by proﬁt / value-added, indicating the degree of competition of 2-digit
industry.
7. Firm Age is the years since the ﬁrm was set up.
8. LOG(V-added) is the logarithm of a ﬁrm's value-added.
9. LOG(Sales) is the logarithm of a ﬁrm's sales volume.
10. Input-output Ratio is deﬁned as intermediate inputs / total value of products and services.
11. Export-sales Ratio is deﬁned as export / sales volume.
12. "Agr" is the net tax revenue loss due to the abolition of agricultural tax. Refer to Expression
(4.2) for its deﬁnition.
13. LOG(GDP) is the logarithm of a county's GDP per capita.
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Table 2: Abolition of Agriculture Tax and Eﬀective VAT Rate
Dependent Variable: Eﬀective VAT Rate
Panel A: Panel B:
Baseline Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agr × Post 2.35 2.22 2.11 2.37 2.41 1.78
(0.82)*** (0.83)*** (0.84)** (0.78)*** (0.78)*** (0.67)***
Agr × Year 2003 -1.05 -1.52
(1.02) (1.18)
Agr × Year 2002 -0.84 -1.18
(0.74) (0.87)
Agr × Year 2001 0.09 -0.57
(1.55) (1.90)
Agr × Year 2000 0.57 -0.17
(1.48) (1.85)
Controls: Year Dummy
Post 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Year 2003 -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.06)
Year 2002 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.030
Year 2001 0.05 0.03
(0.04) (0.06)
Year 2000 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.07)
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968
R2 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Clustering Prefecture level (362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence
level.
32
Table 3: VAT Sharing Ratio and Incentives for Tax Enforcement
Dependent Variable: Eﬀective VAT Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agr × Post 2.68 2.62 2.58 2.68
(0.84)*** (0.85)*** (0.83)*** (0.85)***
Agr × Post × (1 - County Share) / 100 -0.23
(0.06)***
Agr × Post × Prefecture Share / 100 -0.29 -0.16
(0.09)*** (0.10)
Agr × Post × Province Share / 100 -0.48 -0.35
(0.15)*** (0.17)**
Post and Other Interaction Terms
Post 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Post × (1 - County Share) / 100 0.99
(1.58)
Post × Prefecture Share / 100 1.88 0.57
(2.9) (3.37)
Post × Province Share / 100 2.90 1.73
(3.39) (3.93)
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968
R2 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Clustering Prefecture level(362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence
level.
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Table 4: Resource Mobilization Capacity and Incentives for Tax Enforcement
Dependent Variable: Eﬀective VAT Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Agr × Post 2.56 2.43 2.50
(0.85)*** (0.84)*** (0.84)***
Agr × Post × VAT Base /100 -0.21
(0.07)***
Agr × Post × Land Sales / GDP / 100 -0.26
(0.11)***
Agr × Post × Land Sales / Rev / 10000 -1.77
(0.72)**
Post and Other Interaction Terms
Post 0.01 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Post × VAT Base / 100 2.22
(3.30)
Post × Land Sales / GDP / 100 -9.99
(9.47)
Post × Land Sales / Rev / 10000 -37.04
(46.02)
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES
Sample size 17,828 17,872 17,944
R2 0.44 0.44 0.44
Clustering Prefecture level(362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence
level.
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Table 5: Eﬀect on Total Tax Revenue and Other Revenues
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Panel A: Panel B:
Tax Revenue Other Revenue Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Tax Tax Net Agr Business Tax All Rev. Bgt Rev. Land Rev
Agr × Post -0.05 0.39 0.25 0.01 -0.04 0.78
(0.07) (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.07) (0.07) (0.36)**
Post 0.01 0 -0.03 0.48 0.53 0.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,895 17,895 17,895 15,147 17,887 10,020
R2 0.9 0.91 0.86 0.94 0.93 0.64
Clustering Prefecture level (362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
Table 6: Eﬀect on Export-sales Ratio and Input-output Ratio
Dependent Variable
(1) (2)
Intermediate Input / Output Export / Sales
Agr × Post -0.02 -0.99
(0.84) (1.26)
Post -1.02 -2.37
(0.22)*** (0.91)***
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES
County FE YES YES
Sample size 17,968 17,968
R2 0.69 0.17
Clustering Prefecture level (362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture
level (362 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%,
90%) conﬁdence level.
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Table 7: Eﬀect on Firms' Value-added
Dependent Variable: LOG(Value-added)
Panel A: Panel B:
Baseline Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agr × Post 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Agr × Year 2003 -0.16 -0.27
(0.09)* (0.12)**
Agr × Year 2002 -0.11 -0.2
(0.09) (0.12)*
Agr × Year 2001 0.15 -0.02
(0.11) (0.14)
Agr × Year 2000 -0.16 -0.27
(0.11) (0.12)**
Controls: Year Dummy
Post -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*
Year 2003 0.02 0.03
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
Year 2002 -0.01 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)
Year 2001 0.01 0.02
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
Year 2000 0.01 0.02
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
Controls
LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,950 17,950 17,950 17,950 17,950 17,950
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Clustering Prefecture level (362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence
level.
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Table 8: Eﬀect on the Proﬁt Gap Rate
Dependent Variable: Proﬁt Gap Rate
Panel A: Panel B:
Baseline Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agr × Post -13.68 -13.54 -12.33 -14.17 -12.03 -7.19
(4.27)*** (4.45)*** (4.73)*** (4.43)*** (3.28)*** (2.70)***
Agr × Year 2003 1.41 9.51
-6.09 -6.42
Agr × Year 2002 4.82 10.23
-4.23 (4.29)**
Agr × Year 2001 -4.63 4.88
-11.56 -11.45
Agr × Year 2000 17.54 23.17
-18.26 -19.86
Controls: Year Dummy
Post -0.12 -0.12 -0.19 -0.15 -0.15 -0.39
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.39)
Year 2003 -0.01 -0.01
(0.20) (0.40)
Year 2002 -0.13 -0.32
(0.25) (0.36)
Year 2001 -0.29 -0.24
(0.23) (0.44)
Year 2000 -0.1 -0.11
(0.31) (0.49)
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968 17,968
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Clustering Prefecture level (362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence
level.
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Table 9: Change in Government Expenditure
Dependent Variable: LOG(1 + X / GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGT EXP. ALL EXP. TAX REV. BGT REV. ALL REV.
Agr × Post -2.21 -0.07 -5.47 -4.66 -4.46
(2.88) (3.02) (2.61)** (2.78)* (2.52)*
Post 1.13 0.93 0.74 0.72 0.6
(0.31)*** (0.26)*** (0.27)*** (0.26)*** (0.23)***
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,741 12,694 17,741 17,740 15,023
R2 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.65
Clustering Prefecture level (362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
Table 10: Robustness Checks  Other Alternative Explanations
Dependent Variable: Eﬀective VAT Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drop NE Drop Firms Drop Agr. Related Firm Entry Control for
Provinces > 2001 Industries (Drop > 1999) Industry FE
Agr × Post 2.82 2.46 2.39 1.9 1.31
(0.87)*** (0.82)*** (0.84)*** (0.92)** (0.48)***
Post 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) (0.04)
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
NO
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES NO
County FE YES YES YES YES NO
Pref-Indu-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES
County-Indu FE NO NO NO NO YES
Sample size 16,228 17,625 17,356 17,264 11,938
R2 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.17
Clustering
Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prov-Indu
(362 groups) (362 groups) (362 groups) (362 groups) (155 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362 groups) in
column (1) - (4), at the province-(1-digit)industry level in column (5). *** (**, *) indicates statistical
signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
2. The Pref-Indu-Year FE refers to Prefecture-(1-digit)Industry-Year ﬁxed eﬀect. The County-Indu
FE is County-(2-digit)Industry ﬁxed eﬀect.
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Table 11: Robustness Checks  Pilot Reforms
Dependent Variable: Eﬀective VAT Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agr × Post 1.84 1.8 1.84 1.76
(0.63)*** (0.62)*** (0.63)*** (0.68)**
Post 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Agr × Post × Anhui Dummy 0.00 NO 0.00 NO
(0.00) (0.00)
Agr × Post × Jiangsu Dummy NO 0.00 0.00 NO
(0.00) (0.00)
Controls
LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,950 17,950 17,950 16,671
R2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Clustering
Prefecture level
(362 groups) (362 groups) (362 groups) (332 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level (362
groups in column (1) - (3), 332 groups in column (4)). *** (**, *) indicates statistical
signiﬁcance at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
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A Appendix: Conceptual Framework
A.1 Basic Model
This section is an appendix to the conceptual framework in Section 3.
In this section I characterize the optimal taxation with many types of tax available
and when taxation costs have to be incurred. Suppose public funds T can bring beneﬁt
B(T ), with B′(T ) > 0, and B
′′
(T ) < 0. Without loss of generality, I assume there are only
three types of taxes to ﬁnance the funds, with each type of tax bearing certain taxation
costs denoted by Ci(Ti), i = 0, 1, 2, with C
′
i(Ti) > 0, and C
′′
i (Ti) > 0.
In this model, the marginal taxation cost C
′
i(Ti) is mainly aﬀected by two types of costs:
(1) the administrative costs, (2) the eﬃciency loss due to tax distortions, and, (3) the cost
of tax base loss to local politicians in the presence of horizontal tax competition between
jurisdictions. The third type of cost mainly comes from the fact that the likelihood of
promotion of local politicians is positively related to local GDP performance.1
The problem facing the local government can be simply described by the following
maximization problem:
max{τi}2i=0 B(T )−
2∑
i=0
Ci(τi · yi)
where T =
∑2
i=0 Ti, and Ti = τi · yi, and yi is the tax base, which responds to tax rate τi.
Suppose taxation is on the good side of the Laﬀer curve, therefore ∂Ti/∂τi > 0.
The optimal condition requires that the marginal cost of any tax should be equal to
the marginal beneﬁt of total public funds. That is,
B
′
(T ) = C
′
i(Ti) ,∀i = 0, 1, 2 (A.1)
1Suppose Ci(Ti) = ci(τi) · yi-β · pi(yi), where ci(τi) is the administrative cost of tax collection and
eﬃciency loss associated with the tax rate τi for one unit of tax base. β is the utility gain from political
promotion of local politicians. pi(yi) is the probability getting promoted, and assume p
′
i(yi) > 0 because
promotion is positivey related to local GDP. The marginal taxation cost then can be written as: C
′
i(Ti) =
c
′
i(τi)
(
1− p˜i(τi)/ε
c
τ,i−1
1/|εyτ,i|−1
)
, where εyτ,i =
τi
yi
dyi
dτi
< 0, and εcτ,i =
τi
ci
dci
dτi
> 0, p˜i(τi) = 1 − β · p′i(yi)/ci(τi).
Obviously, C
′
i(Ti) is not only aﬀected by c
′
i(τi) and ε
c
τ,i, but also by ε
y
τ,i. The latter is related to the
tax base loss caused by imposing a higher tax rate. Its underlying determinant is the degree of tax
competition between jurisdictions.
Suppose −1 < εyτ,i < 0, then ∂C
′
i(Ti)/∂
∣∣εyτ,i∣∣ > (=, <)0⇐⇒1 − β · p′i(yi)/ci(τi) < (=, >)εcτ,i. That
means, given the taxation costs ci(τi) and ε
c
τ,i, the greater is the utility from political promotion (bigger
β) and the more sensitive is likelihood of promotion to GDP performance (bigger p
′
i(yi)), the more likely
that a greater intensity of tax competition
∣∣εyτ,i∣∣ leads to a bigger marginal taxation cost C ′i(Ti).
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A.2 Comparative Statics
Abolition of Tax
Now suppose that tax-0 is abolished and no new type of tax can be introduced. Curve
MC1(T ) and MC2(T ) would not move, but the aggregate marginal taxation cost curve
MC(T ) should shift leftwards to the position ofMC
′
(T ). This drives up the taxation cost
and the optimal total public funds drop from Ts to T
′
s, while the tax revenue from both
remaining available taxes go up, from T1 to T
′
1, and from T2 to T
′
2, respectively. Given the
assumption that ∂Ti/∂τi > 0, we know both τ1 and τ2 must increase to sustain the public
funds. Government can raise Ti in two ways as a response: (1) increase the eﬀective tax
rate; (2) crack down on tax evasion and tax base under-reporting.
The prediction can be summarized by the following statement.
Prediction 1. Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and no new type of tax can be intro-
duced, then the government would strengthen enforcement on existing taxes and raise more
revenue from other available sources.
Proof: To make comparative static analysis, I denote the marginal taxation cost as
C
′
i(Ti; θi), i = 0, 1, 2, where θi is a parameter governing the marginal taxation cost, and it
satisﬁes ∂C
′
i(Ti; θi)/∂θi > 0. For tax-0, we additionally assume that limθ0→+∞C
′
0(T0; θ0) =
+∞. Under these assumptions, the abolition of agricultural tax is equivalent to raising
θ0 from a ﬁnite number to positive inﬁnity (that is, collecting agricultural tax will be
extremely costly). To prove prediction 1, we just need to show that ∂T1/∂θ0 > 0 and
∂T2/∂θ0 > 0. Here we go.
The optimal conditions (A.1) deﬁne a simultaneous equations systems in three un-
known variables T0, T1, and T2. Their solutions must be expressions in terms of param-
eters θ0, θ1, and θ2. Take the ﬁrst order derivatives on both sides of optimal conditions
(A.1), we can obtain the following three equations:
B
′′
(T0 + T1 + T2)
(
∂T0
∂θ0
+ ∂T1
∂θ0
+ ∂T2
∂θ0
)
= C
′′
0 (T0; θ0)
∂T0
∂θ0
+
∂C
′
0(T0;θ0)
∂θ0
B
′′
(T0 + T1 + T2)
(
∂T0
∂θ0
+ ∂T1
∂θ0
+ ∂T2
∂θ0
)
= C
′′
1 (T1; θ1)
∂T1
∂θ0
B
′′
(T0 + T1 + T2)
(
∂T0
∂θ0
+ ∂T1
∂θ0
+ ∂T2
∂θ0
)
= C
′′
2 (T2; θ2)
∂T2
∂θ0
(A.2)
From above three equations in (A.2), we then get the solutions to ∂T0/∂θ0, ∂T1/∂θ0,
and ∂T2/∂θ0 as below:
∂T0
∂θ0
= −D0 (1− S0)
∂T1
∂θ0
= D0S1
∂T2
∂θ0
= D0S2
(A.3)
where
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D0 =
∂C
′
0(T0; θ0)
∂θ0
1
C
′′
0 (T0; θ0)
(A.4)
and for i = 0, 1, 2,
Si =
C
′′
i (Ti; θi)
−1
C
′′
0 (T0; θ0)
−1 + C ′′1 (T1; θ1)−1 + C
′′
2 (T2; θ2)
−1 −B′′(T0 + T1 + T2)−1 (A.5)
The assumptions that ∂C
′
i(Ti; θi)/∂θi > 0, C
′′
i (Ti; θi) > 0, i = 0, 1, 2, and B
′′
(Ts) > 0
guarantee that D0 > 0, and 0 < Si < 1, i = 0, 1, 2. Therefore, we have ∂T0/∂θ0 < 0,
∂T1/∂θ0 > 0 and ∂T2/∂θ0 > 0. This implies that, when it becomes more costly to collect
tax-0, governments would raise more revenue from tax-1 and tax-2. Assume that taxation
is on the good side of Laﬀer curve, more taxation in Ti calls for higher tax rate τi.
Moreover, the intensity of the government response in τi to the abolition of tax-0 could
depend on several factors. Here I discuss three of them relevant to my empirical study:
(1) tax sharing ratio of subnational governments; (2) size of tax base; (3) marginal cost
of other public funds. Testable predictions will be made for these three cases.
Tax Sharing Ratio
Suppose there are two levels of governments: central and local, and tax enforcement
is under the de facto control of local governments. Assume tax i is a sharing tax between
central and local government, and the sharing ratio for local government is denoted by
αi ∈ (0, 1). Suppose Ti is the tax revenue obtained by local governments. Under tax
sharing systems, that means the total tax revenue collected for tax-i should be Ti/α.
Therefore, the tax collection cost is Ci(Ti/αi), and we still have T =
∑2
i=0 Ti. Under
these conditions, the optimal condition (2.1) now becomes:
B
′
(T ) =
1
αi
C
′
i(Ti/αi) ,∀i = 0, 1, 2 (A.6)
Under very general conditions for function form of Ci(·) and B(·) , we can prove that
the lower the tax sharing ratio αi, the lower the tax rate τi that would be implemented
according to Equation (A.1). In addition to that, tax rate τi would increase less in response
to a given shock from the abolition of tax-0. Geometrically, it is because theMCi(·) curve
not only shifts to the left but also becomes steeper if αi decreases.
The following Prediction 2 can be made on the eﬀect of tax sharing ratio on tax
enforcement under two assumptions.
Assumption 1. ∂C
′′
0 (T0; θ0)/∂θ0 = 0. Any function form like C0(T0; θ0) = f(T0) +
g(θ0) + h(θ0)T0 would satisﬁy this condistion.
Assumption 2. B
′′′
(Ts) = 0, and C
′′′
k (Tk; θk) = 0 for k = 0, 1, 2.
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Prediction 2. Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and tax-1's eﬀective tax rate τ1 in-
creases, under Assumption 1-2, τ1 would rise by less if the local government has a lower
sharing ratio in tax-1.
Proof: Deﬁne θ1 = 1/α1. Therefore C
′
1(T1; θ1) =
1
α1
C
′
1(T1/α1) = θ1C(θ1T1). We need
to show ∂2T1/∂θ0∂θ1 < 0 in order to prove that lower sharing ratio (bigger θ1) leads to
smaller rise in tax-1 following abolition of tax-0.
Further diﬀerentiating ∂T1/∂θ0 in (A.2) with respect to θ1, we obtain
∂2T1
∂θ0∂θ1
=
∂D0
∂T0
∂T0
∂θ1
S1 +D0
∂S1
∂θ1
(A.7)
where ∂S1
∂θ1
satisﬁes the following expression, which generally holds for i = 0, 1, 2, and
j = 0, 1, 2.
∂Si
∂θj
= ∂Si
∂C
′′
j (Tj ;θj)
∂C
′′
j (Tj ;θj)
∂θj
+
∑2
k=0
(
∂Si
∂C
′′
k (Tk;θk)
C
′′′
k (Tk; θk) +
∂Si
∂B′′ (Ts)
B
′′′
(Ts)
)
∂Tk
∂θj
(A.8)
Under Assumption 1, we have ∂D0
∂T0
= 0. Under Assumption 2, ∂Si
∂θj
= ∂Si
∂C
′′
j (Tj ;θj)
∂C
′′
j (Tj ;θj)
∂θj
.
Therefore, under Assumption 1-2, Expression (A.7) can be re-written as:
∂T 21
∂θ0∂θ1
= D0
∂S1
∂C
′′
1 (T1; θ1)
∂C
′′
1 (T1; θ1)
∂θ1
< 0 (A.9)
In (A.9), ∂2T1/∂θ0∂θ1 < 0 because ∂C
′′
1 (T1; θ1)/∂θ1 > 0 by assumption, and D0 > 0
, ∂S1/∂C
′′
1 (T1; θ1) < 0 respectively by deﬁnition of D0 in (A.4) and deﬁnition of S1 in
(A.5).
Size of Tax Base
Suppose tax revenue Ti = τi · yi for tax i. Assume the elasticity of tax base to tax rate
εyτ,i is a constant in any value of τi for tax i. Then we have the following expression:
dTi/dτi = (1 + εi)yi (A.10)
Assumption 3. εyτ,i is a constant and −1 < εyτ,i < 0.
Assumption 3 implies that the tax is always on the good side of the Laﬀer-curve
(that is, dTi/dτi > 0). Equation (A.10) implies that, if the tax base yi is bigger, then
the tax revenue Ti would rise more for the same amount of increase in the tax rate τi.
Therefore, in order to raise the same amount of tax revenue ∆Ti, a government only needs
to raise tax rate by less amount ∆τi if the tax base yi is greater.
A prediction can be made as below on the eﬀect of tax base size and the change of tax
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rate.
Prediction 3. Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and tax-1's eﬀective tax rate τ1 in-
creases, under Assumption 1-3, τ1 would rise by less if the tax base y1 is bigger in tax-1.
Proof: To prove Prediction 3, we need to show ∂2τ 1/∂θ0∂y1 < 0.
Combining Expression (A.4) and (A.10), we have
∂τ 1
∂θ0
=
∂T 1
∂θ0
∂τ 1
∂T1
=
D0S1
(1 + ε1)y1
(A.11)
Diﬀerentiating ∂τ 1/∂θ0 with respect to y1, we obtain
∂2τ 1
∂θ0∂y1
= − D0S1
(1 + ε1)y21
+
D0
(1 + ε1)y1
∂S1
∂y1
(A.12)
where ∂S1
∂y1
=
[
∂S1
∂C
′′
1 (T1;θ1)
C
′′′
1 (T1; θ1) +
∂S1
∂B′′ (Ts)
B
′′′
(Ts)
]
∂T1
∂y1
. Under Assumption 2, we have
∂S1
∂y1
= 0. Therefore it is straightforward to show that ∂2τ 1/∂θ0∂y1 < 0 by re-writting
Expression (A.12) as:
∂2τ 1
∂θ0∂y1
= − D0S1
(1 + ε1)y21
< 0 (A.13)
Marginal Cost of Other Public Funds
How does the response of tax rate τ1 to abolition of tax-0 change if MC2(·) curve is
ﬂatter? In the real world, it implies that the change of marginal cost for public fund-2
must be smaller. A ﬂatterMC2(·) curve implies a ﬂatterMCs(·) curve. For a given shock
of abolition of tax-0, ﬂatter MCs(·) results in a lower rise in cost (and also beneﬁt) of
public funds in optimality. Consequently, T1 and τ1 would increase by less magnitude as
a response.
The prediction below summarizes the impact of marginal cost of other public funds
on the tax enforcement.
Prediction 4. Suppose that tax-0 is abolished and tax-1's eﬀective tax rate τ1 in-
creases, under Assumption 1-2, τ1 would rise by less if the marginal change of marginal
cost of another source of funds (that is, C
′′
2 (T2)) is smaller.
Proof: To prove Prediction 4, we need to show ∂2T1/∂θ0∂θ2 > 0. Similar to the proof
of Prediction 2, this can be done by diﬀerentiating ∂T1/∂θ0 > 0 with respect to to θ2 as
below:
∂T 21
∂θ0∂θ2
=
∂D0
∂T0
∂T0
∂θ2
S1 +D0
∂S1
∂θ2
(A.14)
where ∂S1
∂θ2
satisﬁes Expression (A.8).
Under Assumption 1, we have ∂D0
∂T0
= 0. Under Assumption 2, ∂Si
∂θj
= ∂Si
∂C
′′
j (Tj ;θj)
∂C
′′
j (Tj ;θj)
∂θj
.
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Therefore, under Assumption 1-2, Expression (A.14) can be re-written as:
∂T 21
∂θ0∂θ2
= D0
∂S1
∂C
′′
2 (T2; θ2)
∂C
′′
2 (T2; θ2)
∂θ2
> 0 (A.15)
In (A.14), ∂2T1/∂θ0∂θ2 > 0 because ∂C
′′
2 (T2; θ2)/∂θ2 > 0 by assumption, and D0 > 0
, ∂S1/∂C
′′
2 (T1; θ1) > 0 respectively by deﬁnition of D0 in (A.4) and deﬁnition of S1 in
(A.5).
B Appendix: VAT Sharing Ratio and the Eﬀective VAT
Rate
This section is an appendix to Section 6.1.1. It mainly shows the cross-province vari-
ation of the VAT sharing ratio and its persistence over time. Evidence of a relationship
between the VAT sharing ratio and the eﬀective VAT rate will also be reported.
Figure B.1 plots the sharing ratio of county government VAT in total province VAT
revenue during 2001 - 2007 against 1995 - 2000 data.
The VAT share of county government in province is deﬁned by county government
VAT revenue / subnational governments total VAT revenue of a province.
Similarly, the right panel plots the sharing ratio of provincial governments. The VAT
share of provincial government in province is deﬁned by provincial government VAT
revenue / subnational governments total VAT revenue of a province.
I do not plot the sharing ratio of prefectural governments because Prefecture Share
= 1 - County Share - Province Share.
There are two features with Figure B.1. First, the ratios vary considerably across
provinces. Second, over time, ratios in most provinces remain stable from 1995 - 2007.
That can be seen from the fact that most data points stay around the 45 degree line.
Does the lower sharing ratio of county governments weaken their incentive to enforce
VAT and lower the eﬀective VAT rate in that province? Figure B.2 plots the eﬀective
VAT rate of each province against 1 - VAT share of county governments (it is also equal
to Prefecture government share + Province government share). The eﬀective VAT has
been controlled for the (4)-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm characteristics including
export-sales ratio, intermediate input-output ratio, ﬁrm size measured by logarithm of
value-added, sales, employment, proﬁtability measured by ratio of total proﬁt to sales,
ﬁrm age, and aﬃliation, and regional characteristics like GDP per capita and logarithm
of GDP.
Figure B.2 shows a slightly but signiﬁcantly negative relationship between the eﬀective
VAT rate and the VAT sharing ratio across provinces.
Table B.1 reports the regression of the eﬀective VAT rate on the 1 - County Share.
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Figure B.1: Persistence of VAT Share in Province
Figure B.2: Eﬀective VAT Rate over VAT Share
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Column (1) shows negative coeﬃcient on 1 - County Share, implying the eﬀective
VAT rate is higher in provinces where provincial and prefectural governments take more,
while county governments take less from 25% of the total VAT revenue belonging to the
subnational government. The coeﬃcient value -2.34 implies the eﬀective VAT rate falls by
about 0.23 percentage points if the county share rises by 10 percentage points. Clearly, the
magnitude of coeﬃcient is so small that a huge part of the eﬀective VAT rate dispersion
across regions cannot be explained by the variation in sharing ratio.
To disentangle the impact of province and prefecture share, column (2) and column
(3) respectively report the regression on Prefectural Share and Province Share. Both
coeﬃcients are negative but not signiﬁcant at a 10% level. Column (4) includes both
Prefectural Share and Province Share, and the coeﬃcients on both are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level.
Table B.1: VAT Sharing Ratio and Incentives for Tax Enforcement Level
Dependent Variable: Eﬀective VAT Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1 - County Share) -2.34
(0.92)**
Prefecture Share -1.37 -3.41
(1.75) (1.72)**
Province Share -1.14 -2.40
(1.05) (1.03)**
Controls
LOG(GDP), LOG(VA), LOG(Sales), Capital/Sales,
Ownership, Degree of Competition, Mobility.
Fixed Eﬀects
Prefecture-Year FE YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES
Sample size 17,845 17,845 17,845 17,845
R2 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12
Clustering Prefecture level(362 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
prefecture level (362 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance
at the 99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
C Appendix: Proﬁt Gap Rate
This section is an appendix to the proﬁt gap rate in Section 7.3.2.
Cai and Liu (2009), using the same dataset as this paper, propose using the gap
between a ﬁrm's imputed proﬁts based on the National Accounting Principle (NAP)
and its reported accounting proﬁts based on the General Accepted Accounting Principles
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(GAAP) to measure the degree of tax evasion (or tax avoidance). Prof,t, the reported
proﬁt for ﬁrm f in year t, can be directly taken from the Annual Survey of Industrial
Production. ImpProf,t, the imputed proﬁt for ﬁrm f in year t, is calculated in the
following way (for notational convenience, I ignore the subscripts):
ImpPro = Y − Intermed− FC −Wage− CurDep− V AT (C.1)
where Y is the ﬁrm's gross output; Intermed is intermediate inputs; FC is ﬁnancial
charges; Wage is the ﬁrm's total wage bill; CurDep is current depreciation; and V AT is
value-added tax payments.
The proﬁt gap ProGap = ImpPro− Pro. To be in line with the measurement of the
eﬀective VAT rate. I divide it by value-added to obtain the proﬁt gap rate.
Conceptually, the proﬁt gap can be broken down into four components:
ProGap = legitimate gap+ tax evasion
+earning management+ accounting error
(C.2)
On the right-hand side of expression (C.2), there are three components in addition
to tax evasion. The ﬁrst term, legitimate gap, is the legal diﬀerence between NAP and
GAAP.2 The accounting error is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a zero
mean. The earning management is not a signiﬁcant concern for the present study as
most ﬁrms in the sample are not publicly listed and do not have strong incentives to
over-report earnings to deceive shareholders.3 Given Expression (C.2), therefore, we only
need to assume that the legitimate gap is not correlated with the tenure of the prefectural
secretary of the CPC. Under this assumption, Expression (C.2) allows us to capture some
fraction, if not all, of the misreporting of ﬁrms' proﬁts.4
2The GAAP allows for more deductible items in calculating ﬁrms' accounting proﬁts than the NAP
does. Therefore the accounting proﬁt Proi,t is generally smaller than the imputed proﬁt ImpProi,t. The
legitimate gap between the two is approximately equal to: Manufacturing Expenses + Business Taxes and
Surcharges + Operating Expense + Management Fees + Asset Impairment Loss + Loss from Changes
in Fair Value + Investment Loss + Non-Business Expenditure - Non-Business Income - VAT.
3Studies related to this, such as Desai (2003, 2005), are predominantly in corporate ﬁnance and
accounting literature.
4Of course, Expression (C.2) cannot capture tax evasion that simultaneously changes the reported
proﬁts and imputed proﬁts by the same magnitude.
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Figure C.1: Distribution of Proﬁt-Gap Rate
Figure C.1 displays the distribution of imputed proﬁt rate, reported proﬁt rate and
the proﬁt gap rate. These three rates are all normalised by ﬁrms' value-added. It should
be noted that the reported proﬁt rate has a signiﬁcant spike around zero and is skewed
to the right. In contrast, the distribution of the imputed proﬁt rate is quite smooth. The
spike suggests that some ﬁrms probably report very low but positive proﬁts to evade tax.
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Figure C.2: Eﬀective VAT Rate Vs. Proﬁt-Gap Rate
Figure C.2 cross-validates the eﬀective VAT rate and the proﬁt gap rate at the pre-
fecture level after controlling for the 4-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀect. We can see that the
two rates are signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated, implying that tax enforcement may
consistently aﬀect both the eﬀective VAT rate and proﬁt misreporting across regions.
Since the eﬀective VAT rate and the proﬁt gap rate both have the value-added as their
denominators, the negative correlation between the two suggests that the variation of
both variables is largely driven by the numerators, which are potentially related to tax
evasion, rather than being driven by the denominator.
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Figure C.3: Dynamic Eﬀect of AGR. Tax Reform on Proﬁt Gap Rate
Figure C.3 plots the dynamic eﬀect of the abolition of agricultural tax on the proﬁt
gap rate based on Equation (7.2). The eﬀects shown in the ﬁgure are consistent with
the regression results in Table 8. The fall of the proﬁt gap rate after the agricultural tax
abolition suggests enforcements were also strengthened on the corporate income tax. It
is harder for ﬁrms to evade corporate income tax by under-reporting proﬁts.
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D Appendix: Figure
Figure D.1: Distribution of Eﬀective VAT Rate
Notes:
1. This ﬁgure controls for two factors that potentially aﬀect the eﬀective VAT
rate. First, ﬁrm characteristics, including: (1) export/sales, input-output structure
measured by intermediate-input/output, ownership type, proﬁtability measured by
proﬁt/value-added and Return-on-Asset, ﬁrm size measured by log(value-added),
log(sales), log(total asset), log(labour), a ﬁrm's aﬃliation type; and, (2) 4-digit
industry ﬁxed eﬀect. Second, measurement errors and ﬁrm-year speciﬁc shocks,
which are controlled for by taking the average of the eﬀective VAT rate across ﬁrms
within provinces and over eight years (2000 - 2007).
2. The dispersion in eﬀective VAT rate across ﬁrms could be the result of several
factors: (1) Statutory tax codes. Goods may apply at diﬀerent rates. For example,
in China, books and agricultural product are at a 13% low rate. Exports can get
the VAT refunded. Some intermediate input, mostly the service, are not deductible.
A manufacturing ﬁrm F may outsource the logistics service to another ﬁrm S in the
service sector. In this case, ﬁrm F's eﬀective VAT rate = (sales of ﬁrm F × 17 % - 0
) ( sales sales of ﬁrm F - purchased from ﬁrm S) > 17%. (2) measurement error and
yearly idiosyncratic shock to ﬁrm. For example, a ﬁrm may buy a huge quantity of
coal as intermediate input this year, therefore it would stir the VAT payment over
time and make the eﬀective VAT rate low in one year and high in the next. (3) tax
enforcement and tax evasion.
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Figure D.2: Distribution of Eﬀective VAT Rate (Raw Data)
Figure D.3: Distribution of Eﬀective VAT Rate (Firm Level, Raw Data)
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Figure D.4: Underground Sales of Fake Invoices
Notes:
1. Both the left and right panel are a print-screen from the author's mobile phone.
They show the conversation via text message between the author and two fake
invoice dealers in China.
2. The left panel shows a text message between the author and a fake invoice dealer
in Kunming, Yunnan Province. The message is a spam advert sent out by the fake
invoice deader thirty minutes after the author arrived at the airport in Kunming,
April 26, 2014. The following is a translation to English. (Dealer) Hello! Our
company can issue various kinds of (invoices from, note: this are the implied words
form the context) the State Administration of Taxation, Local Administration of
Taxation, for the service sector, engineering, accommodation. Checkable on-line!
Good price! Tel: 13078282477. Contact: HuiLin Yang. (Author) Can you issue
VAT Special Invoices for me? Can your invoice number match with that of the
Administration of Taxation? Where are your invoices from? From Administration of
Taxation or from other sources? (Dealer) We have Guanxi (social connection) and
do not pay tax. So it is cheap.
3. The right panel shows the text message between the author and another fake
invoice dealer in Beijing, the capital city of China. The message is a spam advert
received when the author was in Beijing in April, 2014. The head of the screen
shows the phone number of the invoice dealer. Below is the translation of part of the
conversation. (Author) Can you issue legal VAT special invoices? How much point
do you charge? (Dealer) Eight points (Note: that means the dealer charges 8% of
the face value of an invoice issued). (Author) Is it legal invoice? Can your invoice
number match with that of the Administration of Taxation? Is there any limitation
on the types of goods being purchased and sellers of the goods that are recorded
on invoices? Thanks! (Dealer) No limitation, whatever you want. (Author) I am
referring to the VAT special invoices. Is there still no limitation on the type of goods
and the sources of product origin so that you can issue the invoices as to whatever I
demand? (Dealer) Yes.
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Figure D.5: Agricultural Taxes and Government Transfer over Time
Notes:
1. This ﬁgure displays the county level over-time variation in the agricultural tax rev-
enue and subsidy associated with agricultural tax reform as ratios of total tax revenue.
55
Figure D.6: Distribution of Agricultural Revenue Loss across Counties
Notes:
1. This ﬁgure plots the distribution of revenue loss due to abolition of agricultural tax
across almost all county-level jurisdictions in China. The revenue loss is calculated
based on Expression (4.3).
2. By 2007, there were 2,860 county-level jurisdictions according to National Bureau
of Statistics. In this ﬁgure, there are 2,917 county-level jurisdictions. This is because
of the Special Economic Development Zone or Science and Technology Park in
some places which may be recognised by local governments as special county-level
jurisdictions and are assigned a 6-digit county region code.
3. The revenue loss to a small number of counties are negative, showing that these
counties could have beneﬁtted from the reform as they received more in subsidy
than they lost in taxes following the reform.
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Figure D.7: Geographical Distribution of Agricultural Revenue Loss across
China
Figure D.8: Distribution of Agricultural Revenue Loss within Prefecture
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Figure D.9: Agricultural Revenue Loss within Aba Prefecture in Sichuan
Figure D.10: Eﬀective VAT Rate over Time (Grouping by Median)
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Figure D.11: Eﬀective VAT Rate over Time (Grouping by 1st Quartile)
Figure D.12: Eﬀective VAT Rate over Time (Grouping by 1st Quartile)
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Figure D.13: Distribution of Revenue Loss in Pilot Province  Anhui
Figure D.14: Revenue Loss in Pilot Province  Anhui
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Figure D.15: Distribution of Revenue Loss in Pilot Province  Jiangsu
Figure D.16: Revenue Loss in Pilot Province  Jiangsu
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Chapter 2
Political Determinants of Selective Tax Enforcement:
Evidence from China
∗
Abstract
Politicians can play a critical role in administration of tax and other policies, but this role
is rarely documented or investigated in quantitative approaches. In this paper I ﬁrst study
VAT administration in China, which is the de jure responsibility of the State Administration
of Taxation but is subject to the de facto inﬂuence of local politicians, particularly the
prefectural secretaries of the Communist Party. Using the variation in turnover of secretaries
between 2000 and 2007, I ﬁnd that, over the tenure of the prefectural secretaries, the
eﬀective VAT rate changes in favour of capital-intensive industries, and to the detriment
of labour-intensive industries. Additional evidence reveals that the favouritism towards
capital intensity is not limited to VAT enforcement, but is also present for corporate income
tax and access to credit. I conclude the paper by discussing several possible channels for
this favouritism over the tenure of prefectural secretaries. The evidence seems to be most
consistent with the explanation of corruption.
∗The author is grateful to Francesco Caselli and Camille Landais for their supervision throughout the
research on this project and other related topics. Acknowledgements go to Tim Besley, Torsten Persson,
Ethan Ilzetzki, Steve Pischke, Henrik Kleven, Michael Peters, Johannes Spinnewijn, Robin Burgess,
John Sutton, Frank Cowell for their suggestions and comments, and to Eddy Tam for very helpful
discussions. The author also appreciates the feedback from participants in Work-in-progress Seminars on
Public Economics, Macroeconomics, and Labour at LSE, and in Seminars at Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, Renmin University of China, Central University of Finance and Economics. Special thanks to
Songtao Tan for sharing the dataset on Turnover of Prefectural Secretary, and Heng Yin for data on
County Public Finance Statistics. The author, of course, bears the responsibility for all the errors in the
paper.
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1 Introduction
De jure rates of taxation on corporations and individuals are predictable, codiﬁed,
and based on a number of observables. However, tax evasion implies that de facto tax
rates and their distribution across ﬁrms are quite diﬀerent from de jure tax rates and
their distribution. But what explains the distribution of de facto tax rates across eco-
nomic agents? And how do political institutions and corruption aﬀect the incentives for
selective enforcement by tax authorities? Does favouritism towards corruption-susceptible
ﬁrms inevitably lead to harsh policy at incorrupt ﬁrms? And is this pattern of selective
enforcement common as well to other maneuverable policies such as credit allocation?
In this paper I begin my study with the distribution of de facto VAT rates across
industries in China. The enforcement of VAT is the responsibility of local oﬃces of the
State Administration of Taxation (SAT), but is subject to the inﬂuence of local politicians,
particularly the prefectural secretaries of the Communist Party. I ﬁnd that in the early
years of a secretary's tenure in a certain locality, de facto VAT rates are relatively high for
local ﬁrms in capital-intensive industries. However, the longer the same individual retains
the role of local party secretary, the more the de facto tax burden shifts to labour-intensive
ﬁrms. Quantitatively, additional year of prefectural secretaries' tenure is associated with
a drop of the eﬀective VAT rate by 8% for capital-intensive ﬁrms, and a rise by 3% for
labour-intensive counterparts.1
In a similar vein, I use a natural experiment that creates variation across counties
through a ﬁscal squeeze that forces them to tighten up enforcement in order to bolster
revenues, to show that the longer the current prefectural secretary has been in his/her role,
the more the burden of adjustment falls on labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive
ﬁrms.
I generalize my ﬁndings by showing that two additional ﬁrm-level outcomes which
are potentially susceptible to political manipulation are sensitive to the local secretary's
tenure. First, the proﬁt gap  a proxy for the misreporting of company proﬁts  widens
by 25% (shrinks by 2.3%) for capital- (labour-) intensive ﬁrms as the party secretary's
tenure increases. This suggests that monitoring becomes more lax for capital-intensive
ﬁrms, and also indicates that the tenure eﬀect may extend to evasion of forms of tax
other than VAT. Second, I ﬁnd that over a secretary's tenure, capital- (labour-) intensive
ﬁrms are able to accumulate more (less) debt. Since the allocation of credit in the econ-
omy in China is subject to considerable political inﬂuence, this suggests that increasing
favouritism towards capital-intensive ﬁrms over the tenure of a secretary is not limited to
less aggressive tax enforcement.
1In this paper, capital-intensity of an industry, denoted by CapInt, is measured by the median of ﬁrms'
capital-sales ratio of the industry. After normalization, an industry with capital-intensity equal to one
(zero) is called a capital- (labour-) intensive industry. Readers can refer to Table 1 for the measurement
of CapInt.
64
I conclude the paper with a discussion of possible explanations for the tenure eﬀect.
I argue that the most plausible explanation is corruption. In support of this explanation
I present some circumstantial evidence. Following Cai et al. (2011), I use the ratio of a
company's entertainment and travel costs (ETC) to its sales as an indicator of corruption.
I ﬁnd that capital-intensive ﬁrms have increasingly higher ETC relative to sales over the
tenure of a prefectural secretary. In contrast, the ETC-to-sales ratio of labour-intensive
ﬁrms remains roughly constant. Further evidence shows that capital-intensive industries
are incentivized to participate in corruption for lucrative returns. For each RMB yuan
of expenditure on ETC, capital-intensive ﬁrms can obtain both greater VAT reductions
and easier access to ﬁnance than their labour-intensive counterparts. Quantitatively,
for capital-intensive ﬁrms, ten percentage points increase in the ETC-to-sales ratio is
associated with a reduction by 0.2 percentage point in the eﬀective VAT rate and a drop
by 0.71 percentage point in the probability of collateral requirement for bank loans. In
contrast, the return of ETC for labour-intensive ﬁrms is not robustly signiﬁcant.
However, I cannot entirely rule out alternative explanations, such as politicians' pref-
erences, industrial policies, political connections and learning eﬀects. I take these possi-
bilities into consideration in my empirical work. Nevertheless, it seems diﬃcult to fully
rationalize the evidence with these explanations.
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Eﬀective VAT Rate
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of the eﬀective VAT rate across ﬁrms in a histogram.
It shows that the dispersion of the actual VAT rate is huge, even though the statutory
standard tax rate is 17% for the whole country.2 Of course, this dispersion in the eﬀective
VAT rate across ﬁrms may be due to legitimate reasons such as lower rates for agricultural
2It also should be noted that the eﬀective VAT rate for some ﬁrms may exceed 17%. This is because
intermediate inputs may not be deductable for these ﬁrms.
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products and export refunds.3 However, the huge variation in the eﬀective VAT rate
can not be fully explained by legal factors, even after controlling for a long list of ﬁrm
characteristics which could potentially aﬀect the eﬀective tax rate.4
To further pin down the incentives for local political intervention, this paper attempts
to study the cross-industry distribution of the eﬀective VAT rate over local political cycles.
It tries to show whether and how the cross-industry distribution of VAT changes over the
tenure of a prefectural secretary of the Communist Party.
Relations to the Literature
The paper ﬁnds rising favouritism towards capital-intensive industries and simultane-
ous harsher treatment on labour-intensive ones as the prefectural secretary of the Com-
munist Party stays in oﬃce longer. The ﬁnding is complementary to a number of related
studies on corruption and political connection by drawing a bigger picture of their impact
not only on the corrupt or connected ﬁrms, but also on the incorrupt and unconnected
ones. In contrast, most existing studies have only shown the direct beneﬁts brought about
to corrupt or connected ﬁrms. For example, political connections aﬀect the taxation of
ﬁrms, in China and other countries (Adhikari et al., 2006; Faccio, 2007; Wu et al., 2009).
In addition to tax, there are other preferential policies  such as credit, permission to ac-
cess proﬁtable markets and so on  that corrupt or politically connected ﬁrms can obtain
from government oﬃcials (Fisman, 2001; Fisman and Wang, 2015, 2014; Faccio, 2006,
2007; Khwaja and Mian, 2005, 2011; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008). Some papers have
pointed out that discriminative bank loans are prevalent in China (Li et al., 2008; Allen
et al., 2005; Ponet et al., 2010; Cull and Xu, 2003; Fith et al., 2009). Moreover, the tenure
eﬀect identiﬁed in this paper is also consistent with the ﬁnding of Koren et al. (2014)
that politically connected ﬁrms in Hungary win more procurement contracts, but that the
number of contracts only gradually increases after the associated party wins the election,
rather than experiencing an immediate jump.
The paper may also shed some light on the distortion and misallocation issues in
China. The results show that the tenure eﬀect of a prefectural secretary on the VAT
rate actually reduces the dispersion of the tax rate between capital-intensive and labour-
intensive industries, which should be regarded as a good signal for an improvement in
aggregate productivity a la Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Of course, this may not be the case
3Here I introduce a simple case as an illustration. A manufacturing ﬁrm F may outsource the logistics
service to another ﬁrm S in the service sector. Acoording to the tax law in China, ﬁrm S in the service
sector is paying business tax and cannot issue the VAT special invoices to ﬁrm F. In this case, ﬁrm F's
eﬀective VAT rate = ( sales of ﬁrm F × 17 % - 0 ) / ( sales sales of ﬁrm F - purchased from ﬁrm S) >
17%.
4These characteristics include: exports/sales, input-output structure measured by intermediate-
input/output, ownership type, proﬁtability measured by proﬁt/value-added and return-on-assets, ﬁrm
size measured by log(value-added), log(sales), log(total asset), log(labour), and ﬁrm's aﬃliation type.
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if we also include distortions other than VAT. Further studies need to be carried out in
this regard.
Based on cross-country data, some recent literature stress the complementarity be-
tween legal capacity and ﬁscal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2011), as well as the
interaction between economic development, tax system, and political institutions (Besley
and Persson, 2013). Additionally, most studies on tax enforcement in developing countries
have long emphasized the information problem and the role of the informal sector in un-
dermining taxation capacity (Gordon and Li, 2009). This paper provides micro evidence
on how the weak legal capacity of a nation could translate into a weak taxation capac-
ity through the channel of political intervention even where information and informality
are not a problem. The paper suggests that a good taxation technology like VAT could
be crippled by unsatisfactory political institutions, and impeccable law codes might be
distorted by corruption.
Around the world, VAT has long been thought of as one of the best taxation tech-
nologies in use to date. For example, Pomeranz (2013) provides evidence from a ﬁeld
experiment on the advantage of VAT in revealing information along the value-added chain.
The ﬁndings in this paper, however, demonstrate that VAT in China is not operating at
its technological frontier. This ﬁnding is consistent with some cross-country studies
which ﬁnd that VAT administration is not eﬃcient in developing countries. For example,
Keen and Lockwood (2010) ﬁnd that the revenue impact of the introduction of VAT is
actually negative for poor countries. Aizenman and Yothin (2008) ﬁnd that the politi-
cal instability of a country reduces its VAT collection eﬃciency. Chen (2015a) suggests
that the within-industry dispersion in the eﬀective VAT rate leads to a loss in China's
manufacturing sector of about 7% of TFP. Chen (2015b) shows that VAT enforcement in
China can be aﬀected by shocks on local governments budget.
There is a huge literature on tax evasion. Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) and Slemrod (2007) provide comprehensive reviews in this regard. Slemrod et al.
(2001) and Kleven et al. (2011) use ﬁeld experiments to study tax-payers' behavioural
responses to the threat of auditing. Tax evasion is not a trivial issue in China. Fisman
and Wei (2004) ﬁnd that importing ﬁrms in China may evade tariﬀs and VAT by misla-
belling the classiﬁcation of imported products from Hong Kong. Cai and Liu (2009) ﬁnd
that market competition may make ﬁrms more likely to conduct tax evasion by under-
reporting their proﬁts. Alumnia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2014) highlight the cross-industry
heterogeneity of ﬁrms' misreporting in response to tax enforcement. Most of the exist-
ing literature highlights the incentive of tax-payers in tax evasion and emphasises the
information problem. Khwaja et al. (2014) is one of the few papers that studies how
pecuniary incentives could stimulate tax inspectors' eﬀorts. My paper focuses on the role
of politicians in tax administration and its impact on the eﬀective tax rate.
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Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of optimal
tax enforcement across industries where corruption is available. Section 3 introduces the
institutional background. Section 4 describes the datasets and measurements of variables.
Section 5 presents the main empirical strategies and the results of the tenure eﬀect on the
eﬀective VAT rate. Section 6 studies the tenure eﬀects on two other tenure-sensitive out-
comes: proﬁt misreporting and the debt ratio. Section 7 discusses the possible underlying
mechanisms of the tenure eﬀect on taxation and credit allocation. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model  Optimal Tax Enforcement with Corruption
This paper focuses on the capital-intensity of industries because it is widely suggested
that, although corruption might be pervasive around the world, it is quite concentrated
in certain industries. By and large, more corrupt industries turn out to be more capital-
intensive than less corrupt ones.5 The relationship between an industry's capital-intensity
and its corruption intensity gives rise to two following questions. First, why are the capital-
intensive ﬁrms more susceptible to corruption than the labour-intensive ones? Second,
if some corrupt ﬁrms can obtain a tax reduction or receive other preferential treatment,
does it necessarily mean that other incorrupt ones have to pay more tax and suﬀer harsh
treatment against them? The model in this section is aimed to answer these two questions
and demonstrate underlying mechanisms.
The model has two features. First, the government has to face a budget constraint.
Second, there exists homogeneous ﬁxed cost of corruption and heterogeneous return from
corruption across industries. The return includes tax reduction and others such as easy
credit and cheap land. In the paper, the model is kept as simple as possible for illustrative
purposes. I will not comprehensively analyse and discuss the model. Propositions of the
model are presented only for the cases relevant to the empirical ﬁndings in the paper.
It should be noted that although the model focuses only on the tax policy, it can easily
extend to other government policies, such as allocation of credit and land, where resource
constraints are binding for the government.
The answer to the second and ﬁrst question are summarized by Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3 respectively. Proposition 2 shows that the distribution of the eﬀective
tax rates across industries may change as the overall business environment grows more
5It is shown that, among other all sectors, the following manufacturing sectors are more prone to graft:
(1) coal, palm oil and timber; (2) oil, gas, chemicals and other energy; (3)steel, other metals, mining and
commodities (Economist, 2014). Most all of them are capital-intensive manufacturing sectors. Similarly,
according to a study based on 427 cases of bribery in international business by the OECD, two-thirds
of the cases occurred in just four industries: extractive (19%); construction (15%); transportation and
storage (15%); and information and communication (10%) (OECD, 2014).
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corrupt. Speciﬁcally, the tax rate drops for the corruption-susceptible capital-intensive in-
dustries and rises for the labour-intensive ones. This is mainly due to the assumption that
government has to face a budget constraint. Proposition 3 suggests that the corruption
of capital-intensive industries are more responsive to tax rate because they can get more
other beneﬁts, such as bank credit, from corruption in addition to tax reduction. The
underlying mechanism is, given the same ﬁxed cost of corruption, bigger other beneﬁts
from corruption can complement the beneﬁt of tax reduction and the complementarity
strengthens incentives of capital-intensive ﬁrms to participate in corruption.
Empirical tests of the models require exogeneous variation in the overall business
environment and rent-seeking opportunity. In most parts of the paper following Section
2, I will argue, with both reasoning and empirical facts, that the turnover and tenure
of a prefectural secretary of the Communist Party is potentially a good source of such
variation.
2.1 Optimal Eﬀective Tax Rates across Sectors
In this part I characterize the optimal eﬀective tax rates across sectors in the presence
of tax collection costs and corruption. The general equilibrium eﬀect of corruption on
taxation can be rationalized by the optimal conditions for taxation.
There are two types of agents in this model: tax-payers (ﬁrms) and the tax admin-
istrator. There are N industries, each indexed by i, and one unit continuum of ex ante
homogeneous ﬁrms in each industry, with each ﬁrm indexed by j.
Tax administrators can choose to enforce the eﬀective tax rate τi for each industry with
costly auditing. For any given τi, suppose there are a fraction 1−ui(τi) of ﬁrms in industry
i that choose to bribe government oﬃcials (not necessarily the tax administrators). In
return, the bribing ﬁrms only need to pay a tax rate τ¯i, which is lower than τi. For
simplicity, τ¯i is exogeneously given. Obviously, the higher the tax rate, the more incentive
to bribe the ﬁrm has. Therefore, u
′
i(τi) < 0.
In choosing the eﬀective tax rate τi, the tax administrator faces a trade-oﬀ between
the beneﬁt of public funds and taxation costs, as well as his/her own personal gain. The
trade-oﬀ can be summarized by the objective function as below:
max{τi}Ni=1 B(T )−
N∑
i=1
C˜i(τi) +
N∑
i=1
V (w)
where B(T ) is the total beneﬁt of public funds T , with B′(T ) ≤ 0, B′′(T ) ≥ 0 . T =∑N
i=1 T˜i, where T˜i is the total tax payment in industry i. T˜i = u(τi)Ti + (1− ui(τi)) T¯i,
where Ti and T¯i are the tax revenue of each non-bribing ﬁrm and bribing ﬁrm in industry
i, respectively, with Ti = τiYi(τi) and T¯i = τ¯iYi(τ¯i). Yi(τi) reﬂects the relationship between
the tax base and the tax rate. It is a reduced form that includes all types of response of
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a ﬁrm's tax base Yi to tax rate τi, with Y
′
i (τi) ≥ 0. Suppose the tax rate is always on the
good side of the Laﬀer Curve (augmented with corruption), that is, T˜
′
i (τi) > 0.
C˜i(τi) is the tax collection cost in industry i when the tax rate is τi. It can be expressed
as below:
C˜i(τi) = ui(τi)Ci(Ti) + (1− ui(τi))Ci(T¯i)
where ui(τi)Ci(Ti) is the tax collection cost for non-bribing ﬁrms, and (1− ui(τi))Ci(T¯i)
for bribing ones. The tax collection cost function Ci(Ti) satisﬁes C
′
i(Ti) > 0 and C
′′
i (Ti) >
0.
V (w) is the tax administrator's utility obtained from income w, and w can be written
in the following way:
w = w0 + θ (1− β)
N∑
i=1
(1− ui(τi))
(
Ti − T¯i
)
where w0 is the non-corruption income. θ (1− β) (1− ui)
(
Ti − T¯i
)
is the rent that the
tax administrator obtained from the bribing ﬁrms. (1− ui)
(
Ti − T¯i
)
is the total rent
of corruption in industry i. Parameter β∈ (0, 1) reﬂects the Nash bargaining power of
bribing ﬁrms in rent-seeking. (1− β) (1− ui)
(
Ti − T¯i
)
is the total bribes paid by ﬁrms.
Parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] is the share of bribes that the tax administrator can really obtain.
θ might be less than 1 because the corruption is conducted through a political network.
Everyone involved eventually take only a slice from the bribes.
There are three elasticities that are useful to describe the optimal conditions. They
are deﬁned as below.
Deﬁnition. (1) The elasticity of tax collection costs to the tax rate: cτ,i =
C
′
i (Ti)
Ci(Ti)−Ci(T¯i)
(
Ti − T¯i
)
;
(2) the elasticity of a ﬁrm's tax payment to the tax rate: Tτ,i =
T
′
i (τi)
Ti(τi)−T¯i (τi − τ¯i); (3) the
elasticity of corruption to the tax rate: uτ,i =
u
′
i(τi)
ui(τi)−ui(τ¯i) (τi − τ¯i).
The optimal eﬀective tax rates in each industry are characterized by the optimal
conditions of the maximization problem. To simplify the analysis, I consider the case
when θ is equal to zero. That is, the tax administrator can only obtain a negligible fraction
of rent as rewards. He/she would not intentionally raise the tax rate to force more ﬁrms
to bribe. This is true if the bribing ﬁrms resort to the more powerful politicians for help
rather than ﬁnding help from the tax administrator. Therefore, most, or even all, bribes
may not go into the tax administrator's pocket.
The optimal tax structure when θ = 0 can be characterized by the proposition as
below. Of course, the proposition still holds when θ is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 1. (The Tax Rate Distribution across Industries) If θ = 0, then the optimal
eﬀective tax rate in each industry is characterized by B′(T ) = Gi(τi)C
′
i(Ti) for any i =
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1, 2, ..., N , where Gi(τi) = 1 − 1−1/
c
τ,i
1−Tτ,i/|uτ,i| and Gi(τi)C
′
i(Ti) is the adjusted marginal tax
collection cost.
(1) Without corruption, that is, uτ,i = 0, then Gi(τi) = 1, and the optimal eﬀective tax
rates should equate to the marginal tax collection cost C
′
i(Ti) across industries.
(2) With corruption, that is, uτ,i < 0, then Gi(τi) > 1, and the the optimal eﬀective
tax rates should equate to the adjusted marginal tax collection cost Gi(τi)C
′
i(Ti) across
industries.
The following proposition demonstrates, in a simpliﬁed setting, that the change of
∣∣uτ,i∣∣
in one industry can aﬀect the whole distribution of the eﬀective tax rate across industries.
Proposition 2. (Change of Tax Rate Distribution across Industries) Suppose T does not
change (or B(T ) curve is vertical and B′(T ) = 0 ) and T˜ ′(τi) > 0 . If
∣∣uτ,i∣∣ in industry
i increases as political and business environment becomes more corrupt, then the eﬀective
tax rate should fall in this industry and rise in other industries.
The proof of this proposition is simple. We know that Gi(τi)C
′
i(Ti) is an increas-
ing function in τi and
∂Gi(τi)
∂|uτ,i| > 0. Suppose 
c
τ,i and 
T
τ,i are constant and determined
by technology and market structure.
∣∣uτ,i∣∣ may change with the business environment.
Given the optimality condition Gi(τi)C
′
i(τiY (τi)) = 0, the increase of
∣∣uτ,i∣∣ shifts the curve
Gi(τi)C
′
i(τiY (τi)) upward and thus reduces the optimal τi. The total tax revenue T˜ (τi)
consequently falls for industry i. Since T is ﬁxed, the tax revenue for other industry
T˜ (τ−i) should increase, which requires τ−i to rise for other industries. In the case of
B′(T ) < 0, the proof is a bit more complicated but the conclusion still holds under some
broad conditions.
Proposition 2 suggests that the eﬀective VAT rate should rise for capital-intensive
industries over the tenure of prefectural secretary while it drops for labour-intensive in-
dustries, if we believe the business environment becomes more corrupt as the tenure of
a prefectural secretary rises, then the corruption of some ﬁrms would create the general
equilibrium eﬀect on other un-corrupt ﬁrms, and, if the capital-intensive ﬁrms tend to be
more corrupt, that is, their
∣∣uτ,i∣∣ rises over the tenure, then we would observe the fall of
VAT rate in capital-intensive industries and its rise in labour-intensive industries.
2.2 Bribing Model and the Structural Form of uτ
The optimal tax condition suggests that the cross-industry distribution of the eﬀective
tax rate relies heavily on
∣∣uτ,i∣∣, the elasticity of corruption to the tax rate in each industry.
A question still remains unanswered. Given the business environment, which tends to
oﬀer equal corruption opportunities to all ﬁrms, why are capital-intensive ﬁrms more
susceptible to corruption than their labour-intensive counterparts? Why is the level of
corruption of capital-intensive ﬁrms more sensitive to the eﬀective tax rate?
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The bribing model in this part attempts to answer these questions and to provide a
structural form for uτ . The model has two features: (1) ﬁxed corruption cost; and (2)
Nash bargaining over the corruption rent. It can generate the complementarity between
tax beneﬁt and other beneﬁts from corruption, which is key to answering the questions.
For narrative convenience, the ﬁrm size Yi is normalized to one in this model. Suppose
the ﬁrms j in each industry i now are heterogeneous in that they need to pay a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc ﬁxed cost sij before being able to bribe. sij is like a club membership fee in
order to enjoy the corruption service. Within each industry, sij satisﬁes a distribution
represented by CDF function F (s) over the support [0,∞). The distribution is the same
for all industries.
There are two kinds of rents created from corruption: preferential tax treatment τi− τ¯i
and other beneﬁts Bi. The latter may include easy access to ﬁnance, cheap land, and so
on. The total rent is τi − τ¯i +Bi.
The rent is split between bribing ﬁrms and corrupt oﬃcials under the Nash bargain,
with the ﬁrm having bargaining power β ∈ (0, 1). If a ﬁrm has decided to bribe, then it
needs to pay a bribe Qi = β (τi − τ¯i +Bi) to the oﬃcial who has promised to help. So
the ﬁrm's beneﬁt from corruption is Ri = (1− β) (τi − τ¯i +Bi).
The decision of a ﬁrm whether or not to participate in corruption is made in the
following way. The ﬁrm ﬁrst observes its sij and Ri. It would like to bribe if sij < Ri.
In this case, it need to pay both the ﬁxed cost sij and the bribe Qi. Otherwise, it would
participate in corruption.
Under these settings, the elasticity of corruption to the tax rate uτ can be pinned down
as the following structural form.
Proposition 3. (Structural Form of the Elasticity of Corruption to Tax Rate) uτ=λi (τi − τ¯i),
where λi = β
f(Ri)
1−F (Ri) , and Ri = (1− β) (τi − τ¯i +Bi). uτ satisﬁes
∂|uτ,i|
∂Bi
> 0 if the hazard
rate f(Ri)
1−F (Ri) is rising in Ri (or sij has a thin-tailed distribution).
Intuitively, this proposition suggests the complementarity between the tax beneﬁts
and other beneﬁts from corruption. The bigger the other beneﬁts Bi, the more sensitive
corruption is to the eﬀective tax rate.
Empirically, the paper has shown that capital-intensive ﬁrms generally obtain more
other beneﬁts, such as access to ﬁnance. Bigger Bi implies bigger
∣∣uτ,i∣∣. Combined with
Proposition 2, it should lead to lower τi in capital-intensive industries and higher τ−i in
labour-intensive industries. As the tenure of the party secretaries rises, more corruption
opportunities are oﬀered. Capital-intensive ﬁrms are more liable to participate in corrup-
tion and more sensitive to τi. Therefore, τi falls for capital-intensive ﬁrms and τ−i rises
for labour-intensive ones.
72
3 Institutional Background
Local Governance in China and the Communist Party Secretary
China is ruled under a ﬁve-level hierarchical structure of governments  central, province,
prefecture, county, and village/town. At each level of government, the de facto political
leader is the secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC). At the prefecture level,
the prefectural secretary of the CPC outranks the mayor, legislators, and judges in most of
the major local government decisions. The political power of party secretaries originates
from their right to appoint personnel.6
The governance of China is centralized through the personnel appointment and control
of Communist Party secretaries at the diﬀerent levels. Usually, the prefectural secretary is
appointed by the Provincial Committee of the CPC. In most cases, the timing of this ap-
pointment coincides with the Prefectural Congress of Party Representatives, which takes
place every ﬁve years and therefore determines a standard ﬁve-year term for prefectural
secretaries.7
Party Secretary and VAT Administration
Although VAT is administered by the State Administration of Taxation and the ap-
pointment of its personnel and funding allocations are under the vertical administration
of the central government, a local party secretary can still exert enormous inﬂuence, either
directly or indirectly, on VAT inspectors.
Within the system of the Communist Party of China, a prefectural party secretary
is the direct supervisor of the party secretary of the State Administration of Taxation
of the same prefecture. The former can considerably aﬀect the promotion prospects and
political career of the latter. In almost all cases, the chief of the State Administration
of Taxation is also the party secretary of the State Administration of Taxation, and is
therefore subject to the supervision of the prefectural party secretary.
In addition to the direct supervisory role of prefectural party secretaries over the chief
of the SAT, there are several other indirect ways through which local governments and
secretaries can intervene in VAT enforcement. First, the local government can help the
SAT in issues such as obtaining land for oﬃce buildings, schooling for children, local
hospitals for health care, and so on. Second, it is openly known that the SAT receives a
subsidy from the local government in order to improve its working conditions and staﬀ
6One of the political principles in China is that the cadre should be under the rule of the Party (CPC)
(or Dang Guan Gan Bu in Chinese. A cadre is generally a party member in key position at diﬀerent level
of governments). The power of secretaries of the CPC, originated from personnel appointment, is known
as the the mother of power. (People's Forum (Renmin Luntan), issue 2, 2007). For more introduction
to secretaries of the CPC, refer to http://baike.baidu.com/view/2372141.htm?func=retitle.
7Xu (2011) oﬀers an insightful and comprehensive description of the characteristics of China's political
regime.
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welfare, or for any other reason. Third, the capability of the SAT in tax law enforcement
is limited by local departments of Public Security, which are under the tight control of
local governments.8 Fourth, tax administrators have their own dirty laundry. Selective
anti-corruption is a popular threat of local governments against a tax administrator once
he/she refuses to cooperate.
There are many potential ways through which local politicians can inﬂuence the de
facto tax rate. Here I introduce two possible ones. First, local governments can demand
that the SAT turns a blind eye to ﬁrms using fake invoices, which are rampant across
China.9 Second, local governments can directly order the local oﬃce of the SAT to
enforce a lower VAT rate on a ﬁrm, if the local oﬃcials are powerful enough.10
To sum up, although the de jure VAT rates are legislated at the national level, pre-
fectural party secretaries and other local oﬃcials can inﬂuence the de facto tax rate of a
ﬁrm.
4 Data and Main Variables of Interest
4.1 Data
The paper employs four datasets: (1) the Annual Survey of Industrial Production
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2000-2007); (2) newly-digitized
data on political turnovers of prefectural secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (2000-
2010); (3) the Investment Climate Survey conducted by the World Bank in China (2005);
(4) the County Public Finance Statistics Yearbook of China (2000-2007).
The Annual Survey of Industrial Production includes all state-owned ﬁrms and non-
state owned ﬁrms with annual sales of more than 5 million RMB yuan (approximately
800,000 US dollars). I use the data from 2000 to 2007. Number of ﬁrms increases from
8For example, in China, the SAT is entitled to crack down on fake invoices only with the help of
the police. Therefore, the SAT can do nothing with a fake invoice if the local police are not willing to
collaborate.
9Anecdotal evidence show that this type of case is not rare in many regions. A case is currently being
brought to the court in Jiang Xi province in which a company is being charged with issuing and selling
fake VAT special invoices to other ﬁrms. The company under charge is said to be subsidised by the local
government. For another example, the SAT annouced the eight biggest cases of tax law violation in 2013.
All of these cases were related to fake VAT special invoices. In every case, the tax evaded is above one
hundred million RMB yuan (about 15 million US dollars). The highest eﬀective tax rate the ﬁrm paid
in one of these cases was only 0.11% (Xinhua Net, October 21, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-
10/21/c_117804571.htm)
10For example, anecdotal evidence reveals that in 2012, Samsung Electronics decided to invest a project
worth seven billion US dollars in Xi'an, capital city of Shannxi Province. To attract the gigantic FDI, Mr.
Zhao, the provincial secretary of the CPC at the time, agreed that a VAT rate of 11% could be applied
to this project. Of course, disputes over the unlawful tax rate followed between the Shannxi government
and the SAT. The central government had to step in and ﬁnally Shannxi government won the case. It
turned out to be a gentleman's agreement through private bargaining between the local government, the
SAT and the cetral government.
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about 66,000 to 168,000 during the sample period after dropping bad observations. In-
formation on each ﬁrm includes a 4-digit industry code, ownership, county-level region
code, value-added, sales revenue, and tax payments including VAT, corporate income tax,
business tax and other minor local taxes.
Data on the political turnover of prefectural secretaries of the Chinese Communist
Party is collated from government websites. The dataset is a balanced panel containing
all prefectures (there are around 300 prefectures in China) and all years from 2000 to
2010. The data reveal whether there is a change in prefectural secretary of the CPC for
each prefecture in each year and, if there is a change, whether the new secretary is locally
promoted or appointed from elsewhere.11
The Investment Climate Survey Data in China conducted by the World Bank (2005)
includes 12,000 manufacturing and service sector ﬁrms in 120 prefectures of China. The
questionnaire covers a huge range of information regarding the investment climate. In
this paper, we are interested in only two types of ﬁrm records: (1) tax payments and
balance sheets; and (2) the relationship between ﬁrms and governments.
The County Public Finance Statistics Yearbook of China (2000 - 2007) includes gov-
ernment revenue and government expenditure at the county and prefecture levels. In this
paper, we are interested in the following variables: (1) tax revenue; (2) total revenue (in-
cluding oﬀ-budget revenue); (3) total expenditure (including oﬀ-budget expenditure); (4)
agricultural taxation revenue; (5) subsidy for the agricultural taxation reform; (6) total
population; and (7) total GDP.
All the summary statistics of main variables are reported in Table 1. It should be noted
that the ﬁrm-level data in the Annual Survey of Industrial Production are collapsed at the
county-(2-digit)industry-year level for regressions. Similarly, the data in the Investment
Climate Survey prefecture-(2-digit) level are collapsed at the prefecture-(2-digit)industry
level because it does not provide the county code.
Table 1: Summary Statistics (INSERT)
4.2 Measurement of Main Variables
4.2.1 Eﬀective VAT Rate
I construct the eﬀective VAT rate of a ﬁrm f in year t as:
Effective V AT ratef,t =
Payble V AT f,t
V alue addedf,t
(4.1)
11Of course, one may propose using even smaller county-level jurisdiction to do the same work. But
the problem with the county level is there are about three thousand county-level jurisdictions in China.
On average, there will be only three ﬁrms in each country-(2-digit)industry-year cell, leaving the study
contaminated by a potentially large sampling error.
75
which can be re-written as
τ˜sf,t·S˜f,t−τ˜mf,t·M˜f,t
Sf,t−Mf,t , where S˜f,t and M˜f,t are the sales and inter-
mediate inputs used to calculate the payable VAT. For notational convenience, I ignore
subscripts f and t for all relevant variables in this section. These are the numbers recorded
by ﬁrms on their VAT special invoices. τ˜ s and τ˜m are the tax rates actually applied for
sales and intermediate inputs, respectively. They could diﬀer from the statutory tax rates
τ s and τm. In the data, only τ˜ s · S˜ and τ˜m · M˜ are observable.
To understand sources of variation in the eﬀective VAT rate, I decompose it into two
components as:
Effective V AT rate = τ˜
s·S˜−τ˜m·M˜
τs·S−τm·M · τ
s·S−τm·M
S−M (4.2)
The second component on the right-hand side of Expression (4.2), τ
s·S−τm·M
S−M , can
be re-written as τ s + (τ s − τm) (S/M − 1)−1, which implies that the variation in the
statutory rates τ s and τm, as well as input-output structure S/M , could potentially be
sources of variation in the eﬀective VAT rate. If the ﬁrm exports goods worth E, then
τ s in Expression (4.2) should be replaced by τ s − τ e · (E/S), where τ e is the post-rebate
statutory VAT rate for exports. In this case, the ratio of export to sales is an additional
source of variation.12 Although the second component contains various possible sources
of variation described above, Chen (2015a) shows that they are insuﬃcient to explain
variation in the eﬀective VAT rate. Therefore, this paper focuses on the ﬁrst component
and investigates the variation of the eﬀective VAT rate as a result of lax tax enforcement
or tax evasion.
Several caveats should be noted with the measurement of the eﬀective VAT rate. First,
because only τ s · S˜ and τm ·M˜ are observable, we cannot distinguish the exact ways of tax
evasion by manipulating the tax rate (τm or τ s) and by the tax base (M˜ or S˜). Second,
one may suspect the variation of the eﬀective VAT rate may come from the manipulation
of reported value-added, that is, the denominator in Expression (4.1), rather than from
tax evasion through the numerator.
4.2.2 Tenure of Prefectural Party Secretary
There are two variables regarding the tenure of prefectural secretaries of the CPC: (1)
tenure of secretary; and (2) duration of secretary in oﬃce. The tenure of the secretary
measures the years that the secretary has been in oﬃce since he/she was appointed. The
duration in oﬃce indicates the total years for which the secretary is in oﬃce between his
appointment and the appointment of his successor.
Figure 4.1 describes the turnover of prefectural secretaries of the CPC from 2001 to
2010 in China. The ﬁgure shows that the turnover is quite random over time. Around 80
12The staturory rate varies because certain sectors or activities are taxed at diﬀerent rates, and ﬁrms
diﬀer in their input-output structure or in the extent to which they engage in activities subject to special
tax treatment.
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out of 300 prefectures undergo political turnover each year.
Figure 4.1: Turnover of Prefectural Secretary of CPC
Figure 4.2 depicts the distribution of tenure and duration of prefectural secretaries
in the whole of China. From the distribution of duration (left graph) we can see that
secretaries are most likely to leave oﬃce after ﬁve years, which is one standard term in
oﬃce for the secretary.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Tenure and Duration of Prefectural Secretary of CPC
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5 Party Secretary's Tenure and the Distribution of Ef-
fective VAT Rate across Industries
5.1 Changes in VAT Rate over Secretary Tenure
Motivated by Figure 4.2, this paper aims to uncover the political factors that shape
the distribution of the eﬀective VAT rate. In particular, the paper shows that the cross-
industry distribution of the eﬀective VAT rate and capital intensity changes over the
tenure of prefectural secretary.
Figure 5.1: Tenure and Variation of Eﬀective VAT Rate with Capital Intensity
Figure 5.1 displays how the variation of the eﬀective VAT rate with capital intensity
changes over the tenure. The capital intensity is deﬁned as LOG(1 + total assets/sales).
The ﬁgure clearly shows that the eﬀective VAT rates of capital-intensive ﬁrms go down
as the tenure rises, while the eﬀective VAT rates of labour-intensive ﬁrms go up.
Figure 5.1 is drawn using the following steps. First, ﬁrms are divided into two groups
according to the tenure of the prefectural secretary in the corresponding region and year.
Because a standard term is ﬁve years, observations are classiﬁed as one group if tenure
< 3, another for tenure ≥ 3. The residual eﬀective VAT rate can then be obtained by a
regression on a list of relevant factors.13 Finally, the variation of the (residual) eﬀective
13These factors include: (1) ﬁrm characteristics: exporst/sales, input-output structure measured by
intermediate-input/output, ownership type, proﬁtability measured by proﬁt/sales, ﬁrm size measured by
log(value-added), log(sales), log(total asset); (2) prefecture-(1-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀect.
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VAT rate with capital intensity for each group is drawn using a local polynomial smooth
method (degree = 1, bin = 0.5). Three red vertical reference lines indicate the quartiles of
capital intensity across industries. The ﬁgure shows that fewer than a quarter of industries
experience a reduction in their VAT rate, while the remaining three-quarters experience
their eﬀective VAT rate rising.
5.1.1 Empirical Strategy
Motivated by Figure 5.1, the main regression is speciﬁed as below to capture the
heterogeneous tenure eﬀect on the relationship between the eﬀective VAT rate and capital
intensity.
τc,i,t = α + ηp,s + µr,t + γ · CapInti · Y eart +
λ · Tenurep,t + ϕ · Tenurep,t · CapInti +
ρ · CapInti + ψ · CapInt2i + θ ·Xp,i + β · Tenurep ·Xp,i +
δ · Zc,t +
∑3
d=1 ωd ·Duration_Dummydp,t + c,i,t
(5.1)
where the outcome variable τc,i,t is the mean of the eﬀective VAT rate within a country-
(2-digit)industry-year cell. Subscripts c, p, r, i, s, t represent county, prefecture, province,
2-digit industry, 1-digit industry and year, respectively.
Key variables on the right-hand side are Tenurep,t and CapInti · Tenurep,t, where
Tenurep,t is the tenure of the secretary of the CPC in prefecture p in year t, which takes
natural numbers {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} in main regressions. CapInti is deﬁned as in Figure 5.1,
except that I subtract its minimum value across 2-digit industries, so that CapInti = 0
for the least capital intensive industry.14
There are three region-industry-time speciﬁc controls. ηp,s is a prefecture-(1-digit)industry
ﬁxed eﬀect, which captures the persistent region-industry factors determining τc,i,t. µr,t
is the province-year ﬁxed eﬀect, which absorbs the province-year speciﬁc shocks, such as
political turnover at the province or the national level. CapInti · Y eart is to absorb the
industrial trend which depends on capital intensity.
To control for the tenure eﬀect on taxation through characteristics other than capital
intensity, I add Tenurep,t · Xp,i in the regression, where Xp,i is a vector of other ﬁrm
characteristics of 2-digit industry i in prefecture p over all years, including ownership,
proﬁtability, ﬁrm age, logarithm of sales volume, logarithm of value-added, ratio of inter-
mediate input to output, and ratio of exports to sales. To avoid the endogeneity problem,
following Fisman and Svensson (2007), all these ﬁrm characteristics, except ownership,
14This paper ﬁnds that capital intensity is an important industry characteristics according to which
the tenure eﬀect shows heterogeneity. The problem is that, conditional on sales volume, capital-intensive
ﬁrms are also the ﬁrms with the greatest capital. One way to disentangle the concept of capital intensity
and ﬁrm size is to use investment intensity rather than capital intensity. The paper performs a robustness
check with this replacement, and the results are consistent.
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take the median within 2-digit-industries of prefecture p (while ownership takes the mean
due to its 0-1 nature). 15 In addition to CapInti, its square term CapInt
2
i is also included
to capture the non-linear relationship between τc,i,t and CapInti shown in Figure 5.1.
Zc,t is a vector of county characteristics, including logarithm of GDP per capita, log-
arithm of total population, and ﬁscal budget pressure faced by the county-level govern-
ment.16 These may aﬀect the incentives for tax enforcement and the taxation capacity of
local governments. Inclusion of local GDP is also due to the concern over the manipula-
tion of GDP data by local oﬃcials. This could aﬀect the eﬀective VAT rate if a ﬁrm's tax
payment is not adjusted, together with the manipulation of value-added data.17
I also divide prefectual secretaries into three groups, and add three dummy variables
Duration_Dummydp,t (d = 1, 2, 3), according to whether their ex post duration is less
than, equal to, or more than ﬁve years (the standard duration of one term), respectively.
I do this because less capable secretaries may ﬁnd it harder to get promoted and tend to
stay in oﬃce longer than one term. The estimates of tenure eﬀect will be biased if these
personal characteristics aﬀect their incentives and ability to intervene in tax enforcement.
To show the dynamics of tenure eﬀect, I also present results where Tenurep,t is replaced
by a vector of dummy variables, each for a diﬀerent possible number of years of tenure.
Because fewer than 8% of the observations have a tenure longer than ﬁve years, the
standard error could be large for these observations. In the empirical implementation,
observations with tenure longer than ﬁve years will be regarded the same as those with
tenure of ﬁve years.
5.1.2 Results
The ﬁrst two rows in Table 2 show the results of the tenure eﬀect on ﬁrms' eﬀective
VAT rates based on Equation (5.1).
Panel A does not include Tenurep,t · Xp,i in the regression. Column (1) shows no
signiﬁcant tenure eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT rate across industries if we do not consider
heterogeneity based on capital intensity. Column (2), however, reveals signiﬁcant opposing
tenure eﬀects on labour-intensive and capital-intensive industries. The coeﬃcients imply
that as the tenure increases, the eﬀective VAT rate increases for the most labour-intensive
15For example, measurement errors of explanatory variables can generally result in biased estimation.
In regression (5.1), the mean of capital-intensity of an industry is sensitive to the extreme measurement
error of outliers, but its median is not.
16Fiscal budget pressure for the county government is measured by: [total budget expenditure - basic
construction expenditure - total budget revenue - (extra-budget revenue - extra-budget expenditure)] /
total population.
17One caveat should be noted. Due to the lack of data on county characteristics for some counties or
in some years, the regression sample size would reduce by half once county characteristics are controlled
for. However, the number of prefectures covered in the sample would not dramatically drop as most
prefectures would still have some counties in the sample. This is not a fatal problem as my interest is
the variation within-prefecture and over time.
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industries and decreases for the more capital intensive ones. Column (3) reports the
key results that control for industrial trends with CapInt ∗ Y ear, and shows that the
tenure eﬀects are still signiﬁcant. However, their magnitude are absorbed slightly by the
industrial trends.
Panel B includes the cross-terms Tenurep · Xp,i. The coeﬃcients of Tenure and
Tenure ∗CapInt in all four columns conﬁrm the baseline results in Panel A. Addition-
ally, the results of Tenure * other industry characteristics in Columns (4)  (6) show
that other industry characteristics are not the channels through which tenure aﬀects the
eﬀective VAT rate. Columns (1) - (4) all control for the county characteristics, including
LOG(GDP/Pop), LOG(Pop), and ﬁscal pressure. In Columns (5) and (6), I drop these
three controls. This allows me to use a larger sample including counties that do not
provide data on these three controls. As a remedy, Column (6) replaces the prefecture-
(1-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀect with a county-(1-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀect. Compared to
columns (5) and (6), the signiﬁcance of Tenure goes up while that of Tenure∗CapInt
goes down.
The results in Column (6) bear some quantitative implications, suggesting that when
the prefectural secretary stays in oﬃce for additional year, the eﬀective VAT rate rises
by 8% (or 0.8 percentage point from 9.5% to 10.3%) for labour-intensive industry with
CapInt = 0, and drops by 3% (or 0.3 percentage point from 11% to 10.7%) for capital-
intensive industry with CapInt = 1. Given the size of the economy involved, the magni-
tude are not negligible.
Table 2: Tenure Eﬀect on Eﬀective VAT Rate (INSERT)
Figure 5.2 shows the dynamic heterogeneous tenure eﬀect on the variation of the eﬀec-
tive VAT rate with capital intensity. The tenure eﬀect is still estimated based on Equation
(5.1) and the regression follows the version of column (5) in Table 2, but with Tenurep,t
replaced by a vector of dummy variables
{
Tenuresp,t
}D
s=0
. The left panel shows the tenure
eﬀect on for the most labour-intensive industry, namely the one with CapInti = 0. The
right panel shows the tenure eﬀect on a more capital intensive industry (CapInti = 1),
which corresponds to the 98th percentile of the distribution of CapInti. Several features
of Figure 5.2 should be noted. First, the tenure eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 95% signiﬁcance level in the ﬁrst two years for either labour-intensive indus-
tries or capital-intensive industries. Second, in year three, the tenure eﬀect is signiﬁcant
but moves in the opposite direction for labour-intensive and capital-intensive industries 
positive for the former and negative for the latter. Third, the eﬀects remain at around the
same level until at least year ﬁve, when the prefectural secretary ﬁnishes his/her standard
ﬁrst term and is quite likely to leave oﬃce. 18
18The cyclical pattern of tenure eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT rate with peak in year four might be possibly
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Figure 5.2: Tenure Eﬀect on Variation of Eﬀective VAT Rate with Capital Intensity
5.2 Tenure-speciﬁc Response to a Natural Experiment
In Section 5.1, we have focused on the eﬀect of the prefectural secretary of the CPC's
tenure on the LEVEL of the eﬀective VAT rate. In this section, I study the eﬀect of the
tenure on the CHANGE in the eﬀective VAT rate across industries in a situation where
local governments have to strengthen tax enforcement for all industries.
Using a Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ approach, Chen (2015b) ﬁnds that, after the abolition of taxes on
agricultural activities, eﬀective VAT rates increased disproportionately in counties that
had previously been most reliant on these taxes. This ﬁnding suggests that abolition
of the agricultural tax is a good natural experiment in which the average level of tax
enforcement is strengthened in response to public revenue losses.
Combining the heterogeneous tenure eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT rate discussed in
Section 5.1 and the change of tax enforcement due to the abolition of agricultural tax,
this section attempts to answer the following questions. After the abolition of agricultural
tax, is the tenure eﬀect on the CHANGE of the variation of the eﬀective VAT rate with
capital intensity consistent with that on the LEVEL of the eﬀective VAT rate? Does the
explained by the capability and incentive of corruption over the local political cycles. Given a ﬁve-year
average term of prefectural secretaries, the window for corruption is narrow for local oﬃcials. In the ﬁrst
two years, the new political network is yet to be in shape. Corruption is hard to carry out. In year ﬁve,
when prefectural secretaries are most likely to get promoted, corruption may hazardously wreck their
political career. Therefore, corruption are most likely to take place in year three and year four in the
middle of a term.
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CHANGE of the eﬀective VAT rate also favour capital-intensive ﬁrms more in the region
where the prefectural secretary stays in oﬃce for longer?
To see how the abolition of agricultural taxation reduced local tax revenue and how this
aﬀected local governments' incentives to strengthen tax enforcement, this paper follows
Chen (2015b) and measures the agricultural taxation revenue shock for each county c as:
Agrc =
(Agr tax revenuec,2000∼2004+Subsidyc,2000∼2004)
total tax revenuec,2000∼2004
− Subsidyc,2005∼2007
total tax revenuec,2005∼2007
(5.2)
On the right-hand side, Xc,2000∼2004 (Xc,2005∼2007) is the average of variable X in county c
between 2000 and 2004 (2005 and 2007). Agr tax revenue is the agricultural tax revenue.
Subsidy is the central government transfer associated with the agricultural taxation reform
and received at the county level. To avoid bargaining between central government and
local government, the subsidy is based on a pre-determined formula. total tax revenue is
the total budgetary tax revenue, including VAT, corporate income tax, business tax and
others, while oﬀ-budget revenue is not included.19
Figure 5.3 plots the distribution of agricultural reform shocks across approximately
3,000 county-level jurisdictions in China. The left graph is the original value of the shock
calculated based on Expression (5.2); the average shock is 25%. It should be noted that
the shocks to a small number of counties are negative, showing that these counties could
even have beneﬁtted from the reform as they received more in subsidy than they lost
in taxes following the reform. The right graph, by normalizing the prefecture average
shock to zero, displays the shock across counties within a prefecture. The shock is quite
symmetric across counties, with standard deviation at about 15%.
Figure 5.3: Distribution of Agriculture Tax Shock across Counties
The nationwide abolition of agricultural tax generates variation of tax revenue loss
across two dimensions. Over time, most of the regions suﬀered a negative revenue loss,
19In China, the local government can also raise revenue through other non-tax sources such as fees and
local funds, or selling land and public assets such as state-owned enterprises.
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while across regions, the intensity of the shock varied. This variation over time and across
regions allows for the standard Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ method to identify the impact on tax enforce-
ment. Chen (2015b) uses the Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ method to demonstrate that the treatment eﬀect
of the abolition of agricultural tax on the eﬀective VAT rate is positive, and the parallel
trend assumption is satisﬁed.
Based on the Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ method, the heterogeneous tenure eﬀect on the variation of
tax enforcement with capital intensity can be captured by the following regression.
τc,i,t = α + βc,i + ηp,s,t + γ · Postt +
(λ · Tenurep,t + ϕ · Tenurep,t · CapIntr,i,t) · Postt · Agrc +
ρ ·Xc,i,t + c,i,t
(5.3)
Postt is the dummy variable for years post the agricultural tax reform. Agrc, measured
by expression (5.2), is the agricultural reform shock for county c, and the vector Xc,i,t
contains all the levels and interactions of terms between Postt, CapIntr,i,t, and Agrc, as
well as additional controls I used in Equation (5.1).
The coeﬃcients λ and ϕ tell us how the distribution of the burden from local govern-
ments having to respond to a ﬁscal shortfall varies with the CPC secretary's tenure. A
positive λ and negative ϕ imply that, the longer the secretary has been in oﬃce, the more
the burden shifts to labour-intensive industries.
I include a prefecture-(1-digit)industry-year ﬁxed eﬀect ηp,s,t to absorb the prefecture-
(1-digit)industry-year speciﬁc shock potentially correlated with the county agricultural
tax shock or turnover in party secretary shock at the prefecture level. I also include a
county-(2-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀect βc,i to control for the time-invariant county-industry
characteristics do not need to be included in the regression.
It should be noted that ﬁrm characteristics at the (2-digit)industry level should not be
included in the regression because βc,i has been introduced. Capital intensity CapIntr,i,t
is the median at the province-(2-digit)industry-year level so that it is not aﬀected by
the prefecture-(2-digit)industry-year shock. Other ﬁrm characteristics take median at the
county-(2-digit)industry-year level (ownership takes the mean due to its 0-1 nature), to
control for their impact on τc,i,t. The same as Equation (5.1),
∑3
d=1 ωd·Duration_Dummydp,t
is introduced to avoid the selection problem.
5.2.1 Results
Based on the regression of Equation (5.3) with the ﬁrm-level data collapsed at the
county-year level, Table 3 reports the heterogeneous tenure eﬀect on the variation of VAT
enforcement triggered by the abolition of agricultural tax with capital intensity.
Panel A reports the Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ baseline regression results. The treatment eﬀect of
agricultural tax reform on VAT enforcement is captured by the coeﬃcient on Post∗Agr.
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To cope with the within-group serial correlation problem, as identiﬁed by Bertrand et al.
(2004), robustness standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level in column (1). As
a robustness check, clustering are at the province level in column (2).
Panel B reports the regressions based on Equation (5.3). The key results are the coef-
ﬁcients on Post * Agr * Tenure and Post * Agr * CapInt * Tenure. They show that
after the agricultural tax reform, the counties suﬀering greater agricultural tax revenue
shock strengthened their VAT enforcement on all industries, but with no diﬀerence be-
tween industries (coeﬃcient of Post * Agr * CapInt, µ = 0 ). However, in counties where
prefectural secretaries were in oﬃce longer, the enforcement is higher on labour-intensive
industries (coeﬃcient of Post * Agr * Tenure, λ > 0) and lower on capital-intensive
industries (coeﬃcient of Post * Agr * Tenure * CapInt, ϕ < 0). Robustness standard
errors are clustered at the province-(1)industry level in Panel B.
Table 3: Tenure Eﬀect on the Change of Tax Enforcement (INSERT)
Figure 5.4: Tenure Dynamic Eﬀect on Change of VAT Rate
Figure 5.4 displays the dynamic tenure eﬀect based on regression (5.3), with Tenurep,t
replaced by a vector of dummy variables for each tenure.20 The results are consistent
20Similar to the approach in Section 4, λ · Tenurep,t + ϕ · Tenurep,t · CapIntr,i,t in Equation (5.3) is
replaced with
∑D
s=0
(
λs · Tenuresp,t + ϕs · Tenuresp,t · CapIntr,i,t
)
, and other terms involving Tenurep,t
do not change to avoid unnecessary complications. The dynamics of the tenure eﬀect for labour-intensive
and capital-intensive industries can be caputured by {λs}Ds=0 and {ϕs}Ds=0, respectively.
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with Table 3 where Tenurep,t takes the natural measurement of tenure. The eﬀective
VAT rate rises for the labour-intensive industries (left panel) and falls for the capital-
intensive industries (right panel) as the tenure of the prefectural secretary increases. Once
again, the results conﬁrm the rising favouritism towards capital-intensive industries as the
prefectural secretary stays in oﬃce longer.21
6 Other Tenure-sensitive Outcomes
In this section, I study the eﬀect of tenure on the misreporting of proﬁt. As Cai and
Liu (2009) suggested, proﬁt misreporting is potentially related to the evasion of corporate
income tax.
Additionally, it is well known that credit allocation in China is subject to political
inﬂuence (Li et al., 2008; Allen et al. 2005; Ponet et al., 2010; Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et
al., 2009). In this section, I explore local favouritism towards capital-intensive industries
in the allocation of credit by looking into the eﬀect of tenure on ﬁrms' debt ratios across
industries.
6.1 Proﬁt Gap Rate
Cai and Liu (2009), using the same dataset as this paper, propose using the gap
between a ﬁrm's imputed proﬁts based on the National Accounting Principle (NAP)
and its reported accounting proﬁts based on the General Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) to measure the degree of tax evasion (or tax avoidance). Proi,t, the reported
proﬁt for ﬁrm i in year t, can be directly taken from the Annual Survey of Industrial
Production. ImpProi,t, the imputed proﬁt for ﬁrm i in year t, is calculated in the following
way:
ImpProi,t = Yi,t − Intermedi,t − FCi,t −Wagei,t − CurDepi,t − V ATi,t (6.1)
where Yi,t is the ﬁrm's gross output; Intermedi,t is intermediate inputs; FCi,t is ﬁnancial
charges;Wagei,t is the ﬁrm's total wage bill; CurDepi,t is current depreciation; and V ATi,t
is value-added tax payments.
The proﬁt gap ProGapi,t = ImpProi,t − Proi,t. To be in line with the measurement
of the eﬀective VAT rate, I divide it by value-added to obtain the proﬁt gap rate.
21The tenure eﬀect on the change of VAT rate in Figure 5.4 is monotonic and seems diﬀerent from the
cyclical pattern as the tenure eﬀect of the eﬀect VAT rate in Figure 5.2. The diﬀerence between the two
needs further exploration.
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Conceptually, the proﬁt gap can be decomposed into four components:
ProGapi,t = legitimate gapi,t + tax evasioni,t
+earning managementi,t + accounting errori,,t
(6.2)
On the right-hand side of expression (6.2), there are three components in addition
to tax evasion. The ﬁrst term, legitimate gap, is the legal diﬀerence between NAP and
GAAP.22 The accounting error is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a zero
mean. The earning management is not a big concern for our study as most ﬁrms in the
sample are not publicly listed and do not have strong incentives to over-report earnings
to deceive shareholders.23 Given Expression (6.2), therefore, we only need to assume that
the legitimate gap is not correlated with the tenure of the prefectural secretary of the
CPC. Under this assumption, Expression (6.2) allows us to capture some fraction, if not
all, of the misreporting of ﬁrms' proﬁts.24
Figure 6.1: Distribution of Proﬁt-Gap Rate
Figure 6.1 displays the distribution of imputed proﬁt rate, reported proﬁt rate, and
the proﬁt gap rate. These three rates are all normalized by ﬁrms' value-added. It should
be noted that the reported proﬁt rate has a signiﬁcant spike around zero and is skewed
22The GAAP allows for more deductible items in calculating ﬁrms' accounting proﬁts than the NAP
does. Therefore the accounting proﬁt Proi,t is generally smaller than the imputed proﬁt ImpProi,t. The
legitimate gap between the two is approximately equal to: Manufacturing Expenses + Business Taxes and
Surcharges + Operating Expense + Management Fees + Asset Impairment Loss + Loss from Changes
in Fair Value + Investment Loss + Non-Business Expenditure - Non-Business Income - VAT.
23Studies related to this, such as Desai (2003, 2005), are mainly in the literature of corporate ﬁnance
and accounting.
24Of course, Expression (6.2) cannot capture tax evasion that simultaneously changes the reported
proﬁts and imputed proﬁts by the same magnitude.
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to the right. In contrast, the distribution of the imputed proﬁt rate is quite smooth. The
spike suggests that some ﬁrms probably report very low but positive proﬁts to evade tax.
Figure 6.2: Eﬀective VAT Rate Vs. Proﬁt-Gap Rate
Figure 6.3: Tenure and Variation of Proﬁt Gap Rate with Capital Intensity
Figure 6.2 cross-validates the eﬀective VAT rate and the proﬁt gap rate at the pre-
fecture level after controlling for the 4-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀect. We can see that the
two rates are signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated, implying that tax enforcement may
consistently aﬀect both the eﬀective VAT rate and proﬁt misreporting across regions.
Since the eﬀective VAT rate and the proﬁt gap rate both have the value-added as their
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denominators, the negative correlation between the two suggests that the variation of
both variables is driven mainly by the numerators, which are potentially related to tax
evasion, rather than being driven by the denominator.
As a ﬁrst-pass test, following the same approach as in Figure 5.1, I provide in Figure
6.3 a visual representation of the relationship between the proﬁt gap rate and capital
intensity changes over tenure. The ﬁgure clearly suggests that the proﬁt gap rate of
capital-intensive ﬁrms goes up as the tenure rises, while the eﬀective VAT rate of labour-
intensive ﬁrms goes down. Similar to Figure 5.1, the ﬁgure shows that fewer than a quarter
of the industries experience more lax tax treatment, while the remaining three-quarters
face tougher treatment.
Table 4: Tenure Eﬀect on Proﬁt Gap Rate (INSERT)
Table 4 reports more formal empirical results.
The results in columns (2) - (6) show pretty signiﬁcant and robust tenure eﬀects, which
suggest that as the tenure rises, the proﬁt misreporting rate increases for capital-intensive
industries and decreases for labour-intensive ones. The results are consistent with the
tenure eﬀects on the eﬀective VAT rate.
Two points should be noted for Panel B. First, unlike in the case of the eﬀective
VAT rate, some of the other industry characteristics appear to show a tenure eﬀect. In
particular, as tenure rises, an industry tends to report less proﬁts if it has fewer state-
owned ﬁrms, higher proﬁts, bigger size, and a higher ratio of intermediate inputs relative
to outputs. Second, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on Tenure rises signiﬁcantly once
the interaction of these characteristics with tenure is included.
Quantitatively, the results in Column (6) suggest that, when the prefectural secretary
stays in oﬃce for additional year, the proﬁt gap rate drops by 2.3% (or 9.2 percentage
points from 40% to 30.8%) for labour-intensive industry with CapInt = 0, and rises by
9.7% (or 2.4 percentage points from 25% to 27.4%) for capital-intensive industry with
CapInt = 1.
Figure 6.4 displays the dynamic eﬀects of tenure on the proﬁt gap rate for low and high
capital intensity. The left picture shows the tenure eﬀect on labour-intensive industries
(CapInti = 0). The right picture shows the tenure eﬀect on capital-intensive industries
(CapInti = 1). The features in Figure 6.4 are quite consistent with those of the eﬀective
VAT rate in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 6.4: Tenure Eﬀect on Variation of Proﬁt Gap Rate with Capital Intensity
6.2 Tenure Eﬀect on Debt Ratio
The debt ratio is deﬁned as a ﬁrm's total debt divided by total assets. It reﬂects a
ﬁrm's willingness and ability to borrow from banks or other ﬁnancial institutions.
Figure 6.5 shows how the relationship between the debt ratio and capital intensity
changes over tenure. This time, the tenure eﬀects do not show opposing directions de-
pending on capital intensity. The picture suggests that the debt ratio of all industries
goes up as the tenure rises, but more considerably and signiﬁcantly for capital-intensive
industries.
Table 5, with the same structure as Table 2, reports the tenure eﬀects on ﬁrms' debt
ratios based on Equation (5.1). Except for the coeﬃcient on Tenure * CapInt in column
(6), all other results in columns (2) - (6) show pretty signiﬁcant and robust tenure eﬀects,
which again conﬁrm the favouritism towards capital-intensive industries. As the tenure
rises, the debt ratio rises for capital-intensive industries and falls for labour-intensive ones.
The results in Column (6) suggest that, when the prefectural secretary stays in oﬃce
for additional year, the debt ratio drops by 6% (or 3.2 percentage points from 55.5% to
52.3%) for labour-intensive industry with CapInt = 0, and rises by 1% (or 0.5 percentage
point from 55% to 55.5%) for capital-intensive industry with CapInt = 1.
It should be noted that there are some signiﬁcant results on Tenure * other industry
characteristics, including ownership, proﬁtability, LOG(V-added), and LOG(Sales). This
means that, as tenure rises, industries with more non-state-owned and more proﬁtable
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ﬁrms tend to accumulate more debt.
Figure 6.5: Tenure Eﬀect on Debt Ratio over capital intensity (LOWESS Smooth)
Table 5: Tenure Eﬀect on Debt Ratio (INSERT)
Figure 6.6: Tenure Eﬀect on Variation of Debt Ratio with Capital Intensity
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Figure 6.6 displays the dynamic tenure eﬀects on the relationship between the debt
ratio and capital intensity based on the dynamic version of the regression in Column
(5) of Table 5. The left panel shows the tenure eﬀect on labour-intensive industries
(CapInti = 0) and the right panel is for capital-intensive industries (CapInti = 1).
From the graphs we can see that in year three the debt ratio falls for labour-intensive
industries and rises for capital-intensive industries, and in year ﬁve it reverts to the original
level for both industries.
7 Explaining the Tenure Eﬀect
All of the results in Section 4 and Section 5 suggest that governments' preferential
policies, both in taxation and credit rationing, shift in the direction of favouring capital-
intensive industries as the tenure of a prefectural secretary increases.
What mechanism underlies the tenure eﬀect? In this section, I explore several possibil-
ities: corruption, politicians' career concerns and industrial policy, political connections,
learning eﬀects, and manipulation of value-added data. Although I cannot entirely rule
out other possibilities, the evidence seems to be more in line with the explanation of
corruption.
To help understand the mechanism of a tenure eﬀect through corruption, I propose a
multi-sector optimal taxation model with tax collection costs in a corrupt environment in
Section 2. The model simply aims to explain the empirical ﬁndings in the paper.
7.1 Corruption
According to the Corruption Perception Index released by Transparency International,
a global corruption watchdog, China ranked 80th in Cleanness among 177 countries
worldwide in 2013.25 But to measure corruption is a tough issue (Olken and Pande, 2012).
And we know that, even in the same corrupt environment, the intensity of corruption
varies considerably across ﬁrms (Svensson, 2003). Firms' incentives to participate in
corruption could be determined by their various characteristics, such as capital intensity,
ownership status, size, proﬁtability, mobility, age, and so on. We therefore need to take
these characteristics into consideration when studying corruption.
Following Cai et al. (2011), I use the ratio of a ﬁrm's entertainment and travel costs
(ETC) to their total sales volume as a relevant indicator for its participation in corruption.
In China, companies' entertainment costs includes the following four types of expenditure:
(1) banquets and working meals; (2) souvenirs; (3) tickets, travelling cost, and other fees
to tourist sites; and (4) expenses for business trips. Chinese ﬁrms spend extravagantly on
entertainment to strengthen their relationship with government or with business partners.
25http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.
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It is well known that many bribes, pecuniary or non-pecuniary, are paid and reimbursed
under the name of ETC expenditure in accounting practice.26 With the data of the
Investment Climate Survey in China, Cai et al. (2011) ﬁnd that ETC is a mix that
includes grease money to obtain better government services, or protection money to lower
tax rates. It is therefore a plausible measure of corruption.
To provide further validation of ETC as an appropriate proxy for corruption, Figure
7.1 plots ETC against the Government Intervention Index (GII) at the province level.27 A
higher GII means a lower degree of government intervention and better market support.
Theoretically, a province with lower GII has more rent-seeking opportunities and should
be expected to have more expenditure on corruption, and we do see such a relationship
in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: ETC Vs. Government Intervention
If corruption is an underlying mechanism behind the favourable eﬀect of tenure for
capital-intensive ﬁrms, then the intensity of corruption of capital-intensive industries
26The media has reported that the entertainment costs of 2,469 listed Chinese companies in 2012 were
13.798 billion RMB yuan (2.26 billion US dollars), at an average of 0.9 million US dollars per company.
Among these, the biggest ETC spender is China Life Insurance Company, spending 1.4 billion RMB (230
Million US dollars). In second place is China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), spending 837
Million RMB (137 million US dollars, or about 11% of its net proﬁts). On August 1st, 2013, four judges
of the Shanghai Higher Court, together with top leaders of Shanghai Construction Group Co.. Ltd, were
caught calling prostitutes in a nightclub. It is alleged that the fees were to have been paid by Shanghai
Construction Group, whose entertainment expenditure in 2012 was 178 million RMB yuan (29 nillion US
dollars). (China Youth Daily, Aug 6th, 2013).
27The Government Intervention Index (GII), compiled by Fan and Wang (2011), is widely used in the
Chinese economics literature. It is constructed along the following four sub-indices: 1. the role of market
in resource allocation; 2. the burden of taxes and fees on farmers; 3. the government intervention to
ﬁrms; 4. the burden on ﬁrms in addition to tax; 5. the size of government. The greater the GII, the
lower the intensity of government intervention.
93
should rise faster over the CPC secretary's tenure than that of labour-intensive indus-
tries. To investigate this, I use the cross-sectional ﬁrm data from the Investment Climate
Survey in China (2005).
Similar to Equation (5.1), the regression is speciﬁed as below to capture the cross-
industry heterogeneous tenure eﬀect on corruption:
yp,i = α + ηr,s + λ · Tenurep + ϕ · Tenurep · CapInti +
β · Tenurep ·Xp,i + ρ · CapInti + ψ · Age_Dummyp,t +
θ ·Xp,i
∑3
d=1 ωd ·Duration_Dummydp,t + p,i
(7.1)
where the outcome variable yp,i is the ETC ratio. Subscripts f , p, r, i, s represent ﬁrm,
prefecture, province, 2-digit-industry, 1-digit industry, respectively. Tenurep is the tenure
of the secretary of the CPC in prefecture p in year 2004. ηr,s captures the province-(1-
digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀect. CapInti is the median of capital intensity of 2-digit industry
i in year 2004, with CapInti normalized to zero for the least capital-intensive industries.
Xp,i is a vector of other ﬁrm characteristics of 2-digit industry i in prefecture p in year
2004, including ownership, proﬁtability, ﬁrm age, logarithm of sales volume and logarithm
of value-added. Reverse causality is a concern. For example, a corrupt ﬁrm may get
more beneﬁt and therefore become bigger and proﬁtable. To deal with this problem,
all these ﬁrm characteristics, except ownership, take the median of 2-digit industries of
prefecture p in year 2004 (ownership takes the mean). Parameters of interests are λ and
ϕ. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the province level. As in Equation (5.1),∑3
d=1 ωd ·Duration_Dummydp,t is introduced to avoid the selection problem.
Three diﬀerences should be noted between Equation (7.1) and Equation (5.1). First,
due to data limitations, Equation (7.1) is just a cross-sectional regression. Second,
CapInt2i is not dropped in Equation (7.1). Even if it were included, its coeﬃcient would
not be signiﬁcant and the main results would not be aﬀected. Third, Age_Dummyp,t
is included in Equation (7.1). It is a dummy variable indicating whether the age of a
prefectural secretary is greater than 50. I take 50 as the threshold not only because it
is the median in the sample, but also because this appears to be the age after which
prefectural secretaries are very unlikely to get promoted, and therefore they tend to be
more corrupt.28
Table 6 shows the results, based on Equation (7.1), of the tenure eﬀect of the prefec-
tural secretary of the CPC on ﬁrms' ETC ratios at the ﬁrm level. The regression uses
the cross-prefectural variation in secretary tenure. The results show that, in prefectures
where the tenure is longer, the ETC ratio is signiﬁcantly higher for capital-intensive in-
dustries. The tenure eﬀect for labour-intensive industries in negative but is insigniﬁcant.
Results in columns (2) - (5) shows that the relationship between the tenure eﬀect and
28In China, it is known as 50-year old phenomena of prefectural secretaries.
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capital intensity is robust to the inclusion of other ﬁrm characteristics. The results in
Column (5) imply that, when the prefectural secretary stays in oﬃce for additional year,
the ETC expenditure rises by 0.8% (or 0.09 percentage point from 10.9% to 11.8%) for
capital-intensive industry with CapInt = 1.
Table 6: Tenure Eﬀect on ETC (INSERT)
Figure 7.2 displays the dynamic tenure eﬀect on ETC based on regression (7.1), with
Tenurep,t replaced by a vector of dummy variables for each tenure year. The left panel
shows the tenure eﬀect on labour-intensive industries (CapInti = 0) and the right panel
is for capital-intensive industries (CapInti = 1). The graph shows that the ETC of
capital-intensive industries goes up signiﬁcantly in year three and remains higher until it
falls in year ﬁve. In contrast, the ETC of labour-intensive industries remains unchanged
until year ﬁve, when it falls sharply.
Figure 7.2: Tenure Dynamic Eﬀect on ETC
Suppose that it is corruption that induces the favouritism towards capital intensity
over the tenure, the question then is why capital-intensive ﬁrms have more incentives
to participate in corruption. One possible way to answer this question is to look at
the beneﬁts associated with corruption at the ﬁrm level. These beneﬁts include a VAT
reduction and access to credit.
Based on the cross-sectional ﬁrm data from the Investment Climate Survey in China
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(2005), the baseline regression can be speciﬁed as follows.
yf = α + ηp,s + λ · ETCf + ϕ · ETCf ·Kf +
β · ETCf ·Xf + ρ ·Kf + θ ·Xf + f
(7.2)
where the notations are the same as those in Equation (5.1). The outcome variables
yf are Eﬀective VAT Rate or Collateral dummy, respectively. The latter indicates
whether the collateral is required for an overdraft or a bank loan. ηp,s is the prefecture-
(1-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀect. Xf and its interaction with ETCf are included as controls.
It should be noted that all the ﬁrm characteristics used in the regression are at the ﬁrm
level and are observable to government oﬃcials, because we want to know the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
return to ETC and manager's political status. It should be expected that the return to
corruption and political connections is higher for capital-intensive ﬁrms.
Table 7 and Table 8 report two types of observable preferential policies  VAT reduction
and credit access, respectively  that capital-intensive ﬁrms with higher ETC can obtain.
Table 7 displays how the association between the eﬀective VAT rate and ETC ex-
penditure varies with capital intensity. Both the baseline regression results in Panel A
(based on equation (7.2)) and the results in Panel B show the robustly negative coeﬃ-
cient on ETC ∗ CapInt. It suggests, that for the same amount of ETC expenditure,
capital-intensive ﬁrms can obtain greater VAT reductions than labour-intensive ﬁrms. The
results in Panel B also show that other industrial characteristics are not channels through
which the ETC aﬀects the eﬀective VAT rate. Quantitatively, the results in Column (8)
suggest that, when the ETC ratio rises by 1 percentage point, then the eﬀective VAT
would drop by 0.0153 percentage point (or around 14%) for capital-intensive industry
with CapInt = 1.
Table 8 reports how the relation between collateral requirements and ETC expenditure
varies with capital intensity. Both the baseline regression results in Panel A (based on
equation (7.2)) and the results in Panel B show the robustly negative coeﬃcient on ETC∗
CapInt. It also suggests that other characteristics seem not to be the channels through
which the ETC aﬀects access to ﬁnance. The results in Column (8) imply that, when
the ETC ratio rises by 1 percentage point, then the probability of collateral requirement
for bank loan would drop by 0.71 percentage point for capital-intensive industry with
CapInt = 1.
Table 7: Return to ETC  Eﬀective VAT Rate (INSERT)
Table 8: Return to ETC  Collateral Requirement for Bank Loan (INSERT)
One caveat should be noted. The results in Table 7 and Table 8 conﬁrm that capital-
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intensive ﬁrms obtain more returns for the same ETC expenditure. But it seems puzzling
that the labour-intensive ﬁrms' ETC has a negative return in some regressions, for both
the eﬀective VAT rate (columns (1) - (6) of Table 7) and collateral requirement (columns
(1), (3) - (5) of Table 8). However, it is not signiﬁcant in column (8) once all characteristics
are controlled for. Although this is not a big concern as this paper is more interested in
the heterogeneity with capital intensity  that is, the coeﬃcient of ETC ∗CapInt rather
than the coeﬃcients of ETC  I would still like to provide two possible explanations for
this result. One possibility is the general equilibrium eﬀect of corruption. Given the fact
that the total rent-seeking opportunities are ﬁxed, it would be a zero-sum game if both
capital-intensive ﬁrms and labour-intensive were to compete for the preferential treatment
from the local government. If the capital-intensive ﬁrms spend more on ETC and win the
game, then it would be the labour-intensive ﬁrms who would have to pay the higher tax,
even if they have also already paid the ETC of corruption. Another possible explanation is
that labour-intensive ﬁrms can actually get positive returns to ETC in other aspects that
are not observed by statisticians, even though the returns in terms of a VAT reduction
and an ease in credit appear to be negative.
7.2 Other Channels
In addition to heterogeneous corruption depending on capital intensity, there are a
couple of potential mechanisms underlying the tenure eﬀect. I discuss these possibilities
in this section. However, the evidence suggests that most of these mechanisms are unlikely
to be functioning.
7.2.1 Politicians Career Concern and Industrial Policy
Several authors argue that local politicians in China compete in GDP growth in order
to achieve promotion (Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li et al. 2005). For politicians, one way
to boost short-run GDP growth is to stimulate investment in physical assets, and capital-
intensive industries provide good leverage to do so. To verify this explanation, I studied
the tenure eﬀect on ﬁrms' long-term investments based on Equation (5.1). However, the
regression results show no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Another reason for the preferential policy towards capital-intensive ﬁrms could be local
governments picking the winner and wanting to divert resources to the successful capital-
intensive ﬁrms. However, it is diﬃcult to reconcile this explanation with the empirical
results. I studied the distribution of ﬁrms' proﬁtability (measured by returns-on-assets,
ROA) and productivity (measured by total factor productivity of revenue, TFPR) accord-
ing to capital intensity.29 The results show that both ROA and TFPR of capital-intensive
29Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the total factor productivity of Revenue (TFPR) of ﬁrm i is
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ﬁrms are lower than for labour-intensive ﬁrms. And the regression of the tenure eﬀect
based on Equation (5.1) suggests that capital-intensive ﬁrms become even less proﬁtable
(lower ROA) and less productive (lower TFPR) as the tenure of the prefectural secre-
tary rises. If the local politicians are picking the winner, why are preferential policies
given to unsuccessful capital-intensive ﬁrms? And why do these ﬁrms become even more
unsuccessful after obtaining the preferential policies?
7.2.2 Political Connections
Many studies use the political background of ﬁrms' top leaders to measure political
connections, and study the beneﬁts to ﬁrms (Faccion, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). In
China, it is not only the ﬁrm that has an incentive to hire a top leader with a political
background; the government would also like to appoint someone  either a former gov-
ernment oﬃcial or a professional manager  as the top leader of a ﬁrm in order to tighten
its grip on the ﬁrm's operations. To capture these political connections and government
intervention, I also use the status of the ﬁrm's general manager  a dummy variable indi-
cating whether or not the manager is appointed by the government  which is available
from the Investment Climate Survey (2005) in China conducted by the World Bank. The
likelihood of appointment of a politically connected manager does not change over the
tenure of the prefectural secretary, in respective of a ﬁrm's capital intensity.
7.2.3 Learning Eﬀect
One may argue that the shifts in taxation from capital-intensive ﬁrms to labour-
intensive ﬁrms as the tenure rises could be due to the secretary, or some lower level
oﬃcials newly appointed by the secretary, accumulating skills in taxation during their
leadership. However, several hard facts in China go against this argument. First, prefec-
tural secretaries rarely need to learn how to tax; it is the tax inspectors who collect tax
from ﬁrms directly. Also, most grassroots taxation staﬀ are very stable in their positions.
The impact of prefectural secretaries' turnover on their position and taxation skill is very
limited, if not inexistent. Second, lacking the detailed information and professional skill in
taxation, the prefectural secretary in practice would only set the annual tax revenue target
for the local oﬃce of the SAT, rather than painstakingly lecturing tax inspectors on how
to tax diﬀerently across industries. Third, if the shift in taxation from capital-intensive
ﬁrms to labour-intensive ﬁrms is due to learning eﬀects, it must require the prefectural
secretary to learn how to tax labour-intensive ﬁrms more quickly than capital-intensive
ﬁrms. This is at odds with the common understanding that it is easier to learn how to
tax capital-intensive ﬁrms than labour-intensive ﬁrms (Gordon and Li, 2009).
calculated by TFPRi =
V Ai
Kαi ·L1−αi
, where α is the industry-level capital share.
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7.2.4 Manipulation of Value-added Data
Figure 6.2 has already shown that the cross-regional variation of the eﬀective VAT
rate and the proﬁt gap rate are mainly driven by the numerator (which is related to
tax enforcement), rather than the denominator (ﬁrms' reported value-added). However,
one may still suspect that the tenure eﬀect may come from the manipulation of ﬁrms'
reported value-added rather than from tax enforcement. Even though it is true that local
politicians in China may require ﬁrms to over-report their value-added in order to fabri-
cate local economic performance and achieve promotion, this explanation is inconsistent
with another two facts. First, if the manipulation of ﬁrms' value-added is the cause of
the tenure eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT rate, then the opposing tenure eﬀects for capital-
intensive industries and labour-intensive industries must imply that the value-added is
rigged upwards for some industries and rigged downwards for others. Obviously, it would
be extremely unlikely for any local politician to have done this. Second, if the tenure ef-
fect comes from the variation of value-added (the denominator of both the eﬀective VAT
rate and the proﬁt gap rate), then the tenure eﬀect should display the same direction for
both the eﬀective VAT rate and the proﬁt gap rate. The results, however, show opposing
directions for these two rates.
7.2.5 Input-output Structure and Export Refund
Exports can earn a ﬁrm VAT refunds. In addition to this, both the analysis in Section
4.1.1 and the regression results show that a higher input-output ratio for an industry
may also reduce its eﬀective VAT rate. Does the tenure eﬀect on the eﬀective VAT rate
work not through tax enforcement, but instead through input-output structure or export
refunds? To examine whether this is possible, I study the tenure eﬀect on input-output
structure and the export ratio with Equation 5.1. The dependent variable is replaced
with either the input-output ratio or the export ratio at the county-(2-digit)industry-year
level. The results show no signiﬁcant tenure eﬀect on export refunds. This implies that
export refunds are not an alternative channel for the tenure eﬀect. Although the tenure
eﬀect is signiﬁcant for capital-intensive industries in some regressions at the 10% level,
the coeﬃcient ϕ is negative. Because a lower input-output ratio leads to a higher eﬀective
VAT rate, if the input-output channel does exist, it would actually attenuate the tenure
eﬀect and bias the tenure eﬀect towards zero. Therefore, the true tenure eﬀect would be
even stronger than I have estimated.
8 Conclusion
This paper conﬁrms that tax enforcement on ﬁrms and credit allocation over them
vary with local political cycles, as represented by the tenure of the prefectural secretary
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of the Communist Party, who is the de facto local governor in China.
The paper begins with the cross-industry distribution of the eﬀective VAT rate. VAT
is a technologically sound tax that is in operation across around 150 countries. China
adopted VAT in 1994 and has established a nationwide VAT special invoice cross-checking
system. To prevent local intervention, VAT administration has always been under the
charge of the central government-led State Administration of Taxation (SAT). However,
VAT enforcement in China is still proving to be problematic. The empirical results show
rising favouritism towards capital-intensive industries over the tenure of the prefectural
secretary. That is, as the tenure rises, the eﬀective VAT rate falls for capital-intensive
industries and rises for labour-intensive industries. In addition, the paper uses the na-
tionwide abolition of agricultural tax in 2005 as a natural experiment in which local
governments were forced to raise the eﬀective VAT rate for local manufacturing ﬁrms.
The results show that the VAT rate rises less for capital-intensive industries and more for
labour-intensive ones the longer the tenure of the prefectural secretary.
The favouritism towards capital-intensive industries appears to extend to two addi-
tional outcomes. First, the tenure eﬀect on proﬁt misreporting suggests that capital-
intensive ﬁrms are more likely to under-report their proﬁts to evade corporate income
tax the longer the tenure of the prefectural secretary, and vice versa for labour-intensive
ﬁrms. Second, the tenure eﬀect on credit allocation shows that credit is directed from
labour-intensive ﬁrms to capital-intensive ones as the tenure rises.
The paper ﬁnally points out that corruption is a possible underlying mechanism of
the tenure eﬀect on tax enforcement and credit allocation. Other channels, such as pre-
fectural secretaries' career concerns, industrial policy, political connections or learning
eﬀects, seem inconsistent with some of the facts and evidence. Of course, given the in-
direct measurement of corruption and the complexity of political institutions, this paper
is unable to provide ample evidence in this regard. More work needs to be done in the
future once better data are available and better identiﬁcation is possible.
The paper presents a broader and more complete picture of the general equilibrium
eﬀect (or external eﬀect) of corruption. It examines the impact of corruption not only
on corrupt ﬁrms but also on incorrupt (or less corrupt) ones, while most of the existing
literature only study the direct beneﬁts to the corrupt ﬁrms. The results imply, given
the total tax revenue target that the tax inspectors have to achieve, that more lax tax
enforcement for capital-intensive ﬁrms must require tougher enforcement for their labour-
intensive counterparts. By the same token, given the credit constraints faced by local
governments, access to ﬁnance has to shift from labour-intensive ﬁrms to capital-intensive
ﬁrms. In a general sense, because politicians can control only limited resources, corruption
creates negative externalities for incorrupt, or less corrupt, ﬁrms.
The ﬁndings in this paper may also enrich our understanding of the relationship be-
100
tween legal capacity and ﬁscal capacity, which is emphasized by Besley and Persson (2009,
2011, 2013). As the paper demonstrates, even though developing countries can copy tax
codes from the developed world, this cannot be well enforced in a country where the rule
of law is not respected by powerful politicians.
To sum up, the paper contributes to establishing the facts on the cross-industry dis-
tribution of VAT enforcement over local political cycles. However, due to the lack of data
and a proper identiﬁcation strategy, several related questions remain unanswered. For
example, how is the local political network aﬀected by prefectural secretary turnover?
What is the incentive for local political intervention in VAT? Is it related to the age of
secretaries and their chances of promotion? To what degree does local political inter-
vention damage the nation's taxation capacity? Why is the return to ETC higher for
capital-intensive industries? These questions are still calling for further research.
References
1. Adhikari, A., Derashid, C. and Zhang, H. (2006) "Public policy, political connec-
tions, and eﬀective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia", Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, 25(5), pp. 574-595.
2. Aizenman, J. and Jinjarak, Y.. (2008) "The collection eﬃciency of the Value Added
Tax: Theory and international evidence", The Journal of International Trade and
Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, 17(3), pp. 391-410.
3. Allen, F., Qian, J. and Qian, M. (2005) "Law, ﬁnance, and economic growth in
China", Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1), pp. 57-116.
4. Almunia, M. and Lopez-Rodriguez, D. (2014) "Heterogeneous Responses to Eﬀective
Tax Enforcement: Evidence from Spanish Firms", Working paper, University of
Warwick.
5. Andreoni, J., Erard, B. and Feinstein, J. (1998) Tax Compliance, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 36(2), pp. 818-860.
6. Bertrand, M., Duﬂo, E. and Mullainathan, S. (2004) "How Much Should We Trust
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates?" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1),
pp. 249-275.
7. Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2009) "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights,
Taxation, and Politics", American Economic Review, 99(4), pp. 1218-44.
8. Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2011) "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics
of Development Clusters," Princeton University Press.
101
9. Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2013) Taxation and Development, Handbook of Public
Economics Vol. 5, Elsevier, Amsterdam. in Alan Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin
Feldstein, and Emmanuel Saez (eds.), Elsevier, Amsterdam.
10. Cai, H. and Liu, Q. (2009) "Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence
from Chinese Industrial Firms", Economic Journal, 119(537), pp. 764-795.
11. Cai, H., Fang, H. and Xu, C. L. (2011) "Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An
Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese
Firms", Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, 54(1), pp. 55
- 78.
12. Chen, S. X. G. (2015a) VAT Dispersion and Aggregate Eﬃciency in China, Work-
ing Paper, London School of Economics, Accepted by 2014 Annual Conference of
Royal Economic Society, UK.
13. Chen, S. X. G. (2015b) The Eﬀect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement: Ev-
idence from a Natural Experiment in China, Working Paper, London School of
Economics.
14. Chen, Y., Li, H. B. and Zhou, L. A. (2005) "Relative performance evaluation and
the turnover of provincial leaders in China", Economics Letters, 88(3), pp. 421-425.
15. Cull, R. and Xu, C. L. X. (2003) "Who gets credit? The behavior of bureaucrats
and state banks in allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises", Journal of
Development Economics, 71(2), pp. 533-559.
16. Desai, M. A. (2003) "The Divergence between Book and Tax Income", Tax Policy
and the Economy 17: 169206.
17. Desai, M. A. (2005) The Degradation of Reported Corporate Proﬁt, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 19 (1), 171192.
18. Economist (2014) Our Cronyism Index  Planet Plutocrat, March 15th - 21st.
19. Faccio, M. (2006) "Politically Connected Firms", American Economic Review, Amer-
ican Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
20. Faccio, M. (2007) The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms, Working
Paper, Purdue University.
21. Fan, G. and Wang, X. L. (2011) Province Marketization Index in China (1997 -
2009), National Economic Research Institute, China Reform Foundation.
102
22. Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J. and Zhang, T. Y. (2007) "Politically connected CEOs,
corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially priva-
tized ﬁrms", Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), pp. 330-357, May.
23. Firth, M., Lin, C., Liu, P. and Wong, S. (2009) Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit
Allocation in China's Private Sector, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(6), pp.
1144-1155.
24. Fisman, R. (2001) "Estimating the Value of Political Connections", American Eco-
nomic Review, 91(4), pp. 1095-1102.
25. Fisman, R. and Wei, S. J. (2004) Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from
`Missing Imports' in China, Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), pp. 471-496.
26. Fisman, R. and Svensson, J. (2007) "Are corruption and taxation really harmful
to growth? Firm level evidence", Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), pp.
63-75.
27. Fisman, R. and Wang, Y. X. (2015) The mortality cost of political connections,
Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming.
28. Fisman, R. and Wang, Y. X. (2014) Corruption in Chinese Privatizations, Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization, pp. 1- 29.
29. Gordon, R. and Li, W. (2009) "Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles
and a possible explanation", Journal of Public Economics, 93(7-8), pp. 855-866.
30. Keen, M. and Lockwood, B. (2010) "The value added tax: Its causes and conse-
quences", Journal of Development Economics, 92(2), pp. 138-151.
31. Khwaja, A. I. and Mian, A. (2005). "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms?
Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market", The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 120(4), pp. 1371-1411.
32. Khwaja, A. I. and Mian, A.(2011) "Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Mar-
kets", Annual Review of Economics, 3(1), pp. 579-600.
33. Khwaja, A. I., Olken, B. A. and Khan, A. (2014) Property Tax Experiment in Pun-
jab, Pakistan: Testing the Role of Wages, Incentives and Audit on Tax Inspectors'
Behavior, Working Paper.
34. Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S. and Saez, E. (2011) Un-
willing or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark,
Econometrica, 79, pp. 651-692.
103
35. Li, H. B., Meng, L. S., Wang, Q. and Zhou, L. A. (2008) "Political connections,
ﬁnancing and ﬁrm performance: Evidence from Chinese private ﬁrms", Journal of
Development Economics, 87(2), pp. 283-299.
36. Li, H. B. and Zhou, L. A. (2005) "Political turnover and economic performance: the
incentive role of personnel control in China", Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10),
pp. 1743-1762.
37. OECD. (2014) Foreign Bribery Report An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of
Foreign Public Oﬃcials, OECD Publishing. Paris: OECD.
38. Olken, B. A. and Pande, R. (2012) "Corruption in Developing Countries", Annual
Review of Economics, 4(1), pp. 479-509.
39. Poncet, S., Steingress, W. and Vandenbussche, H. (2010) "Financial constraints in
China: Firm-level evidence", China Economic Review, 21(3), pp. 411-422.
40. Pomeranz, D. (2013) "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-
Enforcement in the Value Added Tax", NBER Working Papers 19199, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
41. Koren, M., Szeidl, A. and Vedres, B. (2014) Political Connections and Procurement
in Hungary, Central European University, Working paper.
42. Slemrod, Joel., and Yitzhaki, S. (2002) Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administra-
tion, In Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3, edited by A.J. Auerbach and M.
Feldstein, 1423-1470, North Holland.
43. Slemrod, J. (2007) Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 21(1), pp. 25-48.
44. Slemrod, J., Blumenthal, M. and Christian, C. W. (2001) Taxpayer Response to
an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Min-
nesota, Journal of Public Economics, 79(3), 455-483.
45. Svensson, J. (2003) "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a
Cross-Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, 118(1),
pp. 207-230.
46. Wu, W. F., Wu, C. F., and Rui, M. (2009) Government Background of Top Leaders
in China's Listed Companies and Tax Preferential Policy,Management World, Issue
3. (In Chinese)
47. Xu, C. G. (2011) The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Develop-
ment, The Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), pp. 1076-1151.
104
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Annual Survey of Industrial Production in China (2000 - 2007)
Sample Size Mean St. Dev. Min Max p10 p50 p90
Effective VAT Rate1 139,287 10.34 9.66 -153.22 697.38 0.98 8.74 20.87
Profit Gap Rate2 139,287 34.67 42.85 -2783.55 2813.98 -12.3 40.19 75.92
Debt Ratio3 139,287 55.77 28.94 -120.02 1585.95 22.19 55.28 86.37
CapInt4 139,287 0.18 0.21 0 1.24 0.01 0.13 0.32
Ownership5 139,287 0.89 0.18 0 1 0.7 0.95 1
Profitability6 139,287 0.09 0.65 -16.8 176.27 0.03 0.06 0.14
Firm Age7 139,287 6.36 4.71 0 95 3 6 9
LOG(V-added)8 139,287 9.05 0.69 3.76 16.31 8.33 8.96 9.85
LOG(Sales)9 139,287 10.1 0.7 3.65 16.4 9.36 10.04 10.9
Input - output Ratio10 139,287 0.76 0.17 0 21.3 0.69 0.76 0.84
Export - Sales Ratio11 139,287 0.02 0.13 0 10 0 0 0
Panel B: Investment Climate Survey in China (2005)
Sample Size Mean St. Dev. Min Max p10 p50 p90
Effective VAT Rate1 1,271 9.19 45.02 -1487.88 351.19 2.06 8.70 17.06
ETC Ratio12 1,271 1.09 1.18 0 15.85 0.24 0.78 2.1
Govt-appointed Manager13 1,270 1.88 0.2 1 2 1.67 2 2
Collateral Dummy14 1,271 0.51 0.29 0 1 0 0.5 1
CapInt4 1,271 0.13 0.1 0 0.54 0.03 0.13 0.32
Ownership5 1,271 0.95 0.21 0 1 1 1 1
Profitability6 1,271 0.04 0.8 -27.73 1.33 0 0.05 0.18
Firm Age7 1,271 10.98 9.93 2 86 4 8 20
Manager Tenure15 1,271 5.55 2.64 1 27 3 5 9
LOG(V-added)8 1,270 10.01 1.61 4.62 17.49 8.2 9.83 11.96
LOG(Sales)9 1,271 10.98 1.55 5.71 17.51 9.19 10.89 13
Panel C: Political Turnover of Prefecture Secretary of CPC (2000 - 2010)
Sample Size Mean St. Dev. Min Max p10 p50 p90
Tenure16 2,800 1.91 1.76 0 14 0 2 4
Duration17 2,800 4.13 1.96 0 15 2 4 7
Age18 2,800 49.41 4.05 25.95 59.07 44.01 49.95 54.07
Panel D: County Public Finance Statistics (2000 - 2007)
Sample Size Mean St. Dev. Min Max p10 p50 p90
Agr19 19,950 0.25 0.23 -0.81 1.21 0.01 0.22 0.56
LOG(Pop)20 8,898 3.47 0.94 0 5.78 2.2 3.61 4.52
LOG(GDP/Pop)21 8,823 8.44 0.86 -2.73 12.4 7.59 8.43 9.41
Fiscal Pressure22 7,657 501.82 844.06 -15818.85 10399 -7.22 375.67 1193.59
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Notes:
1. “Effective VAT Rate” is defined as “Payable VAT / value-added × 100”.
2. “Profit Gap Rate” is measured by “profit gap / value-added × 100”, where “profit gap” is the
“imputed profit” minus the “reported profit”. See Section 6.1 for more details.
3. “Debt Ratio” is measured by “total liability/ total assets × 100”.
4. “CapInt” is normalized capital-intensity measured by Log(1 + capital/sales), where Capital is
measured by “total asset” in Panel A, and by “net fixed asset / sales” in Panel B. The measurements
are different due to lack of consistent data. By subtracting the minimum Log(1+capital/sales) among
all industries, the “CapInt” of the least capital-intensive industry is normalized to zero.
5. “Ownership” is dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is not a state-owned enterprise.
6. “Profitability” is measured by “profit / value-added”, indicating the degree of competition of 2-digit
industry.
7. “Firm Age” is the years since the firm was set up.
8. “LOG(V-added)” is the logarithm of a firm’s value-added.
9. “LOG(Sales)” is the logarithm of a firm’s sales volume.
10. “Input-output Ratio” is defined as “intermediate inputs / total value of products and services”.
11. “Export-sales Ratio” is defined as “export / sales volume”.
12. “ETC” is defined as “entertainment and travel expenditure / total sales × 100” of the firm.
13. “Govt-appointed Manager” is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm’s general manager is appointed
by the government.
14. “Collateral” is a dummy variable taking value 1 if collateral is required for an overdraft or loan.
15. “Manager Tenure” is total years since firm’s general manager was in office.
16. “Tenure” indicates the years for which the prefecture secretary has been in current office.
17. “Duration” is the total years of service of the prefectural secretary, indicating the length of periods
from his/her entering to leaving between two consecutive political turnovers.
18. “Age” refers to the age of the prefectural secretary of CPC.
19. “Agr” is the net tax revenue loss due to the abolition of agricultural tax. Refer to Expression
(5.2) for its definition.
20. “LOG(Pop)” is the logarithm of a county’s total population.
21. “LOG(GDP/Pop)” is the logarithm of a county’s GDP per capita.
22. “Fiscal Pressure” = (total expenditure − construction expenditure − net government transfer
revenue − net non-tax revenue) / total population at the county government level of each year;
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Table 2: Tenure Effect on Effective VAT Rate
Dependent Variable: Effective VAT Rate
Panel A: Baseline
Panel B: Control for
Tenure × Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.64 0.71 0.81
(0.06) (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.66) (0.39)* (0.40)**
Tenure NO -0.41 -0.36 -0.53 -0.29 -0.29
× CapInt (0.15)*** (0.15)** (0.17)*** (0.14)** (0.15)*
Industrial Trends
CapInt × Year NO NO -0.70 -0.70 -0.61 -0.58
(0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)***
Fixed Effects
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture-(1)Indu FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
County-(1)Indu FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Secretary’s Controls
Dummy (Duration < 5) 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.36
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)* (0.17)**
Dummy (Duration > 5) -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.19 -0.12
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) -0.23 -0.2 -0.22
Tenure Square -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure × Other Characteristics
Not Included Included
Tenure -0.28 -0.17 -0.29
× Ownership (0.25) (0.19) (0.21)
Tenure 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
× Profitability (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Tenure 0.00 0.00 -0.01
× Firm Age (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure 0.08 0.07 0.04
× LOG(Value-added) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09)
Tenure -0.08 -0.11 -0.08
× LOG(Sales) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
Tenure -0.24 -0.03 -0.02
× Input-Output Ratio (0.32) (0.11) (0.12)
Tenure -0.01 -0.11 -0.08
× Export Ratio (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2: Tenure Effect on Effective VAT Rate (Continued)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapInt 12.27 12.99 1411.89 1416.12 1230.14 1175.81
(1.42)*** (1.46)*** (259.80)*** (262.10)*** (217.68)*** (227.84)***
CapInt Square -8.35 -8.35 -8.48 -8.5 -6.98 -7.12
(1.51)*** (1.53)*** (1.52)*** (1.52)*** (1.24)*** (1.25)***
Ownership -0.94 -0.95 -0.96 -0.46 -0.69 -0.45
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.85) (0.70) (0.72)
Profitability -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.08 -0.04
(0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.07)** (0.03)** (0.05)
Firm Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LOG(Value-added) 0.16 0.16 0.15 -0.01 -0.54 -0.35
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.46) (0.43) (0.46)
LOG(Sales) 0.97 0.97 0.99 1.13 1.74 1.43
(0.44)** (0.44)** (0.44)** (0.48)** (0.45)*** (0.49)***
Input-Output Ratio -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.29 -0.20 -0.35
(0.22)** (0.22)** (0.22)** (0.31) (0.20) (0.24)
Export-Sales Ratio -0.64 -0.63 -0.6 -0.59 -0.85 -0.72
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.66) (0.60) (0.64)
County-Year Characteristics
LOG(gdp/pop) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 NO NO
(0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)***
LOG(Pop) -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 NO NO
(0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)***
Fiscal Pressure 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 NO NO
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Sample size 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 139,261 139,261
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.28
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province-by-(1-digit)industry
level (155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the prefecture-industry and county-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 1-digit
level.
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Table 3: Tenure Effect on the Change of VAT Enforcement
Dependent Variable: Effective VAT Rate
Panel A: Panel B:
Baseline DD Tenure Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Agr 2.47 2.47 0.64 0.84
(0.81)*** (1.03)** (1.21) (1.27)
Post × Agr × Tenure NO NO 0.58 0.46
(0.28)** (0.26)*
Post × Agr × Tenure × CapInt NO NO -1.31 -1.19
(0.48)*** (0.45)***
Post × Agr × CapInt NO NO 1.20 0.78
(1.90) (1.87)
Industrial Trends
CapInt × Year NO NO -0.37 -0.31
(0.14)*** (0.14)**
Fixed Effects
County FE YES YES NO NO
County-(2)Indu FE NO NO YES YES
Other Diff-in-Diff Terms
Post -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Post × CapInt NO NO -0.26 -0.43
(0.79) (0.74)
Agr × CapInt NO NO -2.5 -2.12
(0.90)*** (0.84)**
Agr × Tenure NO NO -0.12 -0.12
(0.20) (0.21)
CapInt × Tenure NO NO -0.07 -0.06
(0.08) (0.07)
Post × CapInt × Tenure NO NO 0.22 0.22
(0.10)** (0.09)**
Agr × CapInt × Tenure NO NO 0.35 0.41
(0.28) (0.28)
CapInt NO NO 738.82 613.87
(279.83)*** (271.61)**
CapInt Square NO NO -0.13 0.23
(0.29) (0.26)
Tenure Square NO NO 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 3: Tenure Effect on the Change of VAT Enforcement (Continued)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ownership NO NO NO -1.15
(0.18)***
Profitability NO NO NO 0.03
(0.00)***
Firm Age NO NO NO 0.04
(0.01)***
LOG(V-added) NO NO NO -4.04
(0.26)***
LOG(Sales) NO NO NO 3.97
(0.24)***
Input-Output Ratio NO NO NO 0.03
(0.01)**
Export-Sales Ratio NO NO NO -0.01
-0.01
Sample size 17,964 17,964 158,885 158,762
R2 0.41 0.41 0.54 0.57
Clustering
Prefecture Province Province-(1)Industry Province-(1)Industry
(362 groups) (31 groups) (135 groups) (135 groups)
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province-by-
(1-digit)industry level (155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the
99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the county-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 2-digit level.
3. In the clustering, province-industry refers to the 1-digit industry level.
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Table 4: Tenure Effect on Profit Gap Rate
Dependent Variable: Profit Gap Rate
Panel A: Baseline
Panel B: Control for
Tenure × Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure -0.52 -0.99 -0.97 -13.86 -9.13 -9.21
(0.27)* (0.33)*** (0.33)*** (3.71)*** (2.27)*** (2.50)***
Tenure NO 2.58 2.51 3.81 2.67 2.42
× CapInt (0.79)*** (0.79)*** (0.87)*** (0.62)*** (0.58)***
Industrial Trends
CapInt * Year NO NO 1.19 1.16 1.18 1.27
(0.65)* (0.65)* (0.61)* (0.62)**
Fixed Effects
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture-(1)Indu FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
County-(1)Indu FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Secretary’s Controls
Dummy (Duration < 5) -0.43 -0.43 -0.41 -0.27 -0.37 -0.87
(0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.76) (0.62) (0.64)
Dummy (Duration > 5) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.6 1.47 1.05
(0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.85) (0.67)** (0.73)
Tenure Square 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.03 0.02
(0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.04) (0.04)
Tenure × Other Characteristics
Not Included Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure 2.72 2.34 2.5
× Ownership (1.65) (1.02)** (1.11)**
Tenure 0.14 0.62 0.53
× Profitability (0.37) (0.33)* (0.32)*
Tenure 0.03 0.02 0.03
× Firm Age (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 0.43 -0.22 0.09
× LOG(Value-added) (0.57) (0.38) (0.39)
Tenure 0.2 0.69 0.38
× LOG(Sales) (0.51) (0.33)** (0.32)
Tenure 5.34 1.52 1.93
× Input-Output Ratio (2.04)*** (0.98) (0.91)**
Tenure 0.33 0.66 0.48
× Export Ratio (0.74) (0.52) (0.49)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4: Tenure Effect on Profit Gap Rate (Continued)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapInt -59.74 -64.31 -2438.69 -2390.39 -2435.3 -2596.31
(8.30)*** (8.42)*** (1,308.48)* (1,301.27)* (1,215.51)** (1,245.27)**
CapInt Square 20.04 20.03 20.26 20.47 19.12 19.28
(8.29)** (8.31)** (8.32)** (8.27)** (6.97)*** (7.12)***
Ownership 1.72 1.78 1.79 -3.15 -0.33 -1.45
(3.54) (3.57) (3.56) (5.53) (3.71) (4.16)
Profitability 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.41 -0.55 -0.47
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.39) (0.45) (0.51)
Firm Age 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
LOG(Value-added) -1.05 -1.04 -1.01 -1.63 1.22 -0.43
(1.99) (1.98) (1.98) (2.13) (1.80) (1.91)
LOG(Sales) -2.87 -2.87 -2.9 -3.38 -5.28 -3.01
(2.06) (2.04) (2.05) (2.15) (1.77)*** (1.82)*
Input-Output Ratio 6.51 6.48 6.48 1.11 4.88 4.08
(2.03)*** (2.02)*** (2.03)*** (2.42) (2.02)** (1.68)**
Export-Sales Ratio 4.39 4.29 4.24 3.75 3.97 3.43
(2.07)** (2.07)** (2.07)** (2.11)* (1.91)** (2.01)*
County-Year Characteristics
LOG(gdp/pop) 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 NO NO
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
LOG(Pop) 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 NO NO
(0.54)** (0.54)** (0.54)** (0.54)**
Fiscal Pressure -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 NO NO
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Sample size 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 139,261 139,261
R2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.17 0.3
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province-by-(1-digit)industry
level (155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the prefecture-industry and county-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 1-digit
level.
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Table 5: Tenure Effect on Debt Ratio
Dependent Variable: Debt Ratio
Panel A: Baseline
Panel B: Control for
Tenure × Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure -0.33 -0.52 -0.5 -6.69 -3.69 -3.23
(0.18)* (0.20)** (0.20)** (1.80)*** (1.26)*** (1.26)**
Tenure 1.07 0.94 1.22 0.81 0.51
× CapInt (0.33)*** (0.28)*** (0.41)*** (0.31)** (0.33)
Industrial Trends
CapInt × Year 2.09 2.1 1.89 1.79
(0.50)*** (0.50)*** (0.51)*** (0.52)***
Fixed Effects
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture-(1)Indu FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
County-(1)Indu FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Secretary’s Controls
Dummy (Duration < 5) 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.12 0.46 0.30
(0.41)** (0.41)** (0.41)** (0.41)*** (0.35) (0.36)
Dummy (Duration > 5) 1.5 1.5 1.51 1.52 0.41 0.62
(0.56)*** (0.56)*** (0.56)*** (0.56)*** (0.44) (0.49)
Tenure Square 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.04
(0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)* (0.02) (0.03)
Tenure × Other Characteristics
Not Included Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure 2.03 1.37 1.2
× Ownership (0.77)*** (0.55)** (0.58)**
Tenure 0.04 0.17 0.36
× Profitability (0.21) (0.13) (0.14)**
Tenure 0.02 0.00 0.01
× Firm Age (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 1.04 0.61 0.78
× LOG(Value-added) (0.30)*** (0.21)*** (0.22)***
Tenure -0.61 -0.3 -0.48
× LOG(Sales) (0.29)** (0.21) (0.22)**
Tenure 1.26 -0.14 -0.24
× Input-Output Ratio (0.91) (0.56) (0.51)
Tenure -0.21 0.23 0.27
× Export Ratio (0.45) (0.38) (0.38)
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Table 5: Tenure Effect on Debt Ratio (Continued)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapInt 10.2 8.31 -4180.6 -4191 -3786.52 -3583.14
(3.22)*** (3.31)** (1,006.74)*** (1,006.41)*** (1,026.71)*** (1,033.22)***
CapInt Square -15.84 -15.84 -15.43 -15.43 -9.71 -9.02
(3.39)*** (3.37)*** (3.39)*** (3.40)*** (2.64)*** (2.73)***
Ownership -18.37 -18.34 -18.33 -22.02 -19.68 -19.04
(2.52)*** (2.52)*** (2.50)*** (2.86)*** (2.27)*** (2.51)***
Profitability -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.28
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.08) (0.13)**
Firm Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
LOG(Value-added) -3.32 -3.32 -3.27 -5.06 -4.53 -5.42
(1.07)*** (1.06)*** (1.07)*** (1.28)*** (1.00)*** (1.01)***
LOG(Sales) 3.46 3.46 3.4 4.43 4.49 5.26
(1.07)*** (1.07)*** (1.07)*** (1.29)*** (0.99)*** (1.01)***
Input-Output Ratio 2.61 2.6 2.61 1.36 4.05 3.13
(1.67) (1.67) (1.66) (1.71) (1.84)** (1.54)**
Export-Sales Ratio 0.71 0.67 0.59 0.94 0.49 0.22
(1.09) (1.1) (1.11) (1.270 (1.17) (1.15)
County-Year Characteristics
LOG(gdp/pop) -0.76 -0.75 -0.76 -0.75 NO NO
(0.32)** (0.32)** (0.32)** (0.32)**
LOG(Pop) -1.56 -1.56 -1.57 -1.57 NO NO
(0.35)*** (0.35)*** (0.35)*** (0.35)***
Fiscal Pressure 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 NO NO
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Sample size 76,798 76,798 76,798 76,798 139,259 139,259
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.28
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province-by-(1-digit)industry level
(155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the prefecture-industry and county-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 1-digit
level.
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Table 6: Tenure Effect on ETC
Dependent Variable: ETC Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tenure -0.03 -0.22 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22
(0.02) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
Tenure 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
× CapInt (0.01)*** (0.09)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Fixed Effects
Prov-(1)Indu FE YES YES YES YES YES
Secretary’s Controls
Dummy (Duration < 5) NO NO 0.01 NO 0.01
(0.11) (0.10)
Dummy (Duration > 5) NO NO -0.04 NO -0.03
(0.16) (0.16)
Dummy (Age < 50) NO NO NO -0.07 -0.07
(0.17) (0.16)
Dummy (Age >= 50) NO NO NO 0.7 0.72
(0.67) (0.65)
Tenure × Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tenure NO 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
× Ownership (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Tenure NO -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
× Profitability (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Tenure NO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
× Firm Age (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure NO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
× Manager Tenure (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure NO -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
× LOG(Sales) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Tenure NO 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
× LOG(V-added) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 6: Tenure Effect on ETC (Continued)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CapInt 0.47 0.51 0.5 0.17 0.16
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.62) (0.61)
Ownership 0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09
(0.24) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Profitability -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Manger Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LOG(Sales) -0.4 -0.38 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37
(0.07)*** (0.14)** (0.14)** (0.14)** (0.14)**
LOG(V-added) 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14
(0.07)** (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Sample size 1,270 1,270 1,270 1,270 1,270
R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
province-by-(1-digit)industry level (155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates sta-
tistical significance at the 99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the province-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 1-digit
level.
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Table 7: Return to ETC: Effective VAT Rate
Dependent Variable: Effective VAT Rate
Panel A: Panel B: Control for
Baseline (ETC / 100) × Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ETC / 100 0.74 1.36 0.95 0.56 0.93 1.54 1.56 1.41
(0.19)*** (0.71)* (0.28)*** (0.24)** (0.35)*** (0.75)** (0.90)* (1.22)
ETC / 100 -0.48 -0.48 -1.44 -0.46 -0.48 -0.58 -0.59 -1.53
× CapInt (0.18)** (0.19)** (0.57)** (0.19)** (0.18)*** (0.22)** (0.24)** (0.57)***
Fixed Effects
Prefecture-
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1)Indu FE
(ETC / 100) × Other Characteristics
ETC /100 -0.63 -0.28
× Ownership (0.67) (0.77)
ETC /100 -0.62 -0.67
× Profitability (0.36)* (0.37)*
ETC /100 0.02 0.01
× Firm Age (0.01) (0.01)
ETC /100 -0.03 -0.01
× Manager Tenure (0.03) (0.04)
ETC /100 -0.08 -0.47
× LOG(Sales) (0.07) (0.56)
ETC /100 -0.09 0.49
× LOG(V-added) (0.09) (0.57)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
CapInt 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Profitability 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Manager Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LOG(Sales) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
LOG(V-added) -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Constant -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)*
Sample size 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province-by-(1-digit)industry level
(155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the prefecture-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 1-digit level.
3. In this table, ETC = entertainment and travel expenditure / total sales. That is, ETC here is scaled
down by dividing 100 on its standard measurement used in other regressions.
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Table 8: Return to ETC: Collateral Requirement for Bank Loan
Dependent Variable: Collateral Dummy
Panel A: Panel B: Control for
Baseline (ETC / 100) × Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ETC / 100 0.64 0.49 0.62 0.73 0.88 1.43 0.92 1.68
(0.28)** (0.77) (0.28)** (0.38)* (0.36)** (0.99) (0.83) (1.94)
ETC / 100 -0.62 -0.62 -0.61 -0.63 -0.63 -0.72 -0.66 -0.71
× CapInt (0.27)** (0.27)** (0.27)** (0.27)** (0.27)** (0.31)** (0.31)** (0.32)**
Fixed Effects
Prefecture-
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1)Indu FE
(ETC / 100) × Other Characteristics
ETC / 100 0.15 0.03
× Ownership (0.78) (1.18)
ETC /100 0.04 0.07
* Profitability (0.07) (1.19)
ETC / 100 -0.01 -0.01
× Firm Age (0.02) (0.03)
ETC / 100 -0.04 -0.03
× Manager Tenure (0.06) (0.07)
ETC / 100 -0.08 -0.45
× LOG(Sales) (0.09) (0.33)
ETC / 100 -0.03 0.40
× LOG(V-added) (0.09) (0.28)
2-Digit Industry Characteristics
CapInt 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Ownership 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)**
Profitability 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Manager Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
LOG(Sales) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
LOG(V-added) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.27
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)***
Sample size 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291 11,291
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Notes:
1. Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province-by-(1-digit)industry level
(155 groups). *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 99%(95%, 90%) confidence level.
2. In the prefecture-industry fixed effects, industries are identified at the 1-digit level.
3. In this table, ETC = entertainment and travel expenditure / total sales. That is, ETC here is scaled
down by dividing 100 on its standard measurement used in other regressions.
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Chapter 3
VAT Rate Dispersion and
Aggregate Eﬃciency in China∗
Abstract
This paper studies dispersion in the eﬀective VAT rate across manufacturing ﬁrms
in China and assesses its impact on aggregate production eﬃciency from 2000 to
2007. Using a structural model based on Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I ﬁnd that a
tax-neutral reform which eliminates the dispersion in VAT rates produces a gain in
aggregate TFP in the order of 7.9% of GDP on average in the period from 2000 to
2007.
∗The author is grateful to Francesco Caselli for his supervision on this project. Acknowledgements
go to Alwyn Young, Tim Besley, Johannes Spinnewijn, Ximin Yue, Liutang Gong, John Whalley for
their suggestions and comments. The author also appreciates the feedback from participants in Work-
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Seminars at Renmin University of China, Beijing Normal University. This project is funded by the
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119
1 Introduction
Non-lump-sum taxation leads to distortions and eﬃciency loss. Typically, the welfare
loss can be captured by the Harberger triangle created by the tax wedge between the
supply curve and the demand curve (Harberger, 1964a, b). In this paper, I look into
another situation where tax rate dispersions across monopolistic competitive ﬁrms may
also generate an eﬃciency loss via the channel of resource misallocation.
The mechanism of misallocation has been put under the spotlight in quite a few recent
inﬂuential macro-development studies (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Rogerson and Rustuccia,
2008), yet the sources of distortion and misallocation is not clearly identiﬁed and directly
measured. This paper, in an attempt to ﬁll this gap in knowledge, proposes the eﬀective
VAT rate as a direct measurement of one kind of distortion and show its dispersions
across ﬁrms could lead to signiﬁcant loss in aggregate production eﬃciency. As a result,
the ﬁndings could hopefully shed light on the VAT reform agenda in the search for a
eﬃciency-enhancing VAT system as advocated by Mirrlees et al. (2011).
The mechanism underlying the impact of tax rate dispersion on eﬃciency loss is in-
tuitive: the ﬁrm paying a low tax rate is able to steal business from its high-tax rivals
and therefore results in resource misallocation between ﬁrms  low-tax ﬁrms are bigger
than they ought to be and high-tax ﬁrms are smaller compared with the optimal ﬁrm size
distribution which maximizes the aggregate productivity.
As will be demonstrated in the later part of this paper, the VAT rate dispersion
in China's manufacturing ﬁrms is not only large in magnitude, but is also persistent,
coming from within four-digit industry and almost uncorrelated with some important
ﬁrm's characteristics. These attributes allow us to gauge its impact on eﬃciency loss in a
theoretical structural model based on Hsieh and Klenow (2009). I ﬁnd that a tax-neutral
reform which eliminates the dispersion in VAT rates produces a gain in aggregate TFP
in the order of 7.9% of GDP on average in the period from 2000 to 2007.
Figure 1.1 gives us a ﬁrst glimpses at the distribution of the eﬀective VAT rate across
China's manufacturing ﬁrms, where the eﬀective VAT rate is deﬁned as the ratio of payable
VAT to the value-added of a ﬁrm. Although the standard statutory tax rate is 17%, the
eﬀective tax rate varies a lot, with a standard deviation of 11% around the mean 10%.
The majority of ﬁrms pay an actual eﬀective tax rate that is lower than the legitimate
level.1
In this paper, I only focus on VAT in China, although one may also consider the
eﬃciency loss caused by various types of taxation, such as sales tax, capital gains tax,
1It is a bit striking that the eﬀective VAT rate in Figure 1.1 does not stay around the standard
statutory tax rate 17%. But apart from the statutory reasons such as diﬀerential tax rates and export
tax refund, that is actually a vivid indication of poor VAT administration in China. Empirical studies
suggest that the VAT administration in China can be aﬀected by shocks on local governments budget
(Chen, 2015a) and vary over local political cycles (Chen, 2015b).
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Figure 1.1: VAT Rate Distribution over China's Manufacturing Firms
personal income tax, resource tax, and others. There are three reasons for my preference
to VAT. First, it is VAT, rather than the corporate income tax, that is particularly relevant
to the distortion on product in the theoretical model. Second, VAT is an important tax in
China. It accounts for nearly one-third of the government total tax revenue, and therefore
has gigantic welfare implication. Third, eﬀective VAT rate at the ﬁrm level is available
in China's ﬁrm survey.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a toy model that explains the
underlying mechanism of misallocation caused by dispersion in eﬀective VAT rate across
ﬁrms. Section 3 reviews the related literature and points out contributions of this paper.
Section 4 brieﬂy introduces the institutional background of VAT in China. Section 5
presents a theoretical framework that relates tax rate dispersion to aggregate production
eﬃciency loss. Section 6 summarizes the data used in this paper. Section 7 reports the
results and main ﬁndings. Several robustness checks are conducted in Section 8, and
Section 9 is the conclusion.
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2 Conceptual Framework
To understand the working mechanism of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), let us ﬁrst consider
a model economy consisting of two monopolistic competitive ﬁrms with one production
factor (L units in total). The output Y is assumed to be produced with constant-return-
to-scale technology: Yi = AiLi, i = 1, 2, where A is the physical productivity (TFP ). The
monopolistic competition between two ﬁrms is featured with the output aggregator in
Dixit-Stiglitz fashion: Y =
(
Y
σ−1
σ
1 + Y
σ−1
σ
2
) σ
σ−1
, where σ is the elasticity of substitution,
and it also reﬂects the degree of competition between ﬁrms. The GDP of this economy is
aggregated over the value-added of all ﬁrms: PY = P1Y1 + P2Y2, where the ﬁnal output
Y can be chosen as the numeraire and P is normalized to 1.
Monopolistic competition implies that each ﬁrm faces a downward sloping demand
curve for its product: Pi = P
(
Y
Yi
)1/σ
. The revenue (or the value-added) of each ﬁrm
can be written as PiYi = PY
1
σY
σ−1
σ
i = PY
1
σ (AiLi)
σ−1
σ , which is a function of input Li.
Suppose the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm faces the ﬁrm-speciﬁc tax rate on factor income wLi.
Maximizing proﬁt PiYi − w(1 + τi)Li, i = 1, 2 over Li gives rise to the ﬁrst-order con-
dition: VMPLi(Li) = w(1 + τi), where the value of marginal product VMPLi =
∂(PiYi)
∂Li
.
Since VMPLi is positively proportional to A
σ−1
σ
i L
− 1
σ
i , it is downward sloping in Li. Sup-
pose a benevolent government attempts to achieve the aggregate production eﬃciency by
maximizing GDP subject to the monopolistic competitive market structure and resource
constraint L1 + L2 = L. Obviously, the optimality condition requires VMPL1 = VMPL2
(or equivalently, equal revenue productivity TFPRi, as TFPRi =
PiYi
Li
= σ
σ−1VMPLi).
In a decentralized economy, the production eﬃciency is achieved if, and only if, there are
no tax rate dispersions across ﬁrms; that is, τ1 = τ2 = τ . It could also be put another
way: the tax rate dispersion var(τi) leads to additional productivity loss aside from the
welfare loss caused by the distortionary tax τ itself.
In this model economy, the eﬃciency loss is caused by the resource misallocation
between monopolistic competitive ﬁrms. To be speciﬁc, the loss comes from the fact that
the low-tax ﬁrm is able to charge a lower price on its product, thus stealing business from
its high-tax rival. The magnitude of eﬃciency loss therefore relies on two factors: (1) the
dispersion of tax rate across ﬁrms and (2) the elasticity of substitution between the ﬁrms'
products.
The idea above can be illustrated in Figure 2.1. The social optimal allocation is
determined by the intersection point between VMP1 and VMP2. In a decentralized
economy, this can be achieved by setting τ1 = τ2. If τ1 6= τ2, monopolistic competition
gives rise to allocation where VMP1 6= VMP2. In the case of τ1 > τ2, high-tax ﬁrm
(or low-tax ﬁrm) is smaller (or bigger) than the social optimal size, as is referred to as
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Figure 2.1: Tax Rate Dispersion and Production Eﬃciency Loss
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resource misallocation. Although the resource allocation is Pareto optimal2, potential
gain in GDP/Productivity could still be achieved by re-allocating a certain amount of
L from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1. The production eﬃciency loss can be measured by the area of
∆ABC ' 1
2
BC×(BC×ctg(∠A)) = 1
2
BC2ctg(∠A)3, where BC2 = [w(τ1−τ2)]2 ∝ var(τ),
and ctg(∠A) ∼slope of VMPLi ∼ σ, where ∼ denotes to be positively proportional to.
In a more general setting with more than two ﬁrms, we can go even further with par-
ticular assumptions and prove logTFP = logTFP e − σ−1
2
var (log(1 + τi)), where TFP
is the aggregate total factor productivity, and TFP e is the TFP without tax rate dis-
persion. Intuition is: (1) Bigger var(τ) ⇒ more tax rate dispersion ⇒ more resource
mis-allocation⇒ more eﬃciency loss; (2) Higher σ ⇒ products are more substitutable⇒
more business-stealing by low-tax ﬁrm⇒ more resources misallocated from high-tax ﬁrm
to low-tax ﬁrm ⇒ more eﬃciency loss.
At this juncture, a query arise regarding the relationship between the problem of
GDP maximization set out above, and the theory of optimal taxation. To see this, I
suppose
(
Y
σ−1
σ
1 + Y
σ−1
σ
2
) σ
σ−1
is actually the social welfare function (or utility function of
homogeneous consumers). In a standard Ramsey optimal taxation setting, the problem
of government can be written as
max
{L1,L2,τ1,τ2}
(
(A1L1)
σ−1
σ + (A2L2)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(2.1)
2Since we can not increase Y1 without reducing Y2, given the resource constraint on L.
3In our analysis, I ignore the simultaneous upward shift of VMPi (i = 1, 2) curves because Y increases
when the disparity between τ1 and τ2 are eliminated. This simpliﬁcation makes the implication of ∆ABC
more straightforward.
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s.t.
 L1 and L2 in monopolistic competitive equilibrium(τ1L1 + τ2L2)w > T
where T is the tax revenue requirement of the government. In partial equilibrium where
w is taken as exogeneous to Ramsey problem (1), one can prove the optimal taxation is
characterized by τ1 = τ2 = τ .
3 Related Literature
This paper is mainly related both to misallocation and to eﬃciency loss of taxation.
It also sheds some lights on issues of VAT administration.
3.1 Misallocation and Production Eﬃciency
This paper follows a strand of voluminous development accounting literature over
last two decades. These items of literature have been comprehensively reviewed by Caselli
(2005) and Hsieh and Klenow (2010), so I do not attempt to provide a redundant list of
related papers. However, in order to set out precisely where I start, I would brieﬂy refer
to several papers in particular.
Over the past ﬁve years, there has been a sharp increase in research interests focusing
on the ﬁrm-level distortions and their impact on TFP. In Hsieh and Klenow (2009), ﬁrm
speciﬁc distortions result in dispersion in revenue productivity across ﬁrms and lead to
loss in aggregate TFP. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) introduce the distortions in the
Lucas span-of-control model and ﬁnd enormous aggregate TFP loss if distortions and
ﬁrm productivity are positively correlated. Guner, Ventura, Xu (2008) show that the
policies that distort the size of production units could lead to reductions in output and
output per establishment up to 8.1% and 25.6% respectively. Caselli and Gennaioli (2005)
propose a model in which the poor contract enforcement in dynastic family ﬁrms may be
a substantial contributor to observed cross-country diﬀerences in aggregate TFP between
rich and poor countries. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2009) investigate the
eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions on aggregate performance in the cross-country context.
Jones (2011) shows how the sectoral distortions can be ampliﬁed by the input-output
production structure.
In particular, our study moves in the same direction as Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
providing a structural model in an attempt to measure the eﬃciency loss caused by various
distortions. In Hsieh and Klenow (2009) however, the distortions are subject to two
deﬁciencies: (1) The distortions are not directly observable; we are not aware of the sources
of distortions. In their study, the model embraces all distortions in the capital, including
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labour, output markets, taxes, regulations, market frictions, and many other unobservable
factors; a long list which is diﬃcult to examine one by one in quantitative way. (2) The
distortions, being extracted from a structural model, are obviously vulnerable to model
setting and the parametric values of the model.
This paper only focuses on the VAT rate dispersion as a source distortion, which is
able to overcome the shortcomings of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) mentioned above for two
reasons. (1) eﬀective VAT rate is directly observable at the ﬁrm level. (2) VAT rate is
independent of the model setting.
In this paper, I ﬁnd the VAT rate dispersion mainly comes from ﬁrms' time-persistent
factors such as geographic location, ownership and internal organization. This ﬁnding
may provide a partial answer to the question, raised by Moll and Banerjee (2010) and
popular in cross-country development studies, of why the distortion persists.
3.2 Taxation and Eﬃciency loss
The impact of non-lump-sum tax on welfare is usually measured by the Harberger
Triangle created by the tax wedge between the supply curve and the demand curve.
The basic rationale in public ﬁnance theory argues that the tax produces a tax wedge
between buyers and sellers, changes the relative prices of goods, results in the behavioural
response of economic agents, destroys the conditions for Pareto optimality, and thus
leads to a deadweight loss on welfare. According to this argument, the deadweight loss
is proportional to the elasticity of behavioural response to the change in tax rate (the
base of the Harberger Triangle (Hines, 1999)). A series of empirical studies, inspired
by the seminal work of Arnold Harberger in the 1960s (Harberger, 1964a, b), have been
made in order to estimate the welfare impact of a wide array of tax-induced distortions;
including those to labour supply (Browing, 1975), saving (Feldstein, 1978), corporate
taxation (Shoven, 1976), and the consumption of goods (King, 1983). The magnitudes of
the welfare loss, nevertheless, are still ambiguous in these studies, ranging from as low as
2.5% of the tax revenue (Harberger, 1964b) to the stunning 200% (Feldstein, 1999).
This paper suggests an additional mechanism of resource misallocation through which
tax rate dispersions may also result in eﬃciency loss. In a traditional Harberger triangle,
economists actually studied the impact of the mean, or the ﬁrst-order moment, of tax rates
on economic eﬃciency. Tax rate dispersion, measured by its variance or the second-order
moment, is set on the central stage of this paper, which could be viewed as a complement
to the Harberger triangle. From a more comprehensive perspective, both the ﬁrst-order
moment and the second-order moment of the tax rate work together in the provision of a
complete view on the eﬃciency loss of taxation.
This study also relates directly to the Production Eﬃciency Theorem proved in Dia-
mond and Mirrlees (1971). In this paper we will observe that production eﬃciency can
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be achieved when there is no tax rate dispersion.
3.3 VAT and Welfare Loss
VAT in practice usually leads to welfare loss, due to various reasons including exemp-
tion of some sectors out of the VAT system, diﬀerential tax rates and zero rating, and
other similar reasons. Mirrlees et al. (2011, Chapter 9) ﬁnds that the government tax
revenue could increase by three billion pounds by eliminating the diﬀerential tax rates,
while still maintaining the welfare level of the UK family. Zee (2006) ﬁnds that the ex-
emption of ﬁnancial services out of the VAT system leads to a eﬃciency loss amounting
to about 30% of the GDP of the UK. Piggott and Whalley (2001) analyse the eﬃciency
loss caused by the enlarging of the informal sector after the VAT expansion in Canada.
This paper, in attempt to provide a new perspective on the eﬃciency loss caused by
the imperfect VAT system in practice, is a complement to the existing studies on eﬃciency
loss of VAT.
4 Institutional Background of VAT in China
China has introduced VAT as early as 1979. There was a fundamental reform in 1994
on the whole Chinese tax system, which transformed the Chinese VAT into modernity
and made it consistent with those in developed countries. Since 1994, the VAT has been
administered by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). Despite several adjustments
has been made over the last decade, its framework remained stable.
4.1 Taxpayers
There are two types of VAT taxpayers in China, acknowledged in terms of the criteria
of turnover of sale goods and services, and the condition of their accounting system. One
is general taxpayer, the other is small taxpayer 4. In the ﬁrm survey dataset I use in this
paper, all the ﬁrms are General VAT taxpayers.
4.2 Taxable items and tax rates
Tax rates of VAT in China are ﬂat, with diﬀerential rates (17%, 13% and 0%) applied
to diﬀerent taxable goods and services. There are three main rates: (1) the standard rate
4The standard deﬁnition of Small Taxpayer is: (1) where the taxpayer is engaged in the production
of goods or in the provision of taxable services as his sole or principal business and his annual turnover
is less than one million RMB ¥; or (2) where the taxpayer is engaged in the wholesale or retail of goods
and his annual turnover is less than 1.8 million RMB ¥. However, A Small Taxpayer who maintains a
sound accounting system and is able to provide accurate accounting records for taxation purposes may
be registered as a General Taxpayer.
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at 17% for most taxable goods and services; (2) the reduced rate at 13% for agricultural
goods, public utilities, agriculture production inputs (such as fertilizers and agricultural
machinery), books, newspapers, magazines, and other products; (3) the zero rating for
exports.
4.3 Tax Exemption and Refund
Items exempted from tax include: (1) some agricultural production materials; (2)
contraceptive medicines and devices; (3) antique books purchased from the public; (4)
some goods imported for direct use in scientiﬁc research, experiment and education, and
(5) materials and equipment imported as donations, for poverty relief or other charity
purposes.
In the case of the zero tax rate applicable to exported goods, the exporters may apply
to the tax authorities for the input tax refund on those particular exported goods. At
present, the refund rates vary, at 3%, 5%, 8%, 13% and 17%.
4.4 Tax Authorities
To accommodate the tax revenue sharing system after the 1994 reform, the tax or-
ganisations at and below the provincial level are divided into oﬃces of the SAT (State
Administration of Taxation) and local tax bureaus.
According to the rules of the State Council on revenue sharing system, the tax revenue
in China may be divided into Central tax revenue, local tax revenue and the tax revenue
shared between the Central and local governments. Here local refers to governments at
and below the provincial level, including provincial, municipal, county and village. The tax
revenue sharing system between central and local governments was clearly deﬁned in the
1994 reform. Tax revenue shared between the Central and local governments is arranged
in the following way: (1) For domestic VAT, 75% is retained by Central Government and
25% is retained by Local Governments. (2) VAT collected by Customs belongs to Central
tax revenue.
4.5 Tax Compliance and Tax Administration
The degree of tax compliance varies across ﬁrms on the basis of ﬁrm ownership, ﬁrm
size, access to ﬁnancial market, ﬁrm location, and various other factors.
Cai and Liu (2009) show that, after controlling for other characteristics, ﬁrms facing
higher tax rates or tighter ﬁnancial constraints and smaller ﬁrms are more likely to avoid
tax.
Another salient feature in China is that State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) have more
incentive to comply with the tax code than their non-SOE counterparts. This is largely
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due to the fact the head of the SOE is generally motivated by pursuing his own promotion
as opposed to maximising the ﬁrm's post-tax proﬁt. In China, the performance of the SOE
is usually measured in terms of the total taxes and proﬁts contributed to the government,
while for the Non-SOE, a penny paid as tax is considered to be a penny lost. Moreover,
Non-SOE ﬁrms generally have many disadvantages including higher ﬁnancing costs and
a smaller scale of operation in any competition with SOE rivals. All these features of
Non-SOE ﬁrms mean that they are less likely to adhere to the tax code.
In regard to tax administration, similar to many other developing countries, presump-
tive taxation and minimum tax are prevalent in China's taxation practice, especially for
the lower tier tax authorities when levying taxes on small enterprises.5 These practices
are usually implemented in order to counter deﬁciencies in tax administration. Although
the tax codes are not strictly enforced, these practices are justiﬁable in an economic sense,
given the limited resources available (such as the number of tax staﬀ, especially staﬀ of
superior quality; computers and other facilities) to the tax authorities, as well as the
large number of small businesses unable to keep standard accounting books and to ﬁle a
qualiﬁed tax declaration.
Presumptive methods may help reduce audit time and cost. A simple approach is
to levy a lump sum on all businesses. A more sophisticated approach involves a census
of taxpayers and an estimation of income, assets, turnover, or other alternatives. At
the same time, the taxpayers can negotiate their tax liability with tax oﬃcials. Since
presumptive tax generally comprises a tax on average or normal tax base, the marginal
tax rate on a tax base above this average tax base is zero, leading to a declining eﬀective
average tax rate as the size of the actual tax base increases.
Minimum tax is another method for an imperfect tax administration to levy taxes by
requiring minimum tax contributions. Generally, tax administration in China is inclined
to focus on large taxpayers, while rudimentary presumptive methods or minimum tax
have to be used for contributions from smaller taxpayers.
At the local (provincial, municipal, county) government level, the tax authorities (SAT
and local tax bureau) regularly list the Major Tax Contributors among all the taxpayers
each year according to a certain criterion (generally, their tax contribution from the
previous year). Although the number of Major Tax Contributors in simple numerical
terms account for a tiny part of all taxpayers, they contribute a much larger proportion
of the tax revenue. For example, in the year 2007, about 70% of the tax revenue in the
city of GuangZhou came from the Major Tax Contributors, who number less than 1% of
the registered taxpayers in the city. Between 2001 and 2005, over 30% of the tax revenue
in the city of ShenZhen was collected from the top 100 Major Tax Contributors, who
5For presumptive tax and minimum tax, refer respectively to Bulutoglu (1995) and Stotsky (1995) for
details.
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Table 1: VAT Rate Dispersions within (Four-digit) Industries
number less than 0.05% of the taxpayers.6
In addtion to the tax administrative practice mentioned above, evidences show that
the VAT administration in China can be aﬀected by incentives faced by the local govern-
ments and local politicians. The eﬀective VAT rate may vary over the tightness of local
governments budget (Chen, 2015a) and local political cycles (Chen, 2015b).
Because of the rugged tax codes (diﬀerential rates, zero rating, tax refund, etc.) as
well as the poor tax administration mentoned above, the eﬀective VAT rate across ﬁrms
in China is quite dispersed. More importantly, Table 1 shows that most of the dispersion
comes from within four-digit industries. This allows us to study the eﬀects of tax rate
dispersion on resource allocation among monopolistic ﬁrms in the same industry as the
theory suggests.
Figure 4.1: VAT Rate Distribution over Firm in a Four-digit Industry
Figure 4.1 depicts the VAT rate dispersion within a four-digit industry (vegetable/fruit
juice or beverages, industry code=1533) in the year 2005. The standard deviation of VAT
rate in this industry is the median among all four-digit industries. Compared with Figure
1.1, we do not see signiﬁcant drop in VAT rate dispersion. This is consistent with the
ﬁnding in Table 1: most of the dispersion comes from within the industry. Details on
6Refer to Chinese literature by Lian He Ke Ti Zu (2007), Tan and Liu (2007).
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analysis of potential sources of the dispersion and related empirical facts could be found
in Appendix A.1.
5 Theoretical Framework: Distortions and TFP
5.1 Model
This model, largely based on Hsieh and Klenow (2009), aims to map the distortions
in the ﬁrm level into the TFP loss in the aggregate level of the manufacturing sector. In
order to fulﬁl this goal, we need a model which is able to aggregate the ﬁrm production,
based on the ﬁrm survey data in China, into the total GDP of the whole manufacturing
sector.
There are many sub-sectors (such as tobacco production, communication equipment
and other similar sectors) within the manufacturing sector, which will be indexed by
subscript s in the model . In the ﬁrm survey data (population census), s is particularly
referred to the four-digit (two-digit) level industry. The classiﬁcation and code of four-
digit (and two-digit) level industry are based on the standard of GB/T 47542002
promulgated by the Bureau of Statistics of China in the year 2002. In each sector s, there
are lots of production ﬁrms, which are indexed by subscript i in the model.
There are, therefore, three tiers of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. 1. Firm at the
bottom, indexed by si, produces Ysi using capital and labor as inputs; 2. Firm in the
middle, indexed by s, produces Ys with Ms diﬀerentiated inputs {Ysi}Msi=1. 3. Firm at
the top produces ﬁnal output Y, using {Ys}Ss=1 as intermediate inputs. The ﬁrm at the
bottom tier is real, and their data can be found in the ﬁrm survey. The middle and top
tiers of ﬁrms are dummy and simply used to aggregate with certain technologies the
products of the bottom ﬁrms.
The ﬁnal output ﬁrm uses a Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Y =
S∏
s=1
Y θss ,where
S∑
s=1
θs = 1 (5.1)
where Y is the total output in manufacturing sector, and Ys is the intermediate input
bought from sector s. HK(09) assumes a perfect competitive ﬁnal output market. So the
ﬁnal good producer's objective is to maximize the proﬁt by choosing {Ys}Ss=1 and taking
prices P, {Ps}Ss=1 as given.
max
{Ys}
P
S∏
s=1
Y θss −
S∑
s=1
PsYs (5.2)
The proﬁt maximization problem of the ﬁnal-output ﬁrm yields the following FOCs:
130
PsYs = θsPY (5.3)
Hereafter, we normalize P to 1 by taking ﬁnal output as numeraire.
Intermediate ﬁrm-s produces Ys with diﬀerentiated inputs Ysi by CES technology
(Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator):
Ys =
(
Ms∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
(5.4)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent inputs. Here, the CES technology
is introduced to accommodate the monopolistic competition in each four-digit sector s.
The price mark-up for the ﬁrms in each sector is governed by σ.
The diﬀerentiated product Ysi is produced by the monopolistic competitive ﬁrm with
a Cobb-Douglas technology of ﬁrm TFP Asi, physical capital Ksi, and human capital Hsi.
Ysi = AsiK
αs
si H
1−αs
si (5.5)
where Hsi = hsiLsi, and hsi is the ﬁrm speciﬁc average human capital level, Lsi is the raw
labour input.
Assume that R is the market rental price of physical capital, and w is the wage rate
of raw labour. Both R and w are exogeneously given, so the model can be justiﬁably
regarded as a partial equilibrium model.
There are two salient features of this model. One is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc exogeneous
distortions in output (τY,i), capital (τ˜Ksi) and in labour (τ˜Hsi). The objective of ﬁrm si
is to maximize the proﬁt by choosing Psi, Ysi, and taking factor prices, distortions, and
output demand curve as given.
max
{Psi, Ysi}
(1− τ˜Ysi)PsiYsi −R(1 + τ˜Ksi)Ksi + w(1 + τ˜Hsi)Hsi (5.6)
subject to the downward sloping (inverse) demand curve
Psi = Ps
(
Ys
Ysi
)1/σ
(5.7)
where τ˜Ysi=1−τY,i−τV Asi , where τV Asi is ﬁrm speciﬁc VAT rate and τY,i is other ﬁrm-speciﬁc
distortions in output market.
For narrative purposes, we deﬁne the distortion-adjusted factor prices as below.
Rsi = R(1 + τKsi) (5.8)
wsi = w(1 + τHsi) (5.9)
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where 1 + τKsi =
1+τ˜Ksi
1−τ˜Ysi , 1 + τHsi =
1+τ˜Hsi
1−τ˜Ysi . By their deﬁnition, Rsi and wsi can be viewed
as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor prices, which are taken as given by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm si.
Now the ﬁrm si's problem can be re-written as
max PsiAsiK
αs
si H
1−αs
si −RsiKsi − wsiHsi (5.10)
which looks like the normal proﬁt maximization problem of a ﬁrm without distortions.
From the ﬁrm's proﬁt maximization conditions, we can express the output price for
ﬁrm i in sector-s as:
Psi =
σ
σ − 1
1
Asi
(
Rsi
αs
)αs (wsi
βs
)1−αs
(5.11)
where 1
Asi
(
Rsi
αs
)αs (
wsi
βs
)1−αs
is the marginal cost of producing Ysi, and
σ
σ−1 is the mark-up.
In reality, the distortion-adjusted factor prices, Rsi and wsi, are unobservable. But
in this model, they can be written as the function of observable resource allocations as
below.
Rsi = αs
σ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Ksi
(5.12)
wsi = (1− αs)σ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Hsi
(5.13)
where PsiYsi and Ksi respectively are the value-added and physical capital stock of ﬁrm
si, which are provided in the ﬁrm survey data. Human capital Hsi is not available in ﬁrm
survey data. In HK(09), they just use the wage bill as proxy for human capital. In this
paper, we will use the more direct measurement of Hsi based on the connection between
the wage bill in the ﬁrm survey and the related information revealed in the population
census.
Below we give two expressions that will be used in the next section. Actually, one can
get the same results from monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
First, we can also obtain the expenditure ratio of intermediate input Ysi in sector s as
follows:
PsiYsi
PsYs
=
(
Psi
Ps
)1−σ
(5.14)
Second, the output price index in sector-s is:
Ps =
(
Ms∑
i=1
P 1−σsi
) 1
1−σ
(5.15)
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5.2 TFP and Production Eﬃciency
In this section, I move on to look at the relationship between distortions and the TFP .
First we need to distinguish two sorts of productivity measurements. One is physical
productivity, also known as TFP . Another is revenue productivity. For ﬁrm si, the
physical productivity is just Asi, and the revenue productivity can be deﬁned as below.
TFPRsi =
PsiYsi
Kαssi H
1−αs
si
= PsiAsi (5.16)
TFPRsi can also be expressed in terms of distortion-adjusted factor prices as follows.
TFPRsi =
σ
σ − 1
(
Rsi
αs
)αs ( wsi
1− αs
)βs
(5.17)
If there are no distortions, i.e., τ˜Ysi = τ˜Ksi = τ˜Hsi = 0 and Rsi = R,wsi = w, then
there would be no variation in revenue productivity TFPRsi in every sector.
In parallel, we can also deﬁne the revenue productivity for sector s as:
TFPRs =
PsYs
Kαssi H
1−αs
si
(5.18)
where PsYs =
∑
i PsiYsi.
From the results obtained before, TFPRs can be written as:
TFPRs =
σ
σ − 1
(∑
i
Rsi
αs
Ksi
Ks
)αs (∑
i
wsi
1− αs
Hsi
Hs
)1−αs
(5.19)
where Ks =
∑
iKsi, Hs =
∑
iHsi.
Deﬁne the TFP in sector s as below:
TFPs =
Ys
Kαss H
1−αs
s
(5.20)
Then we have
TFPs =
1
Ps
PsYs
Kαss H
1−αs
s
(5.21)
=
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
1
Psi
)σ−1] 1σ−1
TFPRs (5.22)
=
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
TFPRs
TRPPsi
)σ−1] 1σ−1
(5.23)
If there are no distortions, i.e., τ˜Ysi = τ˜Ksi = τ˜Hsi = 0, we would have TFPRsi =
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TFPRs for all i in each s. Then TFPs would be simpliﬁed as:
TFP es =
[
Ms∑
i=1
(Asi)
σ−1
] 1
σ−1
(5.24)
We call TFP es the eﬃcient TFP in sector-s since it is the TFP when there are no
distortions.
Ys = TFPsK
αs
s H
1−αs
s (5.25)
Therefore, the TFP loss caused by distortions in sector-s can be measured by TFPs(τ)
TFP es
,
where TFPs(τ) is the TFP in sector s under a vector of distortion τ .
How to measure the contribution of VAT rate dispersion to TFP loss?
Contribution of VAT Dispersion =
TFP (τ ′Ksi , τ
′
Hsi
)
TFP (τKsi , τHsi)
− 1 (5.26)
where τK and τH are vectors of distortions in K and H including the VAT rate. τ
′
K
and τ ′H exclude the VAT rate.
1 + τKsi =
1 + τ˜Ksi
1− τ˜Ysi
, 1 + τHsi =
1 + τ˜Hsi
1− τ˜Ysi
(5.27)
Using 1− τ˜Ysi = 1− τYsi − τV ATsi ≈ (1− τYsi)(1− τV ATsi ), we have
1 + τ ′Ksi =
1 + τ˜Ksi
1− τYsi
≈ (1 + τKsi)(1− τV ATsi )
1 + τ ′Hsi =
1 + τ˜Hsi
1− τYsi
≈ (1 + τHsi)(1− τV ATsi ) (5.28)
6 Data
In this section, I brieﬂy introduce to the reader two data sets I am going to use.
From the theoretical model in Section 4, we know that, for ﬁrm si, we need the
value-added data for Ysi, physical capital stock data for Ksi, human capital for Hsi, wage
compensation to human capital Hsi. We also need to know the factor share αs and output
share θs for each sector s.
Our strategy is to collect Ysi, Ksi, Lsi, and wage compensation from the ﬁrm survey
data and get Hsi from population census data. Factor share αs, and output share θs are
calculated based on the ﬁrm survey data.
134
6.1 Firm Survey
The ﬁrm data set is the same as the one used by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). It is
the Annual Survey of Industrial Production conducted by the Chinese National Bureau
of Statistics, which includes all non-state ﬁrms with more than 5 million RMB Yuan in
revenue (about $600,000) plus all state-owned ﬁrms. I use the data from the year 2000
to 2007. There are over 160,000 ﬁrms in each year. Each ﬁrm has a four-digit industry
code, ownership, region code, wage payments, value-added, capital stock, and a number
of employees.
I use total asset as the physical capital stock, while HK(09) use the book value of
the ﬁxed capital net of depreciation. The main discrepancy between the two are current
assets and intangible assets, which are supposed to create values-added to ﬁrms as well
and therefore should not be ruled out once they are available in the dataset. Otherwise,
I would get incorrect TFP for each ﬁrm and thus inappropriate TFPR dispersion across
ﬁrms. Of course, we would repeat our work in the robustness check by using HK(2009)'s
measurement for physical capital stock.
The wage compensation includes: (1) payable wage; (2) unemployment insurance pre-
mium; (3) pension and medical insurance premium; (4) housing mutual fund; and (5) total
welfare fees. The wage compensation as a share of value-added is only 34% on average,
while it is about 50% in an input-output table. To tackle this problem, I use the same
method as HK(2009) by adjusting the wage compensation with a constant factor (multi-
plied by 3.6 in our case) such that the average wage compensation share is approximately
50%.
In ensure data quality, I dropped three types of observations: (1) the observation with
empty cell and (2) the observation with non-positive value for capital stock, labour input,
value-added and wage compensation, and (3) the observation with value-added less than
the wage (even without adjustment in wage, the value-added in many ﬁrms is also less
than the wage compensation). In the end, we are left with number of ﬁrms ranging from
approximately 66,000 to 168,000 in each year during the period from 2000 to 2007.
Table 2 brieﬂy reports the summary statistics of several key variables in the ﬁrm survey
from the year 2000 to 2007.
Table 2: Summary Statistics - Firm Survey (2000 - 2007)
6.2 Population Census
The population data is from the 1% Sampling Population Census in year 2005 con-
ducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. There are 2,585,481 individuals in
the data set. The variables I use in this paper are: educational attainment, completion of
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Table 3: Summary Statistics - Population Census (2005)
schooling, main source of income, two-digit industry code, and the ownership of the ﬁrm
where the individual is working. To check the robustness of the results of this paper in
the later stage, I may still want to use other variables such as: year and month of birth,
sexual orientation, two-digit address code, ethnicity, monthly income, and occupation.
I dropped the following observations: (1) those not working in the manufacturing
sector; (2) those whose occupation is `farmer' or non-ﬁrm employee; (3) those whose main
source of income is not from labour and from assets. After this ﬁltering process we were
ﬁnally left with about 200,000 observations.
The population census data and the ﬁrm survey data can be matched in the year
2005 by the industry-provincial-ownership characteristics. There are thirty-nine two-digit
manufacturing industries, thirty-one provinces, and two types of ownership (state-owned
and non-state-owned). The match between the two data sets allows us to recover the
human capital for each ﬁrm in the ﬁrm survey data, as will be shown in the next section.
Table 3 brieﬂy reports the key variables in the population census.
Another important issue is the measurement of human capital. In Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), they use the wage bill of each ﬁrm to proxy its human capital. In this paper, I
attempt to improve the human capital measurement by incorporating information about
wages, years of schooling and other relevant characteristics of the labour force in the 1%
population sampling survey. Details of this work are discussed in the Appendix.
7 Main Results
To numerically implement the computation of contribution of distortions to TFP loss,
in the ﬁrst instance I need to calibrate several parameters.
Following HK(2009), I set σ = 3. HK(2009) calibrate αs, capital share in China, to
the corresponding number in the U.S. In this paper, I calibrate αs to the ﬁrm survey
data in China, for which I have two reasons. First, unlike HK(2009), I do not compare
the distortions between China and the U.S., so I do not need the U.S. as a benchmark.
Second, in theory, the appropriate technology in China should be diﬀerent from that in
the U.S. due to diﬀerent endowments (say, the proportion of skilled labour) in these two
countries. It is hard to believe that China's capital share would be the same as that of
U.S.
Regarding R and w, I calibrate them, based on the ﬁrm survey data, respectively to
the average rental price of capital and wage rate in the whole manufactural sector.
Then, following the steps below, I can calculate the contribution of distortions to TFP
loss.
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Step 1: Based on Eq. (5.12) and Eq. (5.13), Rsi and wsi can be calculated from the
value-added PsiYsi, physical capital stock Ksi, and human capital stock Hsi. PsiYsi and
Ksi are available from the ﬁrm survey data. Hsi is the human capital measurement, either
by wage bill as proxy, or by the approach proposed by this paper (I will discuss this point
in detail presently)..
Step 2: Given the results of Rsi and wsi obtained from step (1), I can back out τKsi
and τHsi based on Eq. (5.8) and Eq. (5.9).
Step 3: Calculate TFPRsi based on Eq. (5.17).
Step 4: Calculate TFPRs based on Eq. (5.19).
Step 5: Calculate TFPs based on Eq. (5.21).
Step 6: Following HK(2009), Asi can be calculated from the following equation: Asi =
(PsiYsi)
σ
σ−1
Kαssi H
1−αs
si
.
Step 7: Calculate TFP es based on Eq. (5.24).
Step 8: Calculate the Contribution of V AT dispersion from Eq. (5.26).
7.1 VAT Rate Dispersion and TFP/GDP Loss
This section reports the most important result in this paper  the eﬃciency loss caused
by the VAT rate dispersion across manufacturing ﬁrms in China, which is calculated based
on the counterfactual analysis. I will do it with two sets of distortions in the output market
in our exercises: (1) All the distortions τ˜Ysi(= τYsi + τ
V AT
si ); (2) Only τYsi , the distortions
excluding ﬁrm speciﬁc VAT rate τYsi . Here I assume τ
V AT
si is independent of τYsi , τ˜Ksi ,
τ˜Hsi , and Asi. This assumption justiﬁes that the distribution of other distortions (τYsi ,
τ˜Ksi , and τ˜Hsi) would not change when I eliminate the VAT rate dispersion (τ
V AT
si ).
In both counterfactual exercises, I regard TFP e, the eﬃcient TFP in a world without
any distortions, as the benchmark.
Table 4: Dispersions in VAT and TFP/GDP Loss
I ﬁrst calculate the TFP loss caused by all the distortions τ˜Ysi , which is measured by
1 − TFP (τ ′Ksi , τ ′Hsi)/TFP e, where τ ′Ksi , τ ′Hsi respectively are the distortions in K and H
normalized by τ˜Ysi based on Eq.(5.27). The results every year are reported in row (1)
(TFP Loss) of Table 4.
Then I calculate the TFP loss caused by all the distortions τ˜Ysi , measured by 1 −
TFP (τKsi , τHsi)/TFP
e, where τKsi , τHsi are the distortions in K and H normalized by
τYsi based on Eq.(5.28). The results are reported in row (2) (TFP Loss Net of VAT).
The eﬃciency loss caused by VAT rate dispersion is measured by
TFP (τKsi ,τHsi )
TFP (τ ′Ksi ,τ
′
Hsi
)
− 1,
which can be interpreted as the percentage GDP/TFP gain from removing the VAT rate
dispersion (τV ATsi ) compared with the current actual GDP/TFP (TFP (τ
′
Ksi
, τ ′Hsi)). This
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exercise is close to the revenue-neutral tax reform since it only eliminates the spread
between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc VAT rate and the economy-wide average VAT rate, with the
tax rate for the high-tax ﬁrm being lowered and for the low-tax ﬁrm being raised. The
results are in row (3) (Contribution of VAT). The mean of the eﬀective VAT rate within
industries are reported in row (4).
From numbers in row (3) I can see that the contribution of VAT rate dispersion to
GDP (or TFP) loss is characterized by its signiﬁcant magnitude and high volatility. The
percentage of GDP (or TFP) loss ranges from 5% to 16%, while the average eﬀective tax
rate is largely unaﬀected.
7.2 Distribution of τK, τH, τ
V AT , and their correlation
In the counter-factual analysis I have done, I assume τV ATsi is independent of τYsi , τ˜Ksi ,
τ˜Hsi , and Asi. However, how plausible is this assumption? Also, to what extent will the
conclusion will be changed if this assumption is violated?
Table 5 shows the correlation coeﬃcients between ﬁve variables in the model. The
numbers in the ﬁrst column suggest that the correlation between the VAT rate, other
distortions, and productivity lnAsi are very low.
Table 5: Correlation between Distortions and Productivity
If ln(1− τV ATsi ), ln(1 + τ ′K,si), ln(1 + τ ′H,si), lnAsi satisfy the normal distribution, then
we have the following expression for TFP in a four-digit industry s.
lnTFPs =
1
σ − 1 log
(
Ms∑
i=1
Aσ−1si
)
− σ − 1
2
var (lnTFPRsi)
which implies the TFP loss is caused by the dispersion in TFPRsi across ﬁrms, where
var (lnTFPRsi) = var
(
ln(1− τV ATsi ) + lnTFPRKHsi
)
(7.1)
= var
(
ln(1− τV ATsi )) + var(log TFPRKHsi
)
+2cov(ln(1− τV ATsi ), lnTFPRKHsi ) (7.2)
where lnTFPRKHsi = αs log(1 + τ
′
K,si) + (1 − αs) log(1 + τ ′H,si), and Table 5 shows the
correlation between ln(1− τV ATsi ) and lnTFPRKHsi is equal to 0.0009, very close to zero.
In our previous analysis, we assume τV ATsi is independent of τYsi , τ˜Ksi , τ˜Hsi , and
Asi. Now we know that the error we made in calculating the percentage contribution
of VAT rate dispersion to TFP can be captured approximately by σ−1
2
× 2cov(log(1 −
τV ATsi ), log TFPR
KH
si ). Given σ = 3, we have
σ−1
2
= 1.The number is equal to 2 × 0.0009
× 0.1451 × 1.1036 × 100% = 0.0288%. So we underestimate the TFP loss caused by
VAT rate dispersion in Table 4 only by a negligible magnitude of 0.0288%.
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8 Robustness Check
8.1 Export Refund
To see to what extent the export tax refund leads to the VAT rate dispersion and
eﬃciency loss, we can do the robustness check by recovering the counter-factual VAT rate
for each ﬁrm by removing the export refund in the same way as we did in Table 19. The
results are reported in Table 6, where row (1) is the contribution of VAT rate dispersion
to GDP/TFP loss after removing the export refund, and row (2) is the benchmark case
with export refund. Compared to row (2), the numbers in row (1) are not signiﬁcantly
and systematically larger or smaller, suggesting a minor role of export tax refund in TFP
loss.
Table 6: TFP Loss with VAT Tax Refund Excluded
8.2 Time Average
To see what percentage of the eﬃciency loss caused by VAT rate dispersion can be
attributed to ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect and what percentage to time-idiosyncratic shock, we take
the time average of VAT rate over the ﬁrms in six sub-samples. To do this, we ﬁrst need
to link the ﬁrm over years. However, since the ﬁrm ID changed in the year 2004, we can
only link the ﬁrms respectively in two periods: 2000 to 2003, and 2005 to 2007. In each
period, we consider several sub-samples of ﬁrms which stay for certain years.
For every ﬁrm in each sample, we take the year average of the VAT rate. In Sample
1, the year average is taken over four years for all ﬁrms in the sample. In Samples 2 and
5, the year average is taken over three years for all ﬁrms in the sample. In Samples 3 and
6, the year average will be actually taken over only two years for some ﬁrms. In Samples
4 and 7, the year average is just the actual VAT rate in a year within the period.
Using the same method to calculate the Contribution of VAT to TFP/GDP loss as
in Section 7, for each sub-sample of ﬁrms I report in Table 7 and 8 the Contribution of
VAT of actual VAT rate in each year and the year-average over the period.
Table 7: Time Average of VAT Rate (2000-2003)
Table 8: Time Average of VAT Rate (2005-2007)
For ﬁrms staying for the whole period (Samples 1 or 4), by comparing the numbers
in diﬀerent columns, the Contribution of VAT of year-average (1.5% in 2000 to 2003,
4.0 in 2005 to 2007) does not diﬀer too much from that of each year, except in the
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years 2002 and 2007. However, the years 2002 (4.9%) and 2007 (12.6%) themselves diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from other years in each period. This implies that the year-average does not
reduce the contribution of VAT, and the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect plays a major role in the VAT
rate dispersion across ﬁrms.
Then we can make a comparison between diﬀerent rows along the same column. We
can clearly see that the Contribution of VAT is increasing in the sample size (Sam-
ple 4 > Sample 3 > Sample 2 > Sample 1, and Sample 7 > Sample 6 > Sample 5).
This suggests that the entry and exit of ﬁrms brings about additional contribution to
TFP loss. This is mainly because the entry-exit ﬁrms are more distorted in capital and
labour market and thus reduce the actual TFP (τ ′Ksi , τ
′
Hsi
) and increase the contribution
TFP (τKsi , τHsi)/TFP (τ
′
Ksi
, τ ′Hsi) − 1, rather than because the VAT rates are more dis-
persed over these ﬁrms and reduce the TFP (τKsi , τHsi).
Why the years 2002 and 2007 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent is a question that remains in
need of an answer. One possible explanation is that the political cycles and the macroeco-
nomic administration measures in these particular years, such as credit control, resulted
in resource reallocations and distortions and thus reduced the productivity.
This could be an interesting direction for future research.
8.3 Data Quality
Another general and signiﬁcant concern regarding the results in this paper is that of
data quality, even though most of the tax experts and oﬃcials at the State Administration
of Taxation assert how strictly the VAT is administered and enforced in China. The
taxation bureau can locate any two VAT invoices for a speciﬁc transaction using an
electronic network system. In this section, I still take this concern regarding data quality
into serious consideration, by double-checking the data both from the Bureau of Statistics
(the Firm Survey I use in this paper) and from the State Administration of Taxation.
Unfortunately, the ﬁrm level tax data is not available from the State Administration
of Taxation. However, the State Administration of Taxation releases the Tax Burden
Ratio for each two-digit industry and its lower bound as a warning signal regarding ﬁrms'
tax evasion. Tax Burden Ratio is deﬁned as Payable VAT
Sales Value
. The State Administration of
Taxation of China calculates the Guideline and Lower Bound of VAT burden ratio of
each industry based on the ﬁrm level tax data over previous years. The Guideline is
the average VAT burden ratio for ﬁrms within industry. The Lower Bound and Upper
Bound is just the analogue to the conﬁdence interval in statistics.
Figure 8.1 shows the Guideline, Lower Bound, and the Upper Bound from the
State Administration of Taxation and the average VAT rate in the Firm Survey of each
two-digit industry. Among 40 two-digit industries, 9 industries lie outside of the warning
bound.
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In the robustness check, ﬁrms in two-digit industry outside of the warning bounds are
entirely removed from the sample.
Figure 8.1: Data Quality Check
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 9 which reports the results after dropping
the badly inconsistent industries. First, the contribution of VAT dispersion to GDP (or
TFP loss) does not change systematically. That can be seen by comparing row (1) and
row (2). Second, the average of the eﬀective VAT rate in the remaining sample is almost
unchanged. Third, the TFP loss caused by other distortions systematically decreases for
all years. This implies that the ﬁrms in badly inconsistent industries also suﬀer from
more distortions in capital and labour markets.
Table 9: Data Quality
8.4 Outlier
Another potential problem with the ﬁrm survey data is that outliers could exaggerate
the contribution of VAT rate dispersion to TFP loss if a small number of ﬁrms extremely
over-report or under-report their VAT liability and drive up the dispersion in the eﬀective
VAT rate. To avoid the contamination by outliers, I can drop 2α% ﬁrms from the whole
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sample in each year if a ﬁrm's eﬀective VAT rate is below α − th percentile or above
(100− α)− th percentile in that year.
Table 10 reports the results after dropping 0.1% of ﬁrms (α = 0.05). I can see that
the results are not aﬀected, except in the years 2006 and 2007, where the contribution of
VAT dispersion to TFP loss signiﬁcantly decreases to the average level rather than much
below the average.
Overall, the greater α is, the less dispersed is the eﬀective VAT rate, and the contri-
bution of VAT dispersion to TFP loss may also decrease. But is α = 0.05 is a reasonable
setting? The answer is probably `yes'. To observe this, I report in Table 10 the minimum
and maximum of the eﬀective VAT rate after dropping the outliers. The minimum is
-30% and the maximum is 100%. According to the tax law and tax practice in China,
these are not extraordinary numbers even in the absence of tax evasion. Therefore, there
is no strong evidence that we still need to raise the value of α.
Table 10: TFP Loss with Outliers Excluded
8.5 Elasticity of Substitution
As we have shown in Section 1, greater elasticity of substitution would translate into
higher eﬃciency loss. This is because with a greater elasticity of substitution, a low-tax
ﬁrm could steal more business from a high-tax ﬁrm and this could lead to more serious
resource misallocation.
As with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we also do the robustness check with greater elas-
ticity by setting σ = 5 and report the result in row (1) of Table 11. Similar to Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), the TFP loss of all distortions is aggravated massively, and the contribu-
tion of VAT is also enormously ampliﬁed compared to benchmark results in row (2) with
σ = 3 . This suggests that the results are sensitive to the parameter value of σ. More
work needs to be done in estimating σ.
Table 11: TFP Loss with σ = 5
8.6 VAT Reform
Could the results be aﬀected by the VAT reform in north-east provinces in 2004, as
mentioned in Section ?? and suggested by Table 17? To answer this question, I dropped
all ﬁrms in eight industries as well as the three provinces involved in the reform. The
results are reported in row (1) of Table 12 and show that the contribution of VAT to TFP
loss does not change very much compared to the benchmark results in row (2), except
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where it decreases signiﬁcantly in year 2007. In other years, it may increase or decrease
a little bit, without a systematic direction of movement.
Table 12: TFP Loss with VAT Reform Provinces and Industries Excluded
9 Conclusion
Among all possible distortions that lead to misallocation and produce eﬃciency loss,
although the eﬀective VAT rate might not be the most salient one, it is a measurable
one. This allows us to study the impact of dispersion in the eﬀective VAT rate on the
aggregate production eﬃciency. Based on the structural model and approach initiated
by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I conduct a revenue-neutral counter-factual analysis in this
paper by removing the VAT rate dispersion to calculate the potential TFP/GDP gain.
The results show that the TFP/GDP gain is as large as an average order of 7.9%, and
volatile too, ranging from 5% to 16% in the period from 2000 to 2007. This suggests that
the VAT in China can lead to non-negligible distortions and misallocation.
Robustness checks suggest that the eﬃciency loss mainly comes from the time-persistent
and ﬁrm-ﬁxed factors rather than the time-varing shock, demonstrating that the data
quality is not a problem, but revealing that the results are sensitive to the parameter
value of elasticity of substitution. The correlations are close to zero between the ﬁrm's
VAT rate and some of the ﬁrm's characteristics, including ﬁrm size, TFP , distortions in
capital and labour. This suggests that the distortion of VAT is very likely to be indepen-
dent of other potential distortions in China.
One caveat should be noted again in the end. The eﬀective VAT rate dispersion could
be caused either by intricate real-world tax codes or by poor tax administration. This
paper is silent on the respective role of each. Further studies could be done by separating
the contribution of the two to the production eﬃciency. An additional feasible way is to
employ the ﬁrm level data in developed countries such as UK and France, and to set their
eﬀective VAT distribution as a benchmark in the counter-factual exercise, rather than
using the dispersion-free distribution as the benchmark as I have done in this paper. This
is because the eﬀective VAT rate dispersion is due to two broad factors: tax law (e.g., the
existence of a general and reduced rates, rebates for exports and zero-rated goods) and
the implementation of the policy (e.g., tax evasion, corruption, etc.), the TFP eﬃciency
loss calculated in this paper should be attributed to both factors. If one believes that
the dispersion in the eﬀective VAT rate in developed countries are much less likely to be
subject to bad tax implementation than in China, then the counter-factual exercise in
that way may be able to tell us the TFP loss only caused by the bad tax implementation,
rather than by the various special tax treatment.
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Appendix 1. Eﬀective VAT Rate Dispersion  Potential
Sources and Facts
A.1.1 Potential Sources of VAT Dispersion
Theoretically, Value Added Tax (VAT) avoids the cascade eﬀect of sales tax by taxing
only the value added at each stage of production. An ideal VAT system is supposed to
apply a uniform tax rate at every stage along the value-added chain, concluding at the
ﬁnal consumption. Without doubt, the eﬀective VAT rate for diﬀerent taxpayers would be
the same under a perfect VAT system. In practice, however, the eﬀective VAT rate varies
across ﬁrms due to a variety of reasons: (1) The breakdown of the value-added chain; (2)
A non-uniform tax rate; (3) Issues relating to tax compliance; (4) Issues relating to tax
administration and enforcement; (5) Tax reforms. To be consistent with the motivation
of this paper, I focus primarily on the sources of the VAT rate dispersion within the same
(four-digit) industry, as opposed to discussing the VAT rate diﬀerentials between ﬁrms in
diﬀerent industries.
The sources of eﬀective VAT rate dispersion can be demonstrated by a credit-invoice
computation method:
τ =
pyqyτy − pmqmτm
pyqy − pmqm =
(
1− pmqm
pyqy
)−1
(τy − τm) + τm (9.1)
where τ is the eﬀective VAT rate of a ﬁrm. pk, qk, tk (k = y,m) respectively are price,
quantity, and tax rate for goods k (k = y for output, k = m for intermediate input).
pyqy−pmqm is value-added. pyqyτy is the tax payment on sales, pmqmτm is the reclaimable
tax on intermediate goods purchase. pyqyτy − pmqmτm is payable VAT.
Theoretically, if τy = τm = 17% for all ﬁrms, then there would be no cross-ﬁrm
dispersion in τ . But dispersion arises in two cases: (1) Even though all ﬁrms have the same
τy and the same τm, while if τy 6= τm, then the disparity between ﬁrms in (pmqm)/(pyqy)
would imply the dispersion in τ . (2) If τy = τm for each ﬁrm, but they vary across ﬁrms,
then we still have dispersion in τ . These two cases may arise from several sources including
tax law, tax compliance, tax administration and enforcement, and tax reform in China,
and this is discussed in greater detail below.
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Break-down of the Value-added Chain
If all the transactions are included in the VAT system and are applied with the same
ﬂat tax rate, there would be no tax rate dispersion across ﬁrms. But the breakdown of
the value-added chain gives rise to VAT rate dispersions; below are two common cases.
First, service sectors are excluded from VAT system. In China, exemption of many
service sectors from the VAT system does not allow the manufacturing ﬁrms that purchase
the service from other ﬁrms to reclaim on its service input. In this case, τm = 0 for the
service intermediate input purchased from other ﬁrms. Even though all ﬁrms face the
same, τy, the ﬁrm with smaller (pmqm)/(pyqy) beneﬁts from lower τ . A manufacturing
ﬁrm, therefore, has an incentive to vertically integrate service ﬁrms in order to reduce
the purchase of intermediate input pmqm. Diﬀerent (pmqm)/(pyqy) across ﬁrms, probably
due to ﬁrms' heterogeneous capability of vertical integration, would result in tax rate
dispersion.
Second, invoices are diﬃcult to get from purchasing agricultural goods. In China, it is
very common that manufacturing ﬁrms (say, tobacco factories) purchase the agricultural
goods (say, tobacco leaves) as their raw material from farmers who in general are not able
to provide the invoice. In this case, τm = 0. By the same token, a ﬁrm will face a low τ
if it sets up an agricultural farm of its own, or if it is able to purchase from large formal
farms which can provide invoices for their agricultural products.
Non-uniform Tax Rate
There are three common cases of deviation from the standard VAT rate at 17%.
First, diﬀerential tax rates. In China, the VAT rate is 17% at the standard rate but
only 13% for agricultural goods. In this case, τy > τm. A ﬁrm can lower τ by vertically
integrating an agriculture farm as a supplier of intermediate input.
Second, export refund and zero rating. In this case, τy < τm. Suppose two ﬁrms
produce the same product. Firm D produces solely for the domestic market, while Firm
E exports to foreign markets. Firm E can get the VAT tax refund and enjoy a lower
eﬀective tax rate than Firm D.
Third, purchase of goods from small taxpayers. In China, a tax reclaim on a purchase
from small taxpayers is lower than the standard rate, which implies τy > τm. In this case,
a ﬁrm will have a higher tax rate if it has to purchase the intermediate input from small
taxpayers.
Tax Compliance
Although the system of VAT is favourable to other systems because it limits the scope
of tax evasion and fraud by tracing down the invoices in transaction, tax compliance is
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still a big concern in practice. HMRC in the UK estimates that the VAT gap was 11.5
billion, accounting for 14% of the potential revenue yield, from 2009 to 2010; that is the
diﬀerence between tax actually collected and the tax that would have been paid. (Mirrlees
et al., 2011).
Non-compliance can occur in the following ways:
First, ﬁrms do not record sales that ought to be taxable. A ﬁrm can open a direct
sales store without issuing invoices to consumers, or launch a sales promotion just by
bestowing goods as opposed to lowering the price. Thus τy could be diﬀerent between
ﬁrms.
Second, invoices for input purchases can be faked. A ﬁrm can buy agricultural goods
from non-VAT taxpayers. So τm could vary across ﬁrms.
Third, ﬁrms can claim that sales are lower-rated or zero-rated. A ﬁrm can fake export
invoices. τm could vary across ﬁrms.
In addition, China still has a non-negligible number of SOE, and these may be more
compliant when paying tax then Non-SOE.
Tax Administration and Enforcement
China is a huge country with substantial heterogeneity across geographical characteris-
tics. VAT is collected by SAT (State Administration of Taxation). Under the hierarchical
structure of SAT, regional diﬀerences in tax administration and enforcement can be enor-
mous, at least for two reasons. First, the principal-agent relationship between taxation
oﬃcials at diﬀerent levels of SAT sets the asymmetric information problem at the central
stage of tax collection. Second, taxation oﬃcials at the lower level of SAT, for instance
at the county level, are very likely to be connected with the local government oﬃcials,
and thus act in favour of local interests rather than in accordance with tax law. Regional
VAT rates, therefore, are determined to a large extent by regional ﬁxed factors such as
the taxation capability, the agency cost, the administration cost, and the incentive of
taxation enforcement.
In addition, the delay in making payment of payable VAT is also a common practice
in China. It usually takes place when a ﬁrm has used up all their cash and has to make a
request to the taxation oﬃce for an extension of time to make their tax payment. In this
case, a ﬁrm's τ could vary over time, but its overall time average should remain stable.
Tax Reform
Tax reforms are generally launched initially only in some selected industries and re-
gions, as opposed to implementing them all at once across all industries and in the whole
country. This approach to reform may create tax rate dispersions across ﬁrms in diﬀerent
regions and industries. For example, VAT tax reform was initiated in eight industries in
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the north-east provinces on July 1, 2004, with VAT being transformed from a product
type to a consumption type, which led the ﬁrms in these industries in north-east provinces
to experience a lower eﬀective VAT tax rate than those in other regions. In July 2007,
the reform was extended to another twenty-six cities in six central-region provinces. In
this case, τm could be diﬀerent for ﬁrms in diﬀerent regions within the same industry.
A.1.2 Empirical Facts on VAT Dispersion
Although there are many potential sources of VAT rate dispersion, as set out above,
the main factor is the regional variation, which accounts for about 60% of within-industry
VAT rate dispersion. Observable tax compliance and tax planning behaviours, such as
vertical integration, size and ownership of the ﬁrm, do also signiﬁcantly aﬀect the VAT
rate, but with a notably smaller contribution to VAT rate dispersion.
The results also show that consumption type VAT reform reduced the VAT rate dis-
persion in reform industries, while the time-idiosyncratic shock, export refund, entry and
exit of ﬁrms are not a main source of tax rate dispersion.
Tax Administration, Compliance, Ownership
To empirically investigate the sources of VAT rate dispersion, I run the following
regression, in an attempt to measure the impact of regional ﬁxed eﬀect, ownership type of
ﬁrm, and various other characteristics of a ﬁrm including its size, input-output structure,
reliance on exports, organisation of ﬁrm, after controlling for four-digit industry and year
ﬁxed eﬀects. The regression equation is as follows:
τit = α + γt + ηc,s + γSOEi + ηSizeit + λOrganizationit + δExportit + ξit (9.2)
where γt and ηc,s respectively are year ﬁxed eﬀects and county-(4-digit)industry ﬁxed
eﬀect, SOEi is dummy for ownership type (SOEi = 1 for Non-SOE). Sizeit is measured by
logarithm of ﬁrms' value-added, Exportit by
Export
Total sales
. Organization of a ﬁrm is measured
by two variables: (1) input-output structurepyqy−pmqm
pyqy
, (2) number of establishments.
Results in Table 13 bear some implications. The R2 changes from close to zero in
column (1) to 0.06 in column (2). This suggests that about 6% of the cross-ﬁrm variation
in the eﬀective VAT rate can be explained by the variation across (4-digit) industries. By
the same token, the R2 in column (3) and (4) implies that the county ﬁxed eﬀect and the
(4-digit) industries-county ﬁxed eﬀect have explanation power at an magnitude of about
11% and 44% respectively. The results in column (5) suggests that, even after controlling
for some observable ﬁrms' characteristics that should aﬀect the eﬀective rate, there are
still about 45% of the variation remains unexplained.
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Table 13: Sources of VAT Rate Dispersions
Since τ = pyqyτy−pmqmτm
pyqy−pmqm =
pyqy
pyqy−pmqm τy−
pmqm
pyqy−pmqm τm, we also want to know the sources
of dispersion in τy and τm. Similarly, I regress τy and τm on the same regressors as Table 13,
where τm is measured by (Input V AT )/(Intermediate goods purchase), τy is measured
by (Output V AT )/(sales turnover). The results are reported in Table 14 and Table 15.
The R2 in column (3) of table 14 is 0.53. This is in contrast to that in column (1) and
(2), and implies that about 53% of the variation in the eﬀective input VAT rate can be
explained by persistent county ﬁxed eﬀects, while the industry ﬁxed eﬀects have no impact
at all. This might be explained by problematic local VAT administration, particularly
due to ﬁrms using fake invoice for VAT reclaim, as suggested by Chen (2015a, b). By
comparison, the R2 in column (3) of table 15 is only 4%. And it is as big as 0.83 in column
(5), suggesting that the variation in the eﬀective output VAT rate is probably explained
by the statutory factors rather than by poor tax administration.
Table 14: Determinants of Input VAT Rate
From Table 15 we can deduce the following:
(1) The county ﬁxed eﬀect can account for approximately 70% of the dispersion in τy
across ﬁrms within an industry.
(2) A ﬁrm's ownership, size, export refund, and number of establishments account for
approximately 19% of τy.
Table 15: Determinants of Output VAT Rate
Tax Reform
An eyeball test from the summary statistics in Table 16 suggests the consumption-type
VAT reform in 2004 does lead to some change in VAT rate dispersion for the north-east
provinces, dropping from around 13% before reform to 11% of the post-reform level.
To see the precise eﬀect of tax reform on VAT rate, I employ the triple diﬀerence
approach (DDD) in identiﬁcation, by looking into the variation over periods (before and
after reform), across regions (three north-east provinces and others), and across industries
(industries under reform and others). I respectively regress the VAT rate of ﬁrm i in year
t (τit) and standard deviation of τit within an industry-region-period cell (Std(τit)) on
three dummies and their cross-terms as follows:
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Table 16: VAT Rate and Reform - Summary Statistics
τit(or Std(τit)) = α + βR
NE
i + γI
s
i + ηY
After
t + θR
NE
i Y
After
t
+δIsi Y
After
t + κR
NE
i I
s
i + ϕR
NE
i I
s
i Y
After
t + ξit (9.3)
where the parameter of interest is ϕ.
The regression results are reported in Table 17. The reform in six industries in three
north-east provinces reduces the eﬀective VAT rate by 0.76% (insigniﬁcantly) and its
standard deviation by 1.25% (signiﬁcantly at 5% level). In Section 8, I will check whether
the conclusion on TFP loss caused by VAT rate dispersion could be signiﬁcantly changed
by excluding reform region and reform industries from the sample.
Table 17: VAT Rate and Reform - Regression
Time-idiosyncratic Shock
One may explain part of the VAT rate dispersion as a result of taxpayer's time-
idiosyncratic behaviour, such as the delay of VAT payment this year until next year
because of cash constraints. Admittedly, this is not unusual in China's practice. If we
suppose that this is an important factor aﬀecting the tax rate variation, then the VAT
rate dispersion across ﬁrms would be greatly reduced by taking the time average, however
this is not supported empirically.
The VAT rate of each ﬁrm exhibits two salient features over time: (1) strong ﬁxed
eﬀect, and (2) persistency.
Fixed eﬀect is captured by τi, which is largely inherited from regional and ﬁrm's
characteristics. Regression results in Table 13 conﬁrm that about 60% of the ﬁxed eﬀect
come from a ﬁrm's characteristics in terms of jurisdiction, ownership type, and industry.
Persistency is represented by AR(1) parameter ρ. For ﬁrm i, serial correlation coeﬃ-
cient (conditional on i) is corri(τit, τit+1) = ρ. Table 18 reports the correlation coeﬃcient
from 2000 to 2007, showing ρ is around 0.6.
Table 18: Serial Correlation of VAT Rate over Years
Export Refund
One may argue that an export refund could be an important source of VAT rate
dispersion, given the fact that ﬁrms in China are increasingly more reliant on international
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markets. The data, however, does not agree with this argument. Table 19 demonstrates
that the export tax refund does not signiﬁcantly contribute to the VAT rate dispersion,
even though it reduces the average VAT rate. The data only provides the VAT rate ex-
post refund. I recover the VAT rate ex-ante refund by removing the contribution of tax
refund based on the regression of the VAT rate on export.
Table 19: VAT Rate Dispersions and Export Refund
Entry and Exit of Firm
Quite commonly, the entry and exit of a ﬁrm produces massive extensive margins in
addition to the existing ﬁrms. To check the impact of entry and exit on an average VAT
rate dispersion, I categorize the ﬁrms into two groups: (1) ﬁrms staying in the sample for
at least the period from 2000 to 2003 (or at least 2005 to 2007); (2) ﬁrms staying for less
than three years. Table 20 reports the diﬀerence in VAT rate and within-group standard
deviation between Group 1 and Group 2. Group 2 has a signiﬁcantly lower tax rate but
higher dispersion by 1.02%, which is not considered to be a striking diﬀerence.
Table 20: Eﬀect of Entry and Exit of ﬁrms on VAT Rate
Correlation with Size of Firm
Regression in Table 13 suggests that the eﬀective VAT rate would decrease by 1% if
the size of the ﬁrm (measured by valued-added) was increased by 2.5 times. This eﬀect
is signiﬁcant but not notably big. In this paper, I assume τit(ω) is independent of other
characteristics of a ﬁrm, such as TFP or distortion in labour and capital, that may aﬀect
ﬁrms' decisions regarding their size measured by value-added, labour input, and capital
input.
This assumption is based on three justiﬁcations, as follows. (1) Suppose the negative
regression coeﬃcient represents the causal eﬀect from ﬁrm size to VAT rate. In a dynamic
setting, a ﬁrm may take this eﬀect into account in its expanding plan. In the short run
or a static setting, however, the eﬀect would be hardly relevant to the ﬁrm's production
decision since even the rapid expansion of the ﬁrm in the short-term would only yield
a negligible drop in the VAT rate. (2) The regression coeﬃcient may likely reﬂect the
reverse causality from tax rate to ﬁrm size. In this case, the independence between the
VAT rate and the ﬁrm's size-determining characteristics could still lead to the negative
regression coeﬃcient under the rationale of the misallocation theory: a low-tax ﬁrm be-
comes larger by stealing business from high-tax rivals. (3) Very importantly, Table 21
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demonstrates that the correlation between VAT rate and ﬁrm size, measured in terms of
several variables, is quite small.
Table 21: Correlation between VAT Rate and Firm Sizea
Appendix 2. Measurement of Human Capital
Human capital measurement is vital to distortion issues, since the distorted wage is
measured in the following way:
wi = w(1 + τi) =
σ − 1
σ
(1− α)PiYi
hiLi
(9.4)
Obviously, bad measurement for hi will be attributed to distortion τi
It should be noted that the term human capital used in this paper is a misnomer for
Marginal Product Value of Labour. Hereby I call it human capital just for narrative
purpose. In this section, I study how to calculate the marginal product value of labour,
rather than the narrowly deﬁned human capital which is usually viewed as the returns
to schooling, training, and health. To do this, we need to know the market return to
workers with certain characteristics, which include the worker's characteristics, including
years of schooling, age, sex, and occupation; and the working ﬁrm's characteristics such
as ownership type, location, and industry. In labour economics, the wage regression is a
very complicated question. It may suﬀer serious problems such as ability bias, selection
bias, and many others. Moreover, quite a lot of factors that contribute to the wage
compensation, such as worker-ﬁrm matching quality, externality of human capital (peer
eﬀects), are unobservable to econometricians. In this paper, I leave aside these micro-
labour concerns, due to the lack of high quality data and because of the macroeconomic
nature of our original question.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use the ﬁrm's wage bill to proxy human capital and point
out that the wage bill in China's ﬁrm survey might be problematic.
In the following sections, I attempt to sort out this problem by proposing a method
for human capital measurement. I ﬁrst compare the results, at the industry-province-
ownership cell level rather than the ﬁrm level, by using the wage bill as proxy for human
capital (as per HK(2009)'s approach) and by using the hedonic wage as human capital.
We will observe that Hsieh and Klenow (2009) may understate the contribution of labour
distortion to TFP loss. After realising the pitfalls regarding using the wage bill as proxy
for human capital, I propose a method, based on the hedonic wage, to calculate the human
capital (marginal product value of labour) for each ﬁrm in the ﬁrm survey data.
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A.2.1 Why Do We Need the Hedonic Wage?
To examine the potential risk of using the wage bill as proxy for human capital, we
need to compare the results between the case that uses the wage bill as proxy for human
capital and the case that uses other measurements for marginal product value of labour.
There are two natural candidates for the measurements of marginal product value of
labour: (1) Mincerian type human capital; (2) The hedonic wage. The former is widely
used in the development accounting exercise (Klenow and Rodrigue Clare, 1997; Caselli,
2005).
From the theoretical model in section 5, we can observe that the accuracy of mea-
surement in labour distortion relies heavily on how correctly we are aware of the human
capital of labour in each industry. The measurement of human capital by wage bill and
by Mincerian human capital (return to schooling) are at two ends of the spectrum. Using
the wage bill as proxy for human capital implies that the observed wage dispersions across
ﬁrms are caused exclusively by variations in human capital rather than by distortions in
the labour market, leading to a smaller contribution of labour market distortions to TFP
loss. At the opposite end of the spectrum, measuring human capital simply with return
to years of schooling demonstrates that the marginal value of labour depends simply on
the years of schooling, and dispersions in wage net of the dispersions in return to years of
schooling would potentially cause market distortions that we cannot observe.
In this paper, I take the middle ﬁeld between the two extreme cases. It is well known
that, in real world, there are actually enormous wage dispersions across industries, even
after controlling for the education level and other characteristics of workers (Krueger
and Summers, 1986). The more reasonable way to measure the marginal product value
of labour is to estimate the wage return to each characteristic of the worker and the
corresponding job. This could be achieved by regression with the population census data.
The standard wage regression would simply allow us to estimate the return to years
of schooling and to each industry, as well as return to other characteristics of a worker.
Actually, this approach is just an application of hedonic pricing to the wage determination
in a competitive labour market. I presumably think, due to perfect market competition,
that the hedonic wage fully reﬂects the marginal productivity of labour, and that the
deviation of the actual wage from the hedonic wage is caused by various distortions in the
labour market (both outside and inside the ﬁrm).
The hedonic wage can be calculated following the two steps below.
First, in light of the wage regression in labour economics literature, we can run the
regression below in the ﬁrst place:
lnwp,05j = α +Xjβ + Zjγ + εi (9.5)
where lnwp,05j is a logarithm of wage of individual-j in 2005 population census, the su-
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Table 22: TFP Loss Caused by Distortions in K and H
perscript p of lnwp,05j implies that the data comes from the population census, and the
superscript 05 indicates the year 2005, Xj is a vector of individual-j's characteristics
including years of schooling, age, age2, sex, occupation, hukou7, migrant worker. Zj is a
vector of characteristics of ﬁrm where individual-j works, including ownership of the ﬁrm,
location, industry (two-digit). The ﬁtted value for lnwpj can be viewed as the hedonic
wage of individual-j.
Second, the hedonic wage in each province, each two-digit industry, and each ownership
type can be calculated by taking the conditional average over the individual's lnwj.
lnwp,05p,i,n = E(lnw
p,05
j |province p, industry i, ownership n) (9.6)
lnwp,05p,i,n is calculated in order to match the wage rates in the ﬁrm survey. I collapse the
data in STATA by industry, province, and ownership type to get an average hedonic wage
rate of each ﬁrm (cell) in 31 provinces, 39 industries, and 2 types of ownership. Since
the cell is not rectangular, we have only 1,860 ﬁrm-cells rather than 2,418 (31×39×2)
ﬁrms. On average, there are 115 (=214,318/1,860) individuals in each ﬁrm. So the
average hedonic wage of each ﬁrm is, though not perfect, still quite representative.
With two types of human capital measurements available, we can follow the seven steps
described at the beginning of Section 6 and calculate the TFP loss caused by distortions
in capital and labour. The results are reported in Table 22.
From Table 22, we can see that the distortion in human capital can lead to TFP loss
by 13%, greater than the role of physical capital (11%). Due to correlations between the
distortions, the three distortions combined reduce TFP by 19%, less than the sum of the
individual contributions (11% + 13% = 24% ).
Table 22 also reports the TFP loss by using HK(2009) method (the wage bill as proxy
for human capital). From Table 22 we can see HK(2009) under-estimate the TFP loss by
approximately 5%. This is mainly because HK(2009) use the wage bill as proxy for human
capital. The wage bill in the ﬁrm survey has larger dispersion than the true human capital
and would attribute the distortions to the variations in human capital. The contribution
of distortions to TFP loss, therefore, is understated.
From Table 22, we are convinced that it is better to use the hedonic wage as a mea-
7Hukou is a household registration record that oﬃcially identiﬁes a person as a resident of an area and
includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth. Originally, Hukou as a
family registering system was in existence in China as early as the Xia Dynasty (c. 2100 BC - 1600 BC).
The current Hukou system was promulgated in 1958 by the Chinese government in order to control the
movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals were broadly categorized as a rural or
urban residents. People who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not
qualify for grain rations, employer-provided housing, or health care. There were controls over education,
employment, marriage and so on. (Wikipedia, 2015)
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surement for human capital. But up to now we have simply obtained the hedonic wage
for each industry-province-ownership cell. In order to calculate the eﬀect of distortions
at the ﬁrm level, we still need the human capital measurement for each ﬁrm. This is the
task of the following section.
A.2.2 Hedonic Wage at the Firm Level
What is the hedonic wage rate for each ﬁrm in our sample? This is a diﬃcult question
since the ﬁrm survey only oﬀers the wage bill data and does not say anything about the
characteristics, such as years of schooling or age, of the employees. To cope with this
question, I combine the ﬁrm survey and the population census in year 2005 and make a
statistical inference in the following way.
Firstly, since from the last section we have also known the hedonic wage in each
province, each two-digit industry, and each ownership type lnwp,05p,i,n, to ﬁnd the relationship
between the hedonic wage and the wage rate reported in the ﬁrm survey, we can regress
lnwp,05p,i,n on lnw
f,05
p,i,n, where w
f,05
p,i,n is the average rate in province p, industry i, and ownership
n from the ﬁrm survey.
lnwp,05p,i,n = κ+ φ lnw
f,05
p,i,n + ξp,i (9.7)
based on which we can get the linear projection of the hedonic wage from the wage rate
reported in the ﬁrm survey.
Second, I assume that relationship between lnwp,05p,i,nand lnw
f,05
p,i,n remains stable across
ﬁrms and over the ﬁrm survey sample periods. Making this assumption, I can calculate
the hedonic wage wˆi,t for ﬁrm i in year t based on w
f
i,t, the corresponding reported wage
in ﬁrm survey, as follows:
wˆi,t = exp(κˆ+ φˆ lnw
f
i,t) (9.8)
where κˆ and φˆ are estimators of κ and φ respectively.
By running OLS on Eq. (9.7), I get κˆ = 8.22(0.032), φˆ = 0.235(0.0077). (The numbers
in the brackets are standard deviation) Also, R2 = 0.3344.
With this human capital measurement for each ﬁrm, now we can turn to the most
important work of this paper  calculating the TFP loss caused by tax distortions.
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Table 1: VAT Rate Dispersions within (four-digit) Industries
year Obs All Firms1 Within Industries2 Contribution of Within3
2000 66,200 11.8% 10.5% 97.0%
2001 74,511 11.9% 10.7% 89.4%
2002 83,285 11.0% 10.2% 92.2%
2003 97,993 10.9% 10.1% 90.8%
2004 131,306 11.5% 10.6% 90.6%
2005 129,398 11.3% 10.3% 94.9%
2006 147,696 11.1% 10.2% 95.3%
2007 168,876 10.5% 10.0% 95.1%
Notes:
1. This column lists the standard deviation of the VAT rate across all ﬁrms in
the Annual Survey of Industrial Production in each year.
2. This column lists the mean taken over 4-digit industries on the within-4-
digit-industry standard deviation of VAT rate.
3. This column lists the contribution of within-industry VAT rate variation to
the total variation. The results are obtained by variance decomposition through
random-eﬀect (GLS) regression. The regression model can be written as:
τsit = τt+us+ eit, where subscript s is index for 4-digit industry, i for ﬁrm, t for
year. τt is time ﬁxed-eﬀect, us is 4-digit industry random eﬀect, eit is ﬁrm-year
idiosyncratic disturbance. Suppose var(us) = su, var(eit) = se, and there is no
correlation between us and eit, then contribution of within-industry variance is
measured by ((se)/(su + se)). In STATA, we use the command: bysort year:
xtreg VAT-rate, i(4-digit-industry code). And ((se)/(su + se)) = 1− ρ, where ρ
can be obtained from running xtreg.
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Table 2: Sources of VAT Rate Dispersions
Dependent variable: VAT Rate τit (%)
(Pooled Regression: 2000-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 10.66 10.65 10.78 10.76 16.92
(0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.18)***
SOE1 NO NO NO NO 0.91
(0.10)***
Size of ﬁrm2 NO NO NO NO -0.71
(0.02)***
Ratio of Value-added3 NO NO NO NO -0.04
(0.01)***
Export-Sales Rato4 NO NO NO NO -0.38
(0.03)***
# of establishments5 NO NO NO NO 0.01
(0.01)
Year FE6 YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE7 NO YES NO NO NO
County FE8 NO NO YES NO NO
Indu-County FE9 NO NO NO YES YES
R2 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.44 0.55
Sample Size 899,265 899,265 899,265 899,265 374,649
Notes:
1. Dummy for SOE (State-owned-enterprise). SOE = 1 for State-owned-
enterprise.
2. Size of a ﬁrm is measured by logarithm of its value-added.
3. Ratio of value-added, measured by value-added/(value-added + intermediate
input), reﬂects the extent of a ﬁrm's vertical integration over its upstream
business and products.
4. Export-sales ratio, measured by exports divided by a ﬁrm's sales.
5. Number of establishments within a ﬁrm.
6. Control for year ﬁxed eﬀects.
7. Control for (4-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
8. Control for county ﬁxed eﬀects.
9. Control for (4-digit)industry-county ﬁxed eﬀects.
10. Ordinary least squares. *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
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Table 3: Determinants of Input VAT Rate
Dependent variable: (Input VAT)/(Intermediate Goods Purchase) (%)
(Pooled Regression: 2000-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 145.15 184.79 30.13 44.97 -828.32
(42.65)*** (47.71)*** (30.72) (42.16) (152.51)***
SOE1 NO NO NO NO 24.78
(85.09)
Size of ﬁrm2 NO NO NO NO 97.69
(16.61)***
Ratio of Value-added3 NO NO NO NO 5.6
(6.84)
Export-Sales Rato4 YES YES YES YES -8.77
NO YES NO NO (24.56)
# of establishments5 NO NO YES NO -6.73
NO NO NO YES (10.75)
Year FE6 YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE7 NO YES NO NO NO
County FE8 NO NO YES NO NO
Indu-County FE9 NO NO NO YES YES
R2 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.63 0.79
Observation 898,343 898,343 898,343 898,343 373,987
Notes:
1. Dummy for SOE (State-owned-enterprise). SOE = 1 for State-owned-
enterprise.
2. Size of a ﬁrm is measured by logarithm of its value-added.
3. Ratio of value-added, measured by value-added/(value-added + intermediate
input), reﬂects the extent of a ﬁrm's vertical integration over its upstream
business and products.
4. Export-sales ratio, measured by exports divided by a ﬁrm's sales.
5. Number of establishments within a ﬁrm.
6. Control for year ﬁxed eﬀects.
7. Control for (4-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
8. Control for county ﬁxed eﬀects.
9. Control for (4-digit)industry-county ﬁxed eﬀects.
10. Ordinary least squares. *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
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Table 4: Determinants of Output VAT Rate
Dependent variable: (Output VAT)/(Sales Turnover) (%)
(Pooled Regression: 2000-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 10.42 10.79 10.57 10.86 12.39
(0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.18)***
SOE1 NO NO NO NO 0.61
(0.10)***
Size of ﬁrm2 NO NO NO NO -0.41
(0.02)***
Ratio of Value-added3 NO NO NO NO 5.39
(0.01)***
Export-Sales Rato4 NO NO NO NO -0.48
(0.03)***
# of establishments5 NO NO NO NO 0.00
(0.01)
Year FE6 YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE7 NO YES NO NO NO
County FE8 NO NO YES NO NO
Indu-County FE9 NO NO NO YES YES
R2 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.83
Observation 899,250 899,250 899,250 899,250 374,649
Notes:
1. Dummy for SOE (State-owned-enterprise). SOE = 1 for State-owned-
enterprise.
2. Size of a ﬁrm is measured by logarithm of its value-added.
3. Ratio of value-added, measured by value-added/(value-added + intermediate
input), reﬂects the extent of a ﬁrm's vertical integration over its upstream
business and products.
4. Export-sales ratio, measured by exports divided by a ﬁrm's sales.
5. Number of establishments within a ﬁrm.
6. Control for year ﬁxed eﬀects.
7. Control for (4-digit)industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
8. Control for county ﬁxed eﬀects.
9. Control for (4-digit)industry-county ﬁxed eﬀects.
10. Ordinary least squares. *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
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Table 5: VAT Rate and Reform - Summary Statistics
All Provinces Northeast Provinces1,2 Other Provinces3
year mean (%) S.D. (%) mean (%) S.D. (%) mean (%) S.D. (%)
2000 10.7 11.8 12.0 14.0 10.6 11.6
2000 11.0 11.9 11.0 12.6 11.0 11.9
2002 10.5 11.0 11.1 12.5 10.5 10.9
2003 10.5 10.9 10.7 13.8 10.4 10.7
2004 10.3 11.5 10.8 14.4 10.3 11.2
2005 10.2 11.3 9.0 14.1 10.3 11.1
2006 10.0 11.1 8.0 11.8 10.2 11.0
2007 10.0 10.5 8.0 10.1 10.1 10.5
Notes:
1. Northeast provinces include Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang.
2. Consumption-type VAT was only applicable in six selected industries, includ-
ing agricultural product processing, equipment manufacturing, petrochemical,
metallurgy, ship building, automobile manufacturing, military products and
high-tech products.
3. In July of 2007, the reform was extended to another twenty-six cities in
six central-region provinces. In this column these cities are not dropped from
"Other Provinces" due to very short sample period (only 6 months).
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Table 6: VAT Rate (%) and Reform - Regression 1
τit Std(τit)
(1) (2)
RNEi I
s
i Y
After
t -0.76 -1.25
(0.60) (0.58)**
RNEi Y
After
t -2.21 -0.32
(0.41)*** (0.19)*
Isi Y
After
t 0.49 0.29
(0.29)* (0.19)
RNEi I
s
i -0.05 1.85
(1.21) (0.82)**
RNE,2i 0.62 0.61
(0.46) (0.23)***
Is,3i -1.36 0.44
(0.54)** (0.19)**
Y After,4t -0.39 -0.81
(0.14)*** (0.07)***
Constant 10.85 7.3
(0.20)*** (0.08)***
R2 0.00 0.01
Observation 899,265 69,148
Notes:
1. The regression is based on triple diﬀerence (Equation (4.3)) - between regions,
between industries, over time periods - driven by the consumption-type VAT re-
form in Northeast provinces in 2004. τit is the eﬀective VAT rate at ﬁrm level.
Std(τit) is the standard-deviation of τit within (2-digit)industry-province cells.
2. Regional dummy RNEi for Northeast provinces, including Jilin, Liaoning, and
Heilongjiang.
3. Industrial dummy Isi for six industries under consumption-type VAT reform,
including agricultural product processing, equipment manufacturing, petrochem-
ical, metallurgy, ship building, automobile manufacturing, military products and
high-tech products.
4. Time dummy Y Aftert for years post reform (after January of 2005). In July of
2007, the reform was extended to another twenty-six cities in six central-region
provinces, which are not taken into account due to very short sample period
(only 6 months).
5. Ordinary least squares. *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
(2-digit)industry-province level (1,177 groups).
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Table 7: VAT Rate Dispersions and Export Refund
Ex-post Refund1 Ex-ante Refund2
year mean (%) S.D. (%) mean (%) S.D. (%)
2000 10.7 11.8 10.8 11.8
2001 11.0 11.9 11.1 12.0
2002 10.5 11.0 10.7 11.0
2003 10.5 10.9 10.6 10.9
2004 10.3 11.5 10.4 11.4
2005 10.2 11.3 10.3 11.3
2006 10.0 11.1 10.2 11.1
2007 10.0 10.5 10.1 10.5
Notes:
1. This column lists the mean and standard deviation of the eﬀective VAT rates
in the Annual Survey of Industrial Production.
2. This column lists the mean and standard deviation of the counter-factual VAT
rates with export refund not being conducted. To get the counter-factual VAT
rates, I run the following regression: V AT_rate = α+β∗(Export/V A)+γ∗X+,
where Export is ﬁrm's export value, V A is ﬁrm's value-added, and X are a
vector of ﬁrm's characteristics, including county, 4-digit industry, and own-
ership type. The counter-factual VAT rate is equal to "Eﬀective VAT rate
−βˆ ∗ (Export/V A)" where βˆ is estimator for β.
Table 8: Eﬀect of Entry and Exit of ﬁrms on VAT Rate
Dependent Variable1
Ave_τG2st − Ave_τG1st (%)2 Std_τG2st − Std_τG1st (%)3
-0.13∗4 1.02∗∗∗4
(-1.68) (9.88)
Notes:
1. A dependent variable is regressed on a constant, which indicates the gap
between the Group 1 and the Group 2.
2. Ave_τGist is the average of VAT rate over ﬁrms of group i in industry s in
year t.
3. Std_τGist is the standard deviation of VAT rate over ﬁrms of group i in
industry s in year t.
4. Estimated constant. *** (**, *) indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
99%(95%, 90%) conﬁdence level.
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Table 9: Serial Correlation of VAT Rate over Years
Sample 11 Sample 22
2001-2002 2002-2003 2005-2006 2006-2007
Firm Level 0.53 0.62 0.60 0.60
County Level 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.83
City Level 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.92
Province Level 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97
4-digit Industry Level 0.77 0.49 0.90 0.75
2-digit Industry 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.99
Notes:
1. Because of the change in ﬁrm ID, we can not link the ﬁrms before 2004 to
ﬁrms thereafter. Year 2004 is not included due to inconsistence of ﬁrm ID.
Sample 1 only includes the ﬁrms staying in the survey for 2001, 2002, and 2003
period. The sample size is 50,236. Year 2000 is not included so that Sample 1
and 2 are both comparably three years.
2. Sample 2 only includes the ﬁrms staying in the ﬁrm survey for 2005, 2006,
2007 period. The sample size is 66,345.
Table 10: Correlation between VAT Rate and Firm Size 1
Value-added Capital Labor ln(Value_added) ln(Capital) ln(Labor)
0.0079 0.0221 0.0184 -0.0225 0.0962 0.029
Notes:
1. Size of a ﬁrm is measured respectively by its value-added, capital stock,
number of employee, and their logarithm, including year 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2005, 2006, 2007.
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Table 11: Summary StatisticsFirm Survey (2000 - 2007) 1
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min p12 p502 p992 Max
Capital 108031.6 1450939 1 982 14285 1523384 5.64E+08
Labour 216.1752 949.4027 1 10 82 2183 158288
Value-added 38123.7 462637 4 708 8199 443205 1.63E+08
Wage Bill 14485.27 145675.7 3.6 212.4 3247.2 171399.6 3.02E+07
VAT Rate3 0.1029848 0.111686 -4.364841 0 0.081578 0.4647059 10.96596
Notes:
1. Sample size = 899,265. There are 66,222 ﬁrms in year 2000, 74,511 in year
2001, 83,285 in year 2002, 97,993 in year 2003, 131,306 in year 2004, 129,398 in
year 2005, 147,696 in year 2006, 168,876 in year 2007.
2. p1, p50, p99 respectively are 1-th, 50-th(median), 99-th percentile.
3. The (Eﬀective) VAT Rates are calculated by dividing the payable value-added
tax by the value-added in each ﬁrm.
Table 12: Summary Statistics - Population Census (2005)
Population Census1 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Wage 11830.86 12213.15 12 1199988
Education 9.471699 2.746082 0 19
Age 34.39995 10.33802 18 70
Notes:
1. The data is from 1% sampling Population Census Conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China in Year 2005. Sample size =208,153.
Table 13: Dispersions in VAT and TFP/GDP Loss
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1):TFP Loss (%)1 58.7 54.5 70.3 72.8 62.6 67.3 67.1 78.5
(2):TFP Loss Net of VAT (%)2 56.7 52.6 68.2 71.0 59.9 65.4 65.0 75.1
(3):Contribution of VAT (%)3 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.5 7.4 5.7 6.6 15.9
(4):VAT Rate (%)4 10.7 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2 10 10.0
Notes:
1. This row is the TFP loss caused by all distortions based on HK(2009), with
the elasticity of substitution σ equal to 3.
2. This row is the TFP loss caused by all the distortions net of VAT.
3. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss, which is
equal to [ (1- TFP Loss Net of VAT)/(1-TFP Loss) -1 ] ×100%.
4. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector.
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Table 14: Correlation between Distortions and Productivity
ln(1− τV ATsi ) ln(1 + τ ′ksi) ln(1 + τ ′Hsi) TFPRKH,1si lnAsi
ln(1− τV ATsi ) 1.0000
ln(1 + τ ′ksi) -0.0761 1.0000
ln(1 + τ ′Hsi) 0.1943 0.1503 1.0000
TFPRKHsi
,1 -0.0009 0.9141 0.4935 1.0000
lnAsi -0.0255 0.3711 0.6251 0.5079 1.0000
Std. Dev. 2 0.1451 1.6060 1.0398 1.1036 1.3000
Notes:
1. TFPRKHsi = αsln(1− τ ′ksi) + (1− αs)ln(1− τ ′Hsi).
2. Standard deviation of variables.
Table 15: TFP Loss with VAT Tax Refund Excluded 1
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1):Contribution of VAT (%)2 3.0 4.2 9.5 6.6 7.3 6.0 7.8 16.0
(2):Benchmark contribution (%)3 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.5 7.4 5.7 6.6 15.9
(3):VAT Rate net of Refund (%)4 10.8 11.0 10.7 10.6 10.3 10.3 10.2 10.1
(4):Benchmark VAT Rate (%)5 10.7 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2 10.0 10.0
Notes:
1. The VAT rate used in this table is the counter-factual VAT rate with export
tax refund being excluded.
2. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss.
3. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss in Table 13
(benchmark).
4. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector.
5. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector in Table 13 (benchmark).
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Table 16: Time Average of VAT Rate (%, 2000-2003)
Year 20005 20015 20025 20035 Year Average6
(1):Sample 11 1.8 1.9 5.5 1.5 1.5
(1):Sample 22 2.1 2.0 7.4 6.3 2.2
(3):Sample 33 5.6 3.5 7.9 6.8 3.4
(4):Sample 44 5.0 4.3 7.3 6.5 4.0
Notes:
1. Sample 1 only includes ﬁrms staying over year 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.
2. Sample 2 includes ﬁrms staying for at least three years in year 2000, 2001,
2002, and 2003.
3. Sample 3 includes ﬁrms staying for at least two years in year 2000, 2001,
2002, and 2003.
4. Sample 4 is the full sample.
5. The results in this column are calculated with corresponding year's eﬀective
VAT rate for ﬁrms in the corresponding sample.
6. The results in this column are calculated with the year-average eﬀective VAT
rate for ﬁrms in the corresponding sample. Firms staying in the sample for three
years take the 3-year average of VAT rate. And ﬁrms staying for two years take
2-year average. Firms staying for only one year takes its eﬀective VAT rate in
that year.
Table 17: Time Average of VAT Rate (%, 2005-2007)
Year 20054 20064 20074 Year Average5
(1):Sample 51 3.7 4.0 12.6 4.0
(2):Sample 62 3.9 5.3 13.3 4.2
(3):Sample 73 5.7 6.6 15.9 9.2
Notes:
1. Sample 5 only includes ﬁrms staying over year 2005, 2006, and 2007.
2. Sample 6 includes ﬁrms staying for at least two years in year 2005, 2006, and
2007.
3. Sample 7 is the full sample.
4. The results in this column are calculated with corresponding year's eﬀective
VAT rate for ﬁrms in the corresponding sample.
5. The results in this column are calculated with the year-average eﬀective VAT
rate for ﬁrms in the corresponding sample. Firms staying in the sample for three
years take the 3-year average of VAT rate. And ﬁrms staying for two years take
2-year average. Firms staying for only one year takes its eﬀective VAT rate in
that year.
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Table 18: Data Quality 1
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1):Contribution of VAT (%)2 6.8 4.3 3.5 2.7 7.0 4.6 4.5 21.3
(2):Benchmark contribution (%)3 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.5 7.4 5.7 6.6 15.9
(3): VAT Rate (%)4 10.8 11.0 10.5 10.2 9.9 10.2 10.2 10.0
(4):Benchmark VAT Rate (%)5 10.7 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2 10.0 10.0
Notes:
1. The sample here only includes the ﬁrms in those industries where VAT Tax
Burden Ratio lie within the warning bounds issued in 2007 by the National
Bureau of Taxation.
2. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss.
3. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss in Table 13
(benchmark).
4. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector.
5. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector in Table 13 (benchmark).
Table 19: TFP Loss with Outliers Excluded 1
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1):Contribution of VAT (%)2 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.6 7.4 5.8 4.4 6.5
(2):Benchmark contribution (%)3 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.5 7.4 5.7 6.6 15.9
(3):VAT Rate (Average, %)4 10.6 10.9 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.1 10.0 9.9
(4):VAT Rate (Min, %)5 -16.8 -23 -25.4 -30 -44.5 -30.7 -31 -28.6
(5):VAT Rate (Max, %)6 100 107.2 100 100 105.8 100.1 98.2 98.9
(6):Benchmark VAT Rate (%)7 10.7 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2 10.0 10.0
Notes:
1. The sample here excludes the ﬁrms with the eﬀective VAT rates lower than
1-th percentile or greater than 99-th percentile. 2. This row is the contribution
of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss.
3. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss in Table 13
(benchmark).
4. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector.
5. This row is the ﬁrms' minimum eﬀective VAT rate in each year.
6. This row is the ﬁrms' maximum eﬀective VAT rate in each year.
7. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector in Table 13 (benchmark).
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Table 20: TFP Loss with σ = 5 1
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1):Contribution of VAT (%)2 14.8 19.0 26.7 23.5 40.0 34.9 36.7 58.3
(2):Benchmark contribution (%)3 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.5 7.4 5.7 6.6 15.9
Notes:
1. The results in this table are based on calculation with the elasticity of
substitution σ equal to 5.
2. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss.
3. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss in Table 13
(benchmark).
Table 21: TFP Loss with VAT Reform Provinces and Industries Excluded 1
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1):Contribution of VAT (%)2 5.8 4.8 7.2 8.5 6.7 5.7 5.2 8.8
(2):Benchmark contribution (%)3 5.0 4.3 7.4 6.5 7.4 5.7 6.6 15.9
(3):VAT Rate (%)4 11.0 11.3 10.8 10.8 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4
(4):Benchmark VAT Rate (%)5 10.7 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2 10.0 10.0
Notes:
1. The sample here excludes all ﬁrms in eight industries AND three north-east
provinces under 2004 VAT reform.
2. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss.
3. This row is the contribution of VAT dispersion to the TFP loss in Table 13
(benchmark).
4. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector.
5. This row is the total payable VAT divided by the total value added in the
whole manufacturing sector in Table 13 (benchmark).
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Table 22: TFP Loss Caused by Distortions in K and H 1
Distortions K H (K, H)
TFP Loss (%, Our method2) 11 13 19
TFP Loss (%, HK(09) method3) 11 9 14
Notes:
1. To make comparison, the TFP loss is calculated based on the industry-
province-ownership ﬁrm-cell, rather than the real ﬁrms in ﬁrm survey. There
are thirty-nine 2-digit industries, thirty-one provinces, and two types of ﬁrm
ownership (SOE, and Non-SOE) and 1,860 ﬁrm-cell in our sample.
2. Our method uses hedonic wage as the proxy for human capital for each
ﬁrm-cell.
3. HK(09) method uses wage bill as the proxy for human capital for each
ﬁrm-cell (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
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